U.S. COUNTERTERRORIST ACTIVITY BEFORE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001:
THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S PRE-9/11
By Dr. Condoleeza Rice
The terrorists were at war with us, but we were not yet at war with them. For more than 20 years, the terrorist threat gathered, and America's response across several administrations of both parties was insufficient. Historically, constitutional democratic societies have been slow to react to gathering threats, tending instead to wait to confront threats until they are too dangerous to ignore or until it is too late.
Despite the sinking of the Lusitania in 1915 and continued German harassment of American shipping, the United States did not enter the First World War until two years later. Despite Nazi Germany's repeated violations of the Versailles Treaty and its string of provocations throughout the mid-1930s, the Western constitutional democracies did not take action until 1939.
The U.S. government did not act against the growing threat from Imperial Japan until the threat became all too evident at Pearl Harbor. And, tragically, for all the language of war spoken before September 11, 2001, this country simply was not on a war footing.
Since then, America has been at war. And under President Bush's leadership, we will remain at war until the terrorist threat to our nation is ended. The world has changed so much that it is hard to remember what our lives were like before that day. But I do want to describe the actions the Bush administration was taking to fight terrorism before September 11, 2001.
After President Bush was elected, we were briefed by the Clinton administration on many national security issues during the transition. The president-elect and I were briefed by George Tenet on terrorism and on the Al-Qa'ida network. Members of Sandy Berger's National Security Council Staff briefed me, along with other members of the new national security team, on counterterrorism and Al-Qa'ida.
This briefing lasted about one hour, and it reviewed the Clinton administration's counterterrorism approach and the various counterterrorism activities then underway. Sandy Berger and I personally discussed a variety of other topics, including North Korea, Iraq, the Middle East, and the Balkans.
Because of these briefings and because we had watched the rise of Al-Qa'ida over the years, we understood that the network posed a serious threat to the United States. We wanted to ensure there was no respite in the fight against Al-Qa'ida.
On an operational level, we decided immediately to continue pursuing the Clinton administration's covert action authorities and other efforts to fight the network. President Bush retained George Tenet as Director of Central Intelligence, and Louis Freeh remained the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. I took the unusual step of retaining Richard Clarke and the entire Clinton administration's counterterrorism team on the NSC Staff.
I knew Richard Clarke to be an expert in his field, as well as an experienced crisis manager. Our goal was to ensure continuity of operations while we developed new and more aggressive policies.
At the beginning of his administration, President Bush revived the practice of meeting with the Director of Central Intelligence almost every day in the Oval Office. These were meetings which I attended, along with the Vice President and the White House Chief of Staff. At these meetings, the President received up-to-date intelligence and asked questions of his most senior intelligence officials.
From January 20 through September 10, the President received at these daily meetings more than 40 briefing items on al-Qa'ida, and 13 of these were in response to questions he or his top advisors had posed. In addition to seeing DCI Tenet almost every morning, I generally spoke by telephone every morning at 7:15 with Secretary of State Colin Powell and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. I also met and spoke regularly with the DCI about Al-Qa'ida and terrorism.
Of course, we also had other responsibilities. President Bush had set a broad foreign policy agenda. We were determined to confront the the matter of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We were improving America's relations with the world's great powers.
We had to change an Iraq policy that was making no progress against a hostile regime which regularly shot at U.S. planes enforcing U.N. Security Council resolutions. And we had to deal with the occasional crises, for instance, the crisis that occurred when the crew of a U.S. Navy plane was detained in China for 11 days.
We also moved to develop a new and comprehensive strategy to eliminate the Al-Qa'ida terrorist network. President Bush understood the threat, and he understood its importance. He made clear to us that he did not want to respond to Al-Qa'ida one attack at a time. He told me he was "tired of swatting flies."
This new strategy was developed over the Spring and Summer of 2001, and was approved by the President's senior national security officials on September 4. It was the very first major national security policy directive of the Bush administration. The directive concerned, not Russia, not missile defense, not Iraq, but the elimination of Al-Qa'ida.
Although this National Security Presidential Directive was originally a highly classified document, we arranged for portions to be declassified to help the 9-11 Commission in its work, and I will describe some of those today. The strategy set as a goal of the directive and the Bush administration was the elimination of the Al-Qa'ida network.
