THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATIVE, USA
An Online Journal of Political Commentary & Analysis
Volume XIII, Issue # 194, August 5, 2011
Dr. Almon Leroy Way, Jr., Editor
Government Committed to & Acting in Accord with Conservative Principles
Ensures a Nation's Strength, Progress, & Prosperity
MIDDLE EASTERN UPHEAVALS: MIXED RESPONSE IN IRAN
By Ali Alfoneh
THE REVOLUTIONS SWEEPING ACROSS THE ARAB WORLD: WILL THESE REVOLUTIONS PROVE TO BE THE LONG
AWAITED "THIRD WAVE OF DEMOCRATIZATION," OR WILL THEY MERELY SUBSTITUTE ISLAMIST TOTALITARIANISM FOR
THE EXISTING SECULAR, AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES? VARYING PERCEPTIONS IN IRAN OF THE "WINDS OF CHANGE"
IN ARAB STATES -- VIEW OF THE ISLAMIST REGIME IN TEHRAN: "PEOPLE POWER" GOOD IN STATES ALLIED WITH
THE U.S.A., BUT NOT IN COUNTRIES ALLIED WITH THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN -- VIEW OF THE IRANIAN POLITICAL
OPPOSITION: MORAL SUPPORT FOR ALL PRO-DEMOCRACY MOVEMENTS -- THE REGIME'S DETERMINATION TO
SUPPRESS INTERNAL POLITICAL DISSENT, TO PURSUE ITS NUCLEAR AMBITIONS, & TO SHAPE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
ACCORDING TO ITS WORLDVIEW -- POSSIBILITY THAT INCREASED REPRESSION WILL RESULT IN THE SURFACING OF MORE
RADICAL & REVOLUTIONARY OPPOSITION MOVEMENTS INSIDE IRAN
FULL STORY:
It is too early to tell whether the revolutions sweeping across the Arab world will prove the long awaited "third wave of
democratization" or will merely substitute Islamist totalitarianism for the existing secular, authoritarian regimes. It is clear,
however, that no regional regime is immune to their impact, not even the self-proclaimed vanguard of permanent world
revolutions, the Islamist regime in Tehran.
Perceptions in Iran of the nature of the "Arab Spring" vary. While describing it as an "Islamic awakening" inspired by
Iran's 1979 revolution, the clerics have not failed to indicate their determination to suppress future dissent and to rebuff
any foreign intervention. By contrast, despite tracing the Arab revolts to Iran's June 12, 2009, presidential elections, the
opposition has, thus far, refrained from publicly challenging the regime, though more radical forms of resistance may be
brewing beneath the surface. Thus, the winds of change have apparently radicalized both rival sides.
PEOPLE POWER IS GOOD FOR SOME ARABS . . .
Both regime and opposition responses to the Arab upheavals have varied from case to case, but there has been a clear
consistency in the opposition's moral support for all pro-democracy movements, whereas the regime has endorsed
"people power" only in countries allied with the United States, but not in those aligned with Tehran, such as Syria.
There was also a great deal of caution in both the regime's and the opposition leadership's responses during the first
phase of the uprisings, though ordinary opposition members found quick inspiration for their cause as the events
unfolded in the region.
