MY CYBER COUNTER-JIHAD
By Shannen Rossmiller
In November 2001, I saw a news report about how terrorists and their sympathizers communicated on websites and Internet message boards and how limited government agencies were in their ability to monitor these web communications. This news report showed me how extensively Al-Qa'ida used the Internet to orchestrate 9-11 and how out of touch our intelligence agencies were regarding this Internet activity. Apparently, there were not procedures in place for tracking communications and activity on the Al-Qa'ida websites and Internet forums at the time.
The Internet address named in the news report was "www.alneda.com." I wrote it down and proceeded to see for myself what all the fuss was about. I entered another world when I logged on to that site for the first time. I did not know Arabic, so I clicked away at random, looking at featured pictures depicting such things as dead bodies lying around in the aftermath of a car bombing and other atrocities.
Early in January, 2002, I began taking an Arabic language course online for eight weeks from the Cairo-based Arab Academy,  which, that Autumn, I supplemented with an intensive Arabic course at the State University of New York at Buffalo. As I learned more Arabic, the jihadi websites opened for me. Certain individuals stood out for either their radicalism or the information that they sent. I followed and tracked these individuals and kept notebooks detailing each website and person of interest.
Gradually, as I put to use the knowledge and skills I was developing of the Arabic language, I started posting messages on Internet forums and message boards. However, it was not until I was able to find an Arabic language translator through an online translation service  who was willing to assist me with constructing contextually accurate messages that I began to elicit responses from individuals at these Internet sites. As time went on, and through the process of trial and error, I eventually figured out what to say and how to say it to start the process of passing myself off as a jihadist sympathizer.
I created my first terrorist cover identity on the Internet on March 13, 2002, to communicate and interact with these targets. In my first chat room sting, I convinced a Pakistani man that I was an Islamist arms dealer. When he offered to sell me stolen U.S. Stinger missiles to help the jihadists fighting the U.S. and Coalition forces in Afghanistan, I used the Persian Gulf dialect of Arabic to ask him to provide me with information that I could use to confirm his claims, such as stock numbers. Within a couple of weeks, the missile identification numbers were in my computer inbox.
Stock numbers and the e-mail correspondence in hand, I intended to drive to the closest field office for the FBI here in Montana but was afraid that the FBI would not take me seriously. What were the chances of a Montana mom showing up at their door with information about an individual in Pakistan who was trying to sell Stinger missiles? Instead, I submitted the information to the FBI's online tips site.
A few days later, I received a telephone call from an FBI agent from New Jersey who proceeded to question me. It felt like an interrogation. Several days later, the same agent called to thank me and say that the stock number information for the Stingers did match some of the information that the government had about the missiles.
Encouraged by this success, I continued to communicate with these jihadis online and proceeded to gather more information. Using various Muslim personalities and theatrics for cover, I began monitoring the jihadist chat rooms into the early hours of the morning while my family slept. Plunging in, I started making headway into the world of counterterrorism.
In 2003, the individuals interacting in known Al-Qa'ida affiliated websites and Internet forums began to distribute information about private Internet forums used by Al-Qa'ida and its sympathizers. Under one of my terrorist identities, I was able to infiltrate some of these private sites where the communication and interaction was much more radical than what I had earlier encountered. In March, 2003, I aligned myself with a few of the more prolific individuals in one of these forums. During this time, many messages were circulated about how the "brothers" had perfected the use of cell phones as remote bomb detonators and how they would share the information. When I received the "perfected" schematics for use of cell phones as remote bomb detonators, the "brothers" at the Internet forum stated that the next big attacks would incorporate the use of cell phone detonators for car bombings in the Arab peninsula. I again forwarded this information to the FBI.