The directive ordered the leadership of relevant U.S. departments and agencies to make the elimination of Al-Qa'ida a high priority and to use all aspects of our national power -- intelligence, financial, diplomatic, and military -- to meet this goal. And it gave Cabinet Secretaries and agency heads specific responsibilities.
For instance: It directed the Secretary of State to work with other countries to end all sanctuaries given to Al-Qa'ida. It directed the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of State to work with foreign governments to seize or freeze assets and holdings of Al-Qa'ida and its benefactors.
It directed the Director of Central Intelligence to prepare an aggressive program of covert activities to disrupt Al-Qa'ida and provide assistance to anti-Taliban groups operating against Al-Qa'ida in Afghanistan.
It tasked the Director of the Office of Management and Budget with ensuring that sufficient funds were available in the federal budgets over the next five years to meet the goals laid out in the strategy.
And it directed the Secretary of Defense to "ensure that the contingency planning process include plans: against Al-Qa'ida and associated terrorist facilities in Afghanistan, including leadership, command-control-communications, training, and logistics facilities; against Taliban targets in Afghanistan, including leadership, command-control, air and air defense, ground forces, and logistics; to eliminate weapons of mass destruction which Al-Qa'ida and associated terrorist groups may acquire or manufacture, including those stored in underground bunkers."
This was a change from the prior strategy -- Presidential Decision Directive 62, signed in 1998 -- which ordered the Secretary of Defense to provide transportation to bring individual terrorists to the U.S.A. for trial, to protect Department of Defence forces overseas, and to be prepared to respond to terrorist and weapons of mass destruction incidents.
More importantly, we recognized that no counterterrorism strategy could succeed in isolation. As you know from the Pakistan and Afghanistan strategy documents that we made available to the Commission, our counterterrorism strategy was part of a broader package of strategies that addressed the complexities of the region.
Integrating our counterterrorism and regional strategies was the most difficult and the most important aspect of the new strategy to get right. Al-Qa'ida was both client of and patron to the Taliban, which in turn was supported by Pakistan. Those relationships provided Al-Qa'ida with a powerful umbrella of protection, and we had to sever them. This was not easy.
Not that we hadn't tried. Within a month of taking office, President Bush sent a strong, private message to Pakistani President Musharraf, urging him to use his influence with the Taliban to bring Osama bin Laden to justice and to close down Al-Qa'ida training camps. Secretary of State Powell actively urged the Pakistanis, including Musharraf himself, to abandon support for the Taliban.
I met with Pakistan's Foreign Minister in my office in June of 2001. I delivered a very tough message, which was met with a rote, expressionless response.
America's Al-Qa'ida policy wasn't working because our Afghanistan policy wasn't working. And our Afghanistan policy wasn't working because our Pakistan policy wasn't working. We recognized that America's counterterrorism policy had to be connected to our regional strategies and to our overall foreign policy.
To address these problems, I made sure to involve key regional experts. I brought in Zalmay Khalilzad, an expert on Afghanistan who, as a senior diplomat in the 1980s, had worked closely with the Afghan Mujahedeen, helping them to turn back the Soviet invasion.
I also ensured the participation of the NSC experts on South Asia, as well as the Secretary of State and his regional specialists. Together, we developed a new strategic approach to Afghanistan. Instead of the intense focus on the Northern Alliance, we emphasized the importance of the south -- the social and political heartland of the country.
Our new approach to Pakistan combined the use of carrots and sticks to persuade Pakistan to drop its support for the Taliban. And we began to change our approach to India, to preserve stability on the subcontinent.
While we were developing this new strategy to deal with Al-Qa'ida, we also made decisions on a number of specific anti-Al-Qa'ida initiatives that had been proposed by Richard Clarke. Many of these ideas had been deferred by the last administration, and some had been on the table since 1998.
We increased counterterror assistance to Uzbekistan; we bolstered the Treasury Department's activities to track and seize terrorist assets; we increased funding for counterterrorism activities across several agencies; and we moved quickly to arm Predator unmanned surveillance vehicles for action against Al-Qa'ida.
When threat reporting increased during the Spring and Summer of 2001, we moved the U.S. government at all levels to a high state of alert and activity. Let me clear up any confusion about the relationship between the development of our new strategy and the many actions we took to respond to threats that Summer. Policy development and crisis management require different approaches. Throughout this period, we did both simultaneously.