Public protests against Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali broke out on December 17, 2010, and, by January 15, 2011, the Saudi
government announced that it was hosting the former Tunisian President and his family for an unspecified period of
time. [1] The first official Iranian coverage of the Tunisian events appeared on the Islamic Republic's Arabic language
al-Alam TV on December 28, 2010, eleven days after the protests had begun. [2] The first newspaper editorial on
Tunisia appeared in the January 4, 2010, edition of Iran, more than three weeks after the beginning of the
Tunisian uprising. [3] On January 16, the day after Ben Ali's arrival in the Saudi capital, Ali Larijani, Speaker of
Parliament, made the first official comment on the situation, accusing the United States and the West more generally of
being "behind repression and pressures imposed on the people of Tunisia under the rule of its former President." [4]
Surprisingly, the otherwise opinionated President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad made no comment on Tunisia before January
19, [5] while Supreme Leader Ali Khamene'i made his position known on February 4. Addressing the people of Tunisia
and Egypt in Arabic, after delivering the Friday prayer sermon in Tehran, Khamene'i portrayed himself as "your brother
in religion," described President Husni Mubarak as a "traitor dictator," and said that the events in Tunisia and Egypt
were "natural extensions of Iran's Islamic revolution in 1979." [6]
The Islamic Republic's official responses to the Egyptian revolution were swifter than in the Tunisian case. The first
protests in Egypt started on January 25, 2011, and on February 11 — the anniversary of Iran's 1979 revolution —
Mubarak resigned his post and handed over power to the Supreme Military Council. [7] Again, Larijani was the first
official to refer to the situation, toward the end of January [8] — two weeks after the protests had begun, but well
before Mubarak stepped down. Khamene'i's statement of February 4, which also preceded Mubarak's resignation, [9]
shows that the Islamic Republic had an easier time taking a position on Egypt. A few hours before Mubarak
announced his resignation, Ahmadinejad, addressing the crowds on the occasion of the anniversary of the 1979
revolution, claimed ownership of the revolutionary movements in the entire region. [10]
Yet, from Tehran's point of view, people power is good for some Arabs, but not all Arabs. Though there was little love
lost between the Iranian Islamist regime and those in power in Libya and Yemen, Ramin Mehmanparast, the Foreign
Ministry spokesman, condemned NATO's airstrikes, which aimed at defending the very same people to whom Tehran
had extended its rhetorical support, catching the regime in a bit of a contradiction. [11] As for Damascus, it was
completely exempted from the regime's rhetorical support for people power as there were no commentaries and very
little press coverage of the Syrian protests, which began on January 26. [12] Instead of supporting the protesters,
Larijani met Syrian Prime Minister Muhammad Naji Otri on March 10 to discuss the regional developments. [13]
Though Bahrain, with its majority Shiite population, had long been claimed by Tehran as its own, official Iranian
responses to the crisis in the Emirate were generally more cautious than the regime's reactions to the Egyptian and
Libyan crises, with Washington — rather than Riyadh, which had sent troops to suppress the protests — being
accused of a "violent crackdown of the popular uprisings."
Official Iranian responses to the crisis in Bahrain came fast, but were generally more cautious than reactions to the
Egyptian and Libyan crises, though some Iranian authorities have claimed the tiny Persian Gulf Emirate, with its
majority Shiite population, as Iranian territory. Kayhan editor Hossein Shariatmadari, Khamenei's unofficial
spokesman, has, on several occasions, described Ahmadinejad's trip to Bahrain as "a provincial trip." [14] The
Bahraini opposition declared February 14 an anti-government "Day of Rage," and, by March 16, the Bahraini security
forces, supported by Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) units, had succeeded in suppressing the opposition. [15]
The first Iranian editorial on Bahrain appeared in the February 16 issue of Quds, which stressed the need for
reforms in the Emirate. [16] Stepping up the criticism, on February 17, an unidentified source at the Iranian Foreign
Ministry described, in an interview on the English language Press TV, the developments in Bahrain as an
"internal affair," but called on Manama to "exercise restraint." [17] On February 19, Amir Abdollahian, the Foreign
Ministry's Director-General for the Persian Gulf and Middle East, stressed that "the demands of Bahraini people can
be achieved by democratic and peaceful means; it is regretful to see that the police have resorted to violence in that
country." [18] Again, Larijani took the official lead by accusing Washington of complicity in a "violent crackdown of
popular uprisings" in Bahrain while addressing the Parliament on February 20, 2011. [19] He was followed three days
later by 191 Iranian parliamentarians who issued a statement condemning the "merciless massacre of Muslim people
in Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, and Morocco." [20] On February 27, 2011, Hassan Firouzabadi, Chief of the General Staff,
attacked the United States as well, calling it "the flag-bearer of neo-racism."[21] Khamene'i, however, did not
comment on Bahrain before his March 21 New Year address. [22]
. . . BUT BAD FOR IRANIANS
The Islamic Republic may, at least rhetorically, support the idea of people power for the Tunisians, Egyptians, the
Bahrainis and the Yemenis, but Iranians apparently belong to the same category as the Syrians for whom people
power is bad.