Over the next couple of months, it became clear that Al-Qa'ida would next target Western interests in Saudi Arabia. On April 30, 2003, while chatting online in Arabic with terrorist "friends," a jihadi indicated that the selected targets for new attacks would be Western housing complexes or hotels frequented by Westerners in the Kingdom. After further conversations over the next few days, I became convinced that the attack would be within a week, in Riyadh. On May 12, 2003, four days after I had tipped off the FBI, Al-Qa'ida carried out its attacks. Terrorists drove two cars, a pickup, and an SUV through Riyadh. Two of the vehicles carried heavily armed assault teams, and three of the four were also packed with explosives. Their targets were three compounds: the Durat al-Jadawil, a compound owned by MBI International and Partners; Al-Hamra Oasis Village compound and a compound owned by the Vinnell Corporation, a Virginia-based defense contractor that was training the Saudi national guard. The Islamists killed thirty-four people in and around the compounds. 
Then, four days later on May 16, 2003, Al-Qa'ida struck in Casablanca, setting off five explosions killing at least twenty people and injuring 100. The attacks targeted a Jewish community center, a Spanish restaurant and social club, a hotel, and the Belgian consulate.  Subsequent to the attacks, FBI investigators confirmed that terrorists used cell phones as remote detonators in both operations. 
Two months later, while posing as a courier, I indicated that I was in Mosul, Iraq, and wanted to assist the jihadis fighting the Americans there. I informed them that I could travel between Jordan, Turkey, and Iraq and could take money or information to people in those countries to help the cause. After a couple of weeks, I had gained enough trust in the chat room that I was asked if I could get a letter and some money into Jordan for certain members of Saddam's fedayeen. I was given a "scanned" copy of a letter that was said to have been written by Saddam Hussein and intended as a communiqué for former elements of his regime that had relocated to Jordan after the fall of Baghdad to Coalition forces. I was later told by federal authorities that they believed the letter to be authentic. 
I posed as an Algerian with ties to that country's Armed Islamic Group, which I indicated was closely aligned and working with elements of groups associated with Al-Qa'ida, and sent Rashid an e-mail in English with the subject line "A Call to Jihad." Rashid responded by asking if it was possible that a "brother fighting on the wrong side could sign up or defect, so to speak." Over a period of four months, Rashid and I exchanged a series of thirty e-mails in English. I learned he was a member of the Army National Guard from Washington State, whose tank battalion unit was scheduled to be deployed to Iraq in February, 2004. Through the course of our e-mail exchanges, Rashid provided me with information and materials on the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the M1-AI and M1-A2 Abrams tanks as well as U.S. troop locations in Iraq. At all times during our communications, Rashid perceived me to be a mid-level Al-Qa'ida operative.
After our fifth e-mail exchange, I contacted the Department of Homeland Security, which put me in contact with my local FBI office. During the next four months, I worked closely with the FBI and the Criminal Investigation Division of the Army. On February 12, 2004, just eight days shy of deploying with his National Guard unit, the FBI arrested Spec. Ryan G. Anderson and turned him over to the Army for prosecution.
While I preferred to continue my work anonymously, my undercover life became public because of my involvement in the Anderson case. During his prosecution, I was called to testify, and so my work and identity were exposed in U.S. court records.
After the media picked up my identity at Anderson's Article 32 hearing in May, 2004, I received numerous threats and, on December 5, 2004, someone stole my car out of my family's garage. It was later found wrecked two counties away from my home, riddled with bullet holes. As a result, I now have permanent security.
I have still continued my online sleuthing. After the Anderson case, I worked to capture members of an Al-Qa'ida affiliate in Lebanon seeking to sneak chemical weapons into Iraq. Believing me to be a jihadist banker, group members said that they had already killed twenty-four British troops, wanted to attack U.S. soldiers with weapons of mass destruction, and needed money to buy the materials on the black market. Because of the hard work of a number of investigative bureaus in the United States and abroad, they never got the chance.
