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MIDDLE EASTERN UPHEAVALS: MIXED RESPONSE IN IRAN
By Ali Alfoneh

THE REVOLUTIONS SWEEPING ACROSS THE ARAB WORLD:  WILL THESE REVOLUTIONS PROVE TO BE THE LONG AWAITED "THIRD WAVE OF DEMOCRATIZATION," OR WILL THEY MERELY SUBSTITUTE ISLAMIST TOTALITARIANISM FOR THE EXISTING SECULAR, AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES?  VARYING PERCEPTIONS IN IRAN OF THE "WINDS OF CHANGE" IN ARAB STATES -- VIEW OF THE ISLAMIST REGIME IN TEHRAN:  "PEOPLE POWER" GOOD IN STATES ALLIED WITH THE U.S.A., BUT NOT IN COUNTRIES ALLIED WITH THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN -- VIEW OF THE IRANIAN POLITICAL OPPOSITION:  MORAL SUPPORT FOR ALL PRO-DEMOCRACY MOVEMENTS -- THE REGIME'S DETERMINATION TO SUPPRESS INTERNAL POLITICAL DISSENT, TO PURSUE ITS NUCLEAR AMBITIONS, & TO SHAPE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS ACCORDING TO ITS WORLDVIEW -- POSSIBILITY THAT INCREASED REPRESSION WILL RESULT IN THE SURFACING OF MORE RADICAL & REVOLUTIONARY OPPOSITION MOVEMENTS INSIDE IRAN
FULL STORY:   It is too early to tell whether the revolutions sweeping across the Arab world will prove the long awaited "third wave of democratization" or will merely substitute Islamist totalitarianism for the existing secular, authoritarian regimes. It is clear, however, that no regional regime is immune to their impact, not even the self-proclaimed vanguard of permanent world revolutions, the Islamist regime in Tehran.

Perceptions in Iran of the nature of the "Arab Spring" vary. While describing it as an "Islamic awakening" inspired by Iran's 1979 revolution, the clerics have not failed to indicate their determination to suppress future dissent and to rebuff any foreign intervention. By contrast, despite tracing the Arab revolts to Iran's June 12, 2009, presidential elections, the opposition has, thus far, refrained from publicly challenging the regime, though more radical forms of resistance may be brewing beneath the surface. Thus, the winds of change have apparently radicalized both rival sides.

PEOPLE POWER IS GOOD FOR SOME ARABS . . .
Both regime and opposition responses to the Arab upheavals have varied from case to case, but there has been a clear consistency in the opposition's moral support for all pro-democracy movements, whereas the regime has endorsed "people power" only in countries allied with the United States, but not in those aligned with Tehran, such as Syria. There was also a great deal of caution in both the regime's and the opposition leadership's responses during the first phase of the uprisings, though ordinary opposition members found quick inspiration for their cause as the events unfolded in the region.

Public protests against Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali broke out on December 17, 2010, and, by January 15, 2011, the Saudi government announced that it was hosting the former Tunisian President and his family for an unspecified period of time. [1] The first official Iranian coverage of the Tunisian events appeared on the Islamic Republic's Arabic language al-Alam TV on December 28, 2010, eleven days after the protests had begun. [2] The first newspaper editorial on Tunisia appeared in the January 4, 2010, edition of Iran, more than three weeks after the beginning of the Tunisian uprising. [3] On January 16, the day after Ben Ali's arrival in the Saudi capital, Ali Larijani, Speaker of Parliament, made the first official comment on the situation, accusing the United States and the West more generally of being "behind repression and pressures imposed on the people of Tunisia under the rule of its former President." [4] Surprisingly, the otherwise opinionated President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad made no comment on Tunisia before January 19, [5] while Supreme Leader Ali Khamene'i made his position known on February 4. Addressing the people of Tunisia and Egypt in Arabic, after delivering the Friday prayer sermon in Tehran, Khamene'i portrayed himself as "your brother in religion," described President Husni Mubarak as a "traitor dictator," and said that the events in Tunisia and Egypt were "natural extensions of Iran's Islamic revolution in 1979." [6]