On February 6, Mehdi Karrubi and Mir-Hossein Mousavi, in a joint letter, asked the Interior Ministry for a permit to
demonstrate "in solidarity with popular movements of the region, especially the liberation seeking revolts of the people
of Tunisia and Egypt." [23] Not surprisingly, the permit was denied, and the two opposition leaders, together with
former President Mohammed Khatami, were put under house arrest. [24] As the state-controlled media pounded the
opposition movement as "seditionists," Basij militia chief Mohammed-Reza Naghdi warned that the "Western spy
agencies are trying to find a mentally degenerate person [to] self-immolate in Tehran so they can liken this with the
beginning of the events in Tunisia and Egypt." [25]
Ignoring the demonstration ban, the opposition rallied on February 14 and March 1 with slogans connecting the fate of
the Tunisian and Egyptian dictators with Supreme Leader Khamene'i: "Mubarak, Ben Ali, it is now the turn of Seyyed
Ali [Khamene'i]," [26] "Khamene'i, Mubarak, congratulations with your marriage!" [27] and "Those in Iran with
motorcycles or those in Cairo with camels, death to the dictator." [28]
Although limited to the major population centers and incapable of mobilizing the millions who had joined the protest
movement in the immediate aftermath of the 2009 elections, the anti-regime demonstrations unmasked the duplicity and
double standards of the Islamist regime: People power is good for some Arabs, but not for Iranians.
LESSONS LEARNED
The regime has concluded that it must decisively suppress dissent to prevent it from snowballing into a major crisis, yet
seems neither willing nor capable of liberalizing the political system, once the crisis is over. Khamene'i's March 21 speech
in Mashhad derided the opposition forces in Iran as "[Western] agents, weak, ghoulish individuals who are prisoners of
their egos." [29] Such words leave little room for mutual accommodation.
The regime's analysis of the Libyan experience has also strengthened its resolve to pursue its nuclear goals, as well as
its intent to shape regional developments according to its worldview. In his address, Khamene'i specifically referred to
Libya's cooperation with the West, which he believed had led to Mu'ammar al-Qaddafi's problems: "In recent years, he
did a great service to the West, which realized that a very simple threat drove this gentleman to dismantle his nuclear
capabilities." Khamene'i continued:
"Take a look at the position of our nation and the position
[the Libyan regime] finds itself in. Our nation witnessed a
U.S.-led offensive against Iran's nuclear quest, making
military threats, pledging an attack, and what not. The
Iranian authorities not only did not retreat when
confronted by the enemy, but every year they increased
their nuclear capabilities. Over there [in Libya], the people
saw that the regime, in the face of Western threats, or
Western incentives as they call it, gave the orders to
dismantle its nuclear capabilities. Like putting a sour
lollypop or chocolate into a child's mouth, they gave them
incentives, and they lost everything forever! Well, the
nation sees this, its heart bleeds, and its pride is wounded.
This can be seen in all the countries in which the people
revolted." [30]
Such statements do not provide much hope for a peaceful solution to curbing the Islamic Republic's nuclear ambitions.
Khamene'i also indirectly warned Washington's allies of U.S. perfidy:
"These countries [the United States and its allies] have
always supported the dictators. They supported Husni
Mubarak to the last possible moment, but upon realizing
that he could no longer be saved, threw him away! Let
this be a lesson to the heads of state dependent on the
United States. When they are no longer useful, it will
throw them away, just like a piece of old cloth, and will
ignore them!" [31]
The opposition, however, may also have learned at least one lesson: the need for a division of labor, or even a split,
between, on the one hand, such reformists as Mousavi, Karrubi and Khatami, who, against all wisdom, continue to call
for reforming the system, and, on the other hand, a clandestine radical opposition, which no longer believes the regime is
capable of self-reform and, therefore, might pursue revolutionary goals.
CONCLUSION
The winds of change sweeping across the Middle East and North Africa have indeed reached the shores of Iran, though at
no point did the 2011 anti-government demonstrations threaten the Iranian regime's survival. Better geared to suppressing
internal dissent than other regional dictatorships, the clerics probably have better prospects of weathering the current
crisis, but, as long as they are unwilling to liberalize or incapable of liberalizing the political system, increased repression
may result in the surfacing of more radical opposition movements inside Iran.
NOTES:
[1] Al-Jazeera TV (Doha), Jan. 23, 2011.
[2] BBC Monitoring (London), Dec. 28, 2010.
[3] Ibid., Jan. 4, 2011.
[4] Ibid., Jan. 16, 2011.
[5] Ibid., Jan. 19, 2011.