In January, 2005, I came upon another individual here in the United States who claimed to have knowledge and skills in nuclear physics and was offering his abilities online to Al-Qa'ida to carry out terrorist attacks here on U.S. soil. The individual's online tracks traced back to several public library locations in Ohio. I began communicating with this individual in English and transliterated Arabic and later identified him as Mohammed Radwan Obeid. During the course of our communications, Obeid talked about nuclear weapons and other weapons attractive to the mujahideen as well as his desire to recruit people to start or join a terror cell. In March of 2005, the FBI arrested Obeid, a Jordanian and illegal alien pretending to be a Jehovah's Witness. He has since been sentenced to a year in prison, followed by deportation. 
Finally, in October, 2005, I came into contact with another U.S. citizen intending to harm the United States for Al-Qa'ida. Michael C. Reynolds was arrested on December 5, 2005, outside of Pocatello, Idaho.  He thought he was conspiring with an Al-Qa'ida operative online seeking to cause a major disruption in the U.S. economy and its foreign policy objectives abroad by bombing sections of the Alaska transcontinental pipeline and other U.S. oil and energy installations. On October 3, 2006, a federal grand jury in Scranton, Pennsylvania, indicted Reynolds on six counts of attempted terrorism activities.  Reynolds remains in federal custody in Pennsylvania pending judgment. 
The process that I started in early 2002 would eventually become a template for the government in the new and developing field of fighting terrorism online called "cyber-counterintelligence." It would be counterproductive, though, to ongoing investigations to comment further on the institutionalization of the field or its sources and methods.
Yet my efforts have been worth the personal sacrifice. After hundreds of cases, I continue to challenge myself to outthink and outmaneuver the terror enemy — by forging new and untested methods in the field of cyber-counterintelligence to always gain the upper hand in an operation. Whenever I set out to ensnare any terrorist operative or group, I always have one main motivating factor in sight: Simply said, I cannot and will not ever forget the painful memory of 9-11 and the death and destruction brought to bear upon the United States and the world.
If we are to defeat Al-Qa'ida and all it encompasses, governments need to develop a better understanding of the ways Al-Qa'ida and its affiliates use the Internet and technology. Intelligence agencies must be allowed to "think outside the box" and incorporate creative strategies that allow them to anticipate where the terrorist movements might next carve their path on the Internet. Western governments lag behind in Internet cyber-warfare with Al-Qa'ida. If they do not catch up, they will not gain the upper hand in the war on terror.
 The Arab Academy maintains a website at http://www.arabacademy.com.
 Translation Depot, online site for freelance translators and interpreters.
 CNN.com, May 13, 2003; "Riyadh Bombings," Online NewsHour, Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), accessed Feb 26, 2007.
 CNN News, May 19, 2003.
 "Homeland Security Report," no. 127, Homeland Security Group, Apr. 5, 2004, p. 6.
 See mention in The Washington Post, May 4, 2003.
 "United States of America, Department of the Army vs. Specialist Ryan G. Anderson, Fort Lewis, Army Base, Washington State"; The Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Feb. 13, 2004.
 The Dayton Daily News, July 8, 2006.
 CBS News, Feb. 11, 2006; The Washington Post, Feb. 13, 2006.
 Middle District of Pennsylvania, United States of America vs. Michael Curtis Reynolds, no. 3: CR-05-493, Oct. 3, 2006; The New York Times, Oct. 5, 2006.
 My involvement is mentioned in The Washington Post, June 4, 2006; ABC News, June 5, Oct. 3, 2006; The Telegraph (London), June 27, 2006.
 Jarret M. Brachman, "High-Tech Terror: Al-Qaeda's Use of New Technology," The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Summer 2006.
Middle East -- Arabs, Arab States,
& Their Middle Eastern Neighbors
American Foreign Policy -- The Middle East
International Politics & World Disorder:
War & Peace in the Real World
Page Two Page One
Islamist Terrorist Attacks on the U.S.A.