The Islamic Republic's official responses to the Egyptian revolution were swifter than in the Tunisian case. The first protests in Egypt started on January 25, 2011, and on February 11 the anniversary of Iran's 1979 revolution Mubarak resigned his post and handed over power to the Supreme Military Council. [7] Again, Larijani was the first official to refer to the situation, toward the end of January [8] two weeks after the protests had begun, but well before Mubarak stepped down. Khamene'i's statement of February 4, which also preceded Mubarak's resignation, [9] shows that the Islamic Republic had an easier time taking a position on Egypt. A few hours before Mubarak announced his resignation, Ahmadinejad, addressing the crowds on the occasion of the anniversary of the 1979 revolution, claimed ownership of the revolutionary movements in the entire region. [10]

Yet, from Tehran's point of view, people power is good for some Arabs, but not all Arabs. Though there was little love lost between the Iranian Islamist regime and those in power in Libya and Yemen, Ramin Mehmanparast, the Foreign Ministry spokesman, condemned NATO's airstrikes, which aimed at defending the very same people to whom Tehran had extended its rhetorical support, catching the regime in a bit of a contradiction. [11] As for Damascus, it was completely exempted from the regime's rhetorical support for people power as there were no commentaries and very little press coverage of the Syrian protests, which began on January 26. [12] Instead of supporting the protesters, Larijani met Syrian Prime Minister Muhammad Naji Otri on March 10 to discuss the regional developments. [13]

Though Bahrain, with its majority Shiite population, had long been claimed by Tehran as its own, official Iranian responses to the crisis in the Emirate were generally more cautious than the regime's reactions to the Egyptian and Libyan crises, with Washington rather than Riyadh, which had sent troops to suppress the protests being accused of a "violent crackdown of the popular uprisings."

Official Iranian responses to the crisis in Bahrain came fast, but were generally more cautious than reactions to the Egyptian and Libyan crises, though some Iranian authorities have claimed the tiny Persian Gulf Emirate, with its majority Shiite population, as Iranian territory. Kayhan editor Hossein Shariatmadari, Khamenei's unofficial spokesman, has, on several occasions, described Ahmadinejad's trip to Bahrain as "a provincial trip." [14] The Bahraini opposition declared February 14 an anti-government "Day of Rage," and, by March 16, the Bahraini security forces, supported by Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) units, had succeeded in suppressing the opposition. [15]

The first Iranian editorial on Bahrain appeared in the February 16 issue of Quds, which stressed the need for reforms in the Emirate. [16] Stepping up the criticism, on February 17, an unidentified source at the Iranian Foreign Ministry described, in an interview on the English language Press TV, the developments in Bahrain as an "internal affair," but called on Manama to "exercise restraint." [17] On February 19, Amir Abdollahian, the Foreign Ministry's Director-General for the Persian Gulf and Middle East, stressed that "the demands of Bahraini people can be achieved by democratic and peaceful means; it is regretful to see that the police have resorted to violence in that country." [18] Again, Larijani took the official lead by accusing Washington of complicity in a "violent crackdown of popular uprisings" in Bahrain while addressing the Parliament on February 20, 2011. [19] He was followed three days later by 191 Iranian parliamentarians who issued a statement condemning the "merciless massacre of Muslim people in Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, and Morocco." [20] On February 27, 2011, Hassan Firouzabadi, Chief of the General Staff, attacked the United States as well, calling it "the flag-bearer of neo-racism."[21] Khamene'i, however, did not comment on Bahrain before his March 21 New Year address. [22]

. . . BUT BAD FOR IRANIANS
The Islamic Republic may, at least rhetorically, support the idea of people power for the Tunisians, Egyptians, the Bahrainis and the Yemenis, but Iranians apparently belong to the same category as the Syrians for whom people power is bad.