For the essential crisis management task, we depended on the Counterterrorism Security Group chaired by Richard Clarke to be the interagency nerve center. The CSG consisted of senior counterterrorism experts from the CIA, the FBI, the Department of Justice, the Defense Department (including the Joint Chiefs of Staff), the State Department, and the Secret Service.
The CSG had met regularly for many years, and its members had worked through numerous periods of heightened threat activity. As threat information increased, the CSG met more frequently, sometimes daily, to review and analyze the threat reporting and to coordinate actions in response. CSG members also had ready access to their Cabinet Secretaries and could raise any concerns they had at the highest levels.
The threat reporting that we received in the Spring and Summer of 2001 was not specific as to time, nor place, nor manner of attack. Almost all of the reports focused on Al-Qa'ida activities outside the United States, especially in the Middle East and North Africa.
In fact, the information that was specific enough to be actionable referred to terrorist operations overseas. More often, it was frustratingly vague. Let me read you some of the actual chatter that we picked up that Spring and Summer: "Unbelievable news coming in weeks," "Big event ... there will be a very, very, very, very big uproar," "There will be attacks in the near future."
Troubling, yes. But they don't tell us when; they don't tell us where; they don't tell us who; and they don't tell us how.
In this context, I want to address in some detail one of the briefing items we received, since its content has frequently been mischaracterized.
On August 6, 2001, the President's intelligence briefing included a response to questions that he had earlier raised about any Al-Qa'ida intentions to strike our homeland.
The briefing item reviewed past intelligence reporting, mostly dating from the 1990s, regarding possible Al-Qa'ida plans to attack inside the United States. It referred to uncorroborated reporting from 1998 that terrorists might attempt to hijack a U.S. aircraft in an attempt to blackmail the government into releasing U.S.-held terrorists who had participated in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. This briefing item was not prompted by any specific threat information. And it did not raise the possibility that terrorists might use airplanes as missiles.
Despite the fact that the vast majority of the threat information we received was focused overseas, I was concerned about possible threats inside the United States. On July 5, White House Chief of Staff Andy Card and I met with Richard Clarke, and I asked Clarke to make sure that domestic agencies were aware of the heightened threat period and were taking appropriate steps to respond, even though we did not have specific threats to the homeland.
Later that same day, Clarke convened a special meeting of his CSG, as well as representatives from the Federal Aviation Agency, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Bureau of Customs, and the Coast Guard. At that meeting, these agencies were asked to take additional measures to increase security and surveillance.
Throughout this period of heightened threat information, we worked hard on multiple fronts to detect, protect against, and disrupt any terrorist plans or operations that might lead to an attack. For instance, the Department of Defense issued at least five urgent warnings to U.S. military forces that Al-Qa'ida might be planning a near-term attack, and placed our military forces in certain regions on heightened alert.
The State Department issued at least four urgent security advisories and public worldwide cautions on terrorist threats, enhanced security measures at certain embassies, and warned the Taliban that they would be held responsible for any Al-Qa'ida attack on U.S. interests.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation issued at least three nationwide warnings to federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, and specifically stated that, although the vast majority of the information indicated overseas targets, attacks against the homeland could not be ruled out.
The FBI also tasked all 56 of its U.S. field offices to increase surveillance of known or suspected terrorists and reach out to known informants who might have information on terrorist activities.
The Federal Aviation Agency issued at least five Civil Aviation Security Information Circulars to all U.S. airlines and airport security personnel, including specific warnings about the possibility of hijackings.
The Central Intelligence Agency worked round the clock to disrupt threats worldwide. Agency officials launched a wide-ranging disruption effort against Al-Qa'ida in more than 20 countries.
During this period, the Vice President, DCI Tenet, and the NSC's Counterterrorism Staff called senior foreign officials, requesting that they increase their intelligence assistance and report to us any relevant threat information.
This is a brief sample of our intense activity over the Summer of 2001.
Yet, as your hearings have shown, there was no silver bullet that could have prevented the 9/11 attacks. In hindsight, if anything might have helped stop 9/11, it would have been better information about threats inside the United States, something made difficult by structural and legal impediments that prevented the collection and sharing of information by our law enforcement and intelligence agencies.