Osama bin Laden & the Islamist Declaration of War
Against the U.S.A. & Western Civilization
Islamist International Terrorism &
U.S. Intelligence Agencies
Terrorism & American Homeland Security
Counterterrorism & U.S. National Security
U.S. National Security Strategy
Shannen Rossmiller retired from the bench as a municipal court judge in Montana in September, 2006, and has since taken a position as a civil litigation specialist with the Montana Attorney General's office.
The foregoing article by Shannen Rossmiller was originally published in the Middle East Quarterly, Summer, 2007, and can be found on the Internet website maintained by the Middle East Forum, a think tank which seeks to define and promote American interests in the Middle East, defining U.S. interests to include fighting radical Islam, working for Palestinian Arab acceptance of the State of Israel, improving the management of U.S. efforts to promote constitutional democracy in the Middle East, reducing America's energy dependence on the Middle East, more robustly asserting U.S. interests vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia, and countering the Iranian threat.
Africa: Black Africa *
Africa: North Africa *
American Government 1
LINKS TO PARTICULAR ISSUES & SUBJECT MATTER CATEGORIES
TREATED IN THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATIVE, U.S.A.:
American Government 2 * American Government 3 * American Government 4
American Government 5 * American Politics * Anglosphere * Arabs
Arms Control & WMD * Aztlan Separatists * Big Government
Black Africa * Bureaucracy * Canada * China * Civil Liberties * Communism
Congress, U.S. * Conservative Groups * Conservative vs. Liberal
Constitutional Law * Counterterrorism * Criminal Justice * Disloyalty * Economy
Education * Elections, U.S. * Eminent Domain * Energy & Environment
English-Speaking World * Ethnicity & Race * Europe * Europe: Jews
Family Values * Far East * Fiscal Policy, U.S. * Foreign Aid, U.S. * Foreign Policy, U.S.
France * Hispanic Separatism * Hispanic Treason * Human Health * Immigration
Infrastructure, U.S. * Intelligence, U.S. * Iran * Iraq * Islamic North Africa
Islamic Threat * Islamism * Israeli vs. Arabs * Jews & Anti-Semitism
Jihad & Jihadism * Jihad Manifesto I * Jihad Manifesto II * Judges, U.S. Federal
Judicial Appointments * Judiciary, American * Latin America * Latino Separatism
Latino Treason * Lebanon * Leftists/Liberals * Legal Issues
Local Government, U.S. * Marriage & Family * Media Political Bias
Middle East: Arabs * Middle East: Iran * Middle East: Iraq * Middle East: Israel
Middle East: Lebanon * Middle East: Syria * Middle East: Tunisia
Middle East: Turkey * Militant Islam * Military Defense * Military Justice
Military Weaponry * Modern Welfare State * Morality & Decency
National Identity * National Security * Natural Resources * News Media Bias
North Africa * Patriot Act, USA * Patriotism * Political Culture * Political Ideologies
Political Parties * Political Philosophy * Politics, American * Presidency, U.S.
Private Property * Property Rights * Public Assistance * Radical Islam
Religion & America * Rogue States & WMD * Russia * Science & Ethics
Sedition & Treason * Senate, U.S. * Social Welfare Policy * South Africa
State Government, U.S. * Subsaharan Africa * Subversion * Syria * Terrorism 1
Terrorism 2 * Treason & Sedition * Tunisia * Turkey * Ukraine
UnAmerican Activity * UN & Its Agencies * USA Patriot Act * U.S. Foreign Aid
U.S. Infrastructure * U.S. Intelligence * U.S. Senate * War & Peace
Welfare Policy * WMD & Arms Control
Africa: Black Africa *
Africa: North Africa *
American Government 1
POLITICAL EDUCATION, CONSERVATIVE ANALYSIS
POLITICS, SOCIETY, & THE SOVEREIGN STATE
Website of Dr. Almon Leroy Way, Jr.
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
An Online Journal of Political Commentary & Analysis
Dr. Almon Leroy Way, Jr., Editor