On February 6, Mehdi Karrubi and Mir-Hossein Mousavi, in a joint letter, asked the Interior Ministry for a permit to demonstrate "in solidarity with popular movements of the region, especially the liberation seeking revolts of the people of Tunisia and Egypt." [23] Not surprisingly, the permit was denied, and the two opposition leaders, together with former President Mohammed Khatami, were put under house arrest. [24] As the state-controlled media pounded the opposition movement as "seditionists," Basij militia chief Mohammed-Reza Naghdi warned that the "Western spy agencies are trying to find a mentally degenerate person [to] self-immolate in Tehran so they can liken this with the beginning of the events in Tunisia and Egypt." [25]

Ignoring the demonstration ban, the opposition rallied on February 14 and March 1 with slogans connecting the fate of the Tunisian and Egyptian dictators with Supreme Leader Khamene'i: "Mubarak, Ben Ali, it is now the turn of Seyyed Ali [Khamene'i]," [26] "Khamene'i, Mubarak, congratulations with your marriage!" [27] and "Those in Iran with motorcycles or those in Cairo with camels, death to the dictator." [28]

Although limited to the major population centers and incapable of mobilizing the millions who had joined the protest movement in the immediate aftermath of the 2009 elections, the anti-regime demonstrations unmasked the duplicity and double standards of the Islamist regime: People power is good for some Arabs, but not for Iranians.

LESSONS LEARNED
The regime has concluded that it must decisively suppress dissent to prevent it from snowballing into a major crisis, yet seems neither willing nor capable of liberalizing the political system, once the crisis is over. Khamene'i's March 21 speech in Mashhad derided the opposition forces in Iran as "[Western] agents, weak, ghoulish individuals who are prisoners of their egos." [29] Such words leave little room for mutual accommodation.

The regime's analysis of the Libyan experience has also strengthened its resolve to pursue its nuclear goals, as well as its intent to shape regional developments according to its worldview. In his address, Khamene'i specifically referred to Libya's cooperation with the West, which he believed had led to Mu'ammar al-Qaddafi's problems: "In recent years, he did a great service to the West, which realized that a very simple threat drove this gentleman to dismantle his nuclear capabilities." Khamene'i continued:

    "Take a look at the position of our nation and the position [the Libyan regime] finds itself in. Our nation witnessed a U.S.-led offensive against Iran's nuclear quest, making military threats, pledging an attack, and what not. The Iranian authorities not only did not retreat when confronted by the enemy, but every year they increased their nuclear capabilities. Over there [in Libya], the people saw that the regime, in the face of Western threats, or Western incentives as they call it, gave the orders to dismantle its nuclear capabilities. Like putting a sour lollypop or chocolate into a child's mouth, they gave them incentives, and they lost everything forever! Well, the nation sees this, its heart bleeds, and its pride is wounded. This can be seen in all the countries in which the people revolted." [30]

Such statements do not provide much hope for a peaceful solution to curbing the Islamic Republic's nuclear ambitions. Khamene'i also indirectly warned Washington's allies of U.S. perfidy:

    "These countries [the United States and its allies] have always supported the dictators. They supported Husni Mubarak to the last possible moment, but upon realizing that he could no longer be saved, threw him away! Let this be a lesson to the heads of state dependent on the United States. When they are no longer useful, it will throw them away, just like a piece of old cloth, and will ignore them!" [31]

The opposition, however, may also have learned at least one lesson: the need for a division of labor, or even a split, between, on the one hand, such reformists as Mousavi, Karrubi and Khatami, who, against all wisdom, continue to call for reforming the system, and, on the other hand, a clandestine radical opposition, which no longer believes the regime is capable of self-reform and, therefore, might pursue revolutionary goals.

CONCLUSION
The winds of change sweeping across the Middle East and North Africa have indeed reached the shores of Iran, though at no point did the 2011 anti-government demonstrations threaten the Iranian regime's survival. Better geared to suppressing internal dissent than other regional dictatorships, the clerics probably have better prospects of weathering the current crisis, but, as long as they are unwilling to liberalize or incapable of liberalizing the political system, increased repression may result in the surfacing of more radical opposition movements inside Iran.
NOTES:
[1] Al-Jazeera TV (Doha), Jan. 23, 2011.

[2] BBC Monitoring (London), Dec. 28, 2010.

[3] Ibid., Jan. 4, 2011.

[4] Ibid., Jan. 16, 2011.

[5] Ibid., Jan. 19, 2011.

[6] Ibid., Feb. 4, 2011.

[7] Al-Jazeera TV, Feb. 14, 2011.