[6] Ibid., Feb. 4, 2011.
[7] Al-Jazeera TV, Feb. 14, 2011.
[8] The New York Times, Jan. 29, 2011.
[9] The Christian Science Monitor (Boston), Feb. 4, 2011.
[10] Ibid., Feb. 11, 2011.
[11] Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting World Service (Tehran), Mar. 21, 2011.
[12] Reuters, Mar. 30, 2011.
[13] BBC Monitoring, Mar. 10, 2011.
[14] Asr-e Iran (Tehran), Nov. 20, 2008.
[15] Reuters, Mar. 16, 2011.
[16] BBC Monitoring, Feb. 16, 2011.
[17] Ibid., Feb. 18, 2011.
[18] Ibid., Feb. 19, 2011.
[19] Ibid., Feb. 20, 2011.
[20] Ibid., Feb. 23, 2011.
[21] Ibid., Feb. 27, 2011.
[22] "Payam-e Nowrouzi-ye 1390," Office of the Supreme Leader Sayyid Ali Khamene'i (Tehran) Mar. 21, 2011.
[23] Rah-e Sabz (Tehran), Feb. 6, 2011.
[24] Bloomberg News (New York), Feb. 28, 2011.
[25] Asr-e Iran, Feb. 13, 2011.
[26] "Mubarak, Ben Ali. Now It's Time for Seyyed Ali," YouTube, Mar. 1, 2011.
[27] Iran Press Service (London), Feb. 14, 2011.
[28] Ibid., Feb. 14, 2011.
[29] "Bayanat Dar Haram-e Mottahar-e Razavi Dar Aghaaz-e Sal," The Office of the Supreme Leader Sayyid Ali Khamene'i, Mar. 21, 2011.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Ibid.
LINKS TO RELATED TOPICS:
The Middle East & the Problem of Iran
Middle East -- Arabs, Arab States,
& Their Middle Eastern Neighbors
American Foreign Policy -- The Middle East
Islamism & Jihadism -- The Threat of Radical Islam
Page Three
Page Two
Page One
International Politics & World Disorder:
War, Peace, & Geopolitics in the Real World:
Foreign Affairs & U.S. National Security
Page Two
Page One
Islamist Terrorist Attacks on the U.S.A.
Osama bin Laden & the Islamist Declaration of War
Against the U.S.A. & Western Civilization
Islamist International Terrorism &
U.S. Intelligence Agencies
U.S. National Security Strategy
Ali Alfoneh is Resident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. Previously, he was a Research
Fellow for the Copenhagen Middle East Research Program (2004-2006), a Lecturer in Political Economy at the University of
Southern Denmark (2003-2004), an Independent Researcher for the Institute for Political and International Studies in Tehran
(2003), a Research Assistant in the Office of the President of the European Affairs Committee of the Danish Parliament
(2002-2003), and an elected member of the City Council of Herlev, Denmark (1994-1999). Also, he has been a Research
Fellow at the Institute for Strategy, part of the Royal Danish Defence College.
Alfoneh's research areas include civil-military relations in Iran, with a special focus on the role of the Islamic Revolutionary
Guards Corps in the Islamic Republic of Iran. His articles have appeared in different journals, magazines and newspapers,
including the Middle East Quarterly, the New York Times, National Review, and Ahram Online.
Alfoneh holds Bachelor of Arts and Master of Arts degrees from the University of Copenhagen, as well as another
B.A. degree from Roskilde University, Trekroner, Denmark. Currently, he is a candidate for the Ph.D. degree in the
Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen.
The foregoing article by Ali Alfoneh was originally published in the Middle East Quarterly, Summer, 2011, and
can be found on the Internet website maintained by the Middle East Forum, a foreign policy think tank which seeks to
define and promote American interests in the Middle East, defining U.S. interests to include fighting radical Islam,
working for Palestinian Arab acceptance of the State of Israel, improving the management of U.S. efforts to promote
constitutional democracy in the Middle East, reducing America's energy dependence on the Middle East, more robustly
asserting U.S. interests vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia, and countering the Iranian threat.
(URL: http://www.meforum.org/3006/mixed-response -in-iran)
Republished with Permission of the Middle East Forum
Reprinted from the Middle East Forum News
mefnews@meforum.org (MEF NEWS)
August 5, 2011
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