Since the end of the Persian Gulf War in April, 1991, the U.S.A. and its Western allies have continued to be engaged in military as well as diplomatic conflict with Iraq. Presidents Bush and Clinton, acting under the authority of U.S. Public Law 102-1 (the Persian Gulf Resolu- tion, which is still in effect) and under the authority of various U.N. resolutions passed by the Security Council before and since the close of the Persian Gulf War, have employed the U.S. Armed Forces in an ongoing endeavor to (1) prevent Saddam Hussein's political regime and military machine from again becoming a serious threat to international peace and U.S. national interests in the Middle East, (2) deny Hussein the opportunity to use Iraqi military and security forces to literally exterminate his political opponents among the Kurdish inhabitants of northern Iraq and among the Shi'ite Muslim Marsh Arabs of southern Iraq, and (3) compel the Iraqi government to honor its international obligations, including those relating to (a) the ban on further development, production, and stockpiling of nuclear, biological, chemical, and other weapons of mass destruction, (b) the call for destruction of existing stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction, (c) recognition of and respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of Kuwait, and (d) compliance with the terms of the ceasefire agreement ending the Persian Gulf War.

Since April, 1991, U.S., British, French, and Turkish military aircraft, under "Operation Northern Watch," have been enforcing a no-fly zone in Iraq north of the 36th. parallel, seeking to create and maintain a safe haven for Hussein's Kurdish opponents. Since August, 1992, U.S. and allied warplanes, under "Operation Southern Watch," have been enforcing a similar NFZ south of the 32nd. parallel, in an attempt to prevent Hussein from extinguishing his Shi'ite opponents in southern Iraq. Operations Northern Watch and Southern Watch entail allied reconnnaissance sorties over the two NFZs. On the average, there are 20,000 American troops deployed to the Middle East in support of Operation Southern Watch, which is ongoing and will continue as long as the governments of the U.S.A. and its allies deem the operation to be necessary. Continuation of Operation Northern Watch is dependent upon the Turkish government's continuing approval of deployment of U.S., British, and French military forces in Turkey, but, taking into consideration the strength and durability of the U.S.A.-Turkish alliance and the obstinacy and duplicity of Saddam Hussein, the operation is likely to endure for the foreseeable future.

While patrolling the NFZs, U.S. and allied aircraft have been subject to repeated military challenges, each of them followed by U.S. and allied air strikes on Iraqi military targets. In his August 2, 1999, report to Congress on "the status of efforts to obtain Iraq's compliance with resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council," President Clinton stated:

"Aircraft of the United States and coalition partners enforcing the no-fly zones over Iraq under operations Northern Watch and Southern Watch are regularly illuminated by radar and engaged by anti-aircraft artillery, and occa sionally, by surface-to-air missiles.

"As a result of Iraq's no-fly zone violations and attacks on our aircraft, our aircrews con tinue to respond with force. United States and coalition forces are fully prepared and authorized to defend themselves against Iraqi threats while carrying out their no-fly zone enforcement mission and, when circumstances warranted, have engaged various components of the Iraqi integrated air defense system." [William J. Clinton, "Text of a Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate," Washington, DC: The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, August 2, 1999.]

Since June 26, 1993, when President Clinton initiated air strikes aimed at the Iraqi Intelligence Service headquarters in Baghdad, U.S. military forces have participated in three additional major military actions against Iraq--"Operation Vigilant Warrior" (October, 1994), "Operation Desert Strike" (September, 1996), and "Operation Desert Fox" (December, 1998).

i. Operation Vigilant Warrior

As mentioned previously, a major objective of the continuing military presence and activity of the U.S.A. and its allies in the Middle East--the Southwest Asia/Northeast Africa/Per- sian Gulf region--is to prevent the Iraqi regime and military forces from jeopardizing inter- national peace and U.S. national interests (as well as the interests of U.S. allies) in the region. In reality, this means preventing Iraq from threatening the security and independence of neighboring countries, such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and from endangering America's access and that of other industrialized nations to the oil of the Middle East, the region which has over 70 percent of the earth's known petroleum reserves.

In late September and early October, 1994, just as a gradual drawdown of U.S. military forces in the Middle East had commenced, large numbers of Iraqi ground forces, on Saddam Hussein's orders, moved southward, crossing the 32nd. parallel and headed in the direction of Kuwait. The result was a significant Iraqi military build-up along the Kuwaiti border. Hussein's action clearly manifested his eagerness as well as his capacity to threaten neighboring states and imperil the industrialized West