[8] The New York Times, Jan. 29, 2011.

[9] The Christian Science Monitor (Boston), Feb. 4, 2011.

[10] Ibid., Feb. 11, 2011.

[11] Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting World Service (Tehran), Mar. 21, 2011.

[12] Reuters, Mar. 30, 2011.

[13] BBC Monitoring, Mar. 10, 2011.

[14] Asr-e Iran (Tehran), Nov. 20, 2008.

[15] Reuters, Mar. 16, 2011.

[16] BBC Monitoring, Feb. 16, 2011.

[17] Ibid., Feb. 18, 2011.

[18] Ibid., Feb. 19, 2011.

[19] Ibid., Feb. 20, 2011.

[20] Ibid., Feb. 23, 2011.

[21] Ibid., Feb. 27, 2011.

[22] "Payam-e Nowrouzi-ye 1390," Office of the Supreme Leader Sayyid Ali Khamene'i (Tehran) Mar. 21, 2011.

[23] Rah-e Sabz (Tehran), Feb. 6, 2011.

[24] Bloomberg News (New York), Feb. 28, 2011.

[25] Asr-e Iran, Feb. 13, 2011.

[26] "Mubarak, Ben Ali. Now It's Time for Seyyed Ali," YouTube, Mar. 1, 2011.

[27] Iran Press Service (London), Feb. 14, 2011.

[28] Ibid., Feb. 14, 2011.

[29] "Bayanat Dar Haram-e Mottahar-e Razavi Dar Aghaaz-e Sal," The Office of the Supreme Leader Sayyid Ali Khamene'i, Mar. 21, 2011.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Ibid.


LINKS TO RELATED TOPICS:
The Middle East & the Problem of Iran

Middle East -- Arabs, Arab States,
& Their Middle Eastern Neighbors

American Foreign Policy -- The Middle East

Islamism & Jihadism -- The Threat of Radical Islam
Page Three    Page Two    Page One

International Politics & World Disorder:
War, Peace, & Geopolitics in the Real World:
Foreign Affairs & U.S. National Security

   Page Two    Page One

Islamist Terrorist Attacks on the U.S.A.

Osama bin Laden & the Islamist Declaration of War
Against the U.S.A. & Western Civilization

Islamist International Terrorism &
U.S. Intelligence Agencies

U.S. National Security Strategy



Ali Alfoneh is Resident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. Previously, he was a Research Fellow for the Copenhagen Middle East Research Program (2004-2006), a Lecturer in Political Economy at the University of Southern Denmark (2003-2004), an Independent Researcher for the Institute for Political and International Studies in Tehran (2003), a Research Assistant in the Office of the President of the European Affairs Committee of the Danish Parliament (2002-2003), and an elected member of the City Council of Herlev, Denmark (1994-1999). Also, he has been a Research Fellow at the Institute for Strategy, part of the Royal Danish Defence College.

Alfoneh's research areas include civil-military relations in Iran, with a special focus on the role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps in the Islamic Republic of Iran. His articles have appeared in different journals, magazines and newspapers, including the Middle East Quarterly, the New York Times, National Review, and Ahram Online.

Alfoneh holds Bachelor of Arts and Master of Arts degrees from the University of Copenhagen, as well as another B.A. degree from Roskilde University, Trekroner, Denmark. Currently, he is a candidate for the Ph.D. degree in the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen.


The foregoing article by Ali Alfoneh was originally published in the Middle East Quarterly, Summer, 2011, and can be found on the Internet website maintained by the Middle East Forum, a foreign policy think tank which seeks to define and promote American interests in the Middle East, defining U.S. interests to include fighting radical Islam, working for Palestinian Arab acceptance of the State of Israel, improving the management of U.S. efforts to promote constitutional democracy in the Middle East, reducing America's energy dependence on the Middle East, more robustly asserting U.S. interests vis--vis Saudi Arabia, and countering the Iranian threat. (URL: http://www.meforum.org/3006/mixed-response -in-iran)


Republished with Permission of the Middle East Forum
Reprinted from the Middle East Forum News
mefnews@meforum.org (MEF NEWS)
August 5, 2011




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