So the attacks came. A band of vicious terrorists tried to decapitate our government, destroy our financial system, and break the spirit of America . As an officer of government on duty that day, I will never forget the sorrow and the anger I felt. Nor will I forget the courage and resilience shown by the American people and the leadership of the President that day.
Now, we have an opportunity and an obligation to move forward together. Bold and comprehensive changes are sometimes only possible in the wake of catastrophic events -- events which create a new consensus that allows us to transcend old ways of thinking and acting.
Just as World War II led to a fundamental reorganization of our national defense structure and to the creation of the National Security Council, so has September 11, 2001, made possible sweeping changes in the ways we protect our homeland.
President Bush is leading the country during this time of crisis and change. He has unified and streamlined our efforts to secure the American homeland by creating the Department of Homeland Security, established a new center to integrate and analyze terrorist threat information, directed the transformation of the FBI into an agency dedicated to fighting terror, broken down the bureaucratic walls and legal barriers that prevented the sharing of vital threat information between our domestic law enforcement and our foreign intelligence agencies, and, working with the Congress, given officials new tools, such as the USA Patriot Act, to find and stop terrorists. And he has done all of this in a way that is consistent with protecting America's cherished civil liberties and with preserving our character as a free and open society.
But the President recognizes that our work is far from complete. More structural reform will likely be necessary. Our intelligence gathering and analysis have improved dramatically in the last two years, but they must be stronger still. The President and all of us in his administration welcome new ideas and fresh thinking. We are eager to do whatever is necessary to protect the American people. And we look forward to receiving the recommendations of the 9-11Commission.
We are at war, and our security, as a nation, depends on winning that war. We must and we will do everything we can to harden terrorist targets within the United States. Dedicated law enforcement and security professionals continue to risk their lives every day to make us all safer, and we owe them a debt of gratitude. And, let's remember, those charged with protecting us from attack have to succeed 100 percent of the time. To inflict devastation on a massive scale, the terrorists only have to succeed once, and we know they are trying every day.
That is why we must address the source of the problem. We must stay on offense, to find and defeat the terrorists wherever they live, hide, and plot around the world. If we learned anything on September 11, 2001, it is that we cannot wait while dangers gather.
After the September 11 attacks, our nation faced hard choices. We could fight a narrow war against Al-Qa'ida and the Taliban or we could fight a broad war against a global menace. We could seek a narrow victory or we could work for a lasting peace and a better world. President Bush chose the bolder course.
He recognizes that the war on terror is a broad war. Under his leadership, the United States and our allies are disrupting terrorist operations, cutting off their funding, and hunting down terrorists one-by-one. Their world is getting smaller. The terrorists have lost a home-base and training camps in Afghanistan. The governments of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia now pursue them with energy and force.
We are confronting the nexus between terror and weapons of mass destruction. We are working to stop the spread of deadly weapons and prevent then from getting into the hands of terrorists, seizing dangerous materials in transit, where necessary. Because we acted in Iraq, Saddam Hussein will never again use weapons of mass destruction against his people or his neighbors. And we have convinced Libya to give up all its WMD-related programs and materials.
And as we attack the threat at its sources, we are also addressing its roots. Thanks to the bravery and skill of our men and women in uniform, we removed from power two of the world's most brutal regimes -- sources of violence, and fear, and instability in the Middle Eastern and South Asian region.
Today, along with many allies, we are helping the people of Iraq and Afghanistan to build free societies. And we are working with the people of the Middle East to spread the blessings of liberty and constitutional democracy as the alternatives to instability, hatred, and terror.
This work is hard and dangerous, yet it is worthy of our effort and our sacrifice. The defeat of terror and the success of freedom in those nations will serve the interests of our Nation and inspire hope and encourage reform throughout the greater Middle East.
In the aftermath of September 11, 2001. those were the right choices for America to make -- the only choices that can ensure the safety of our nation in the decades to come.
War & Peace in the Real World
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Islamist Terrorist Attacks on the U.S.A.
Terrorism & U.S. Homeland Security
Osama bin Laden & the Islamist Declaration of War
Against the U.S.A. & Western Civilization
Islamist International Terrorism &
U.S. Intelligence Agencies
U.S. National Security Strategy
Dr. Condoleeza Rice, National Security Advisor in the Presidency of George W. Bush, presented the foregoing statement, on
April 8, 2004, as testimony at the hearings of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (9-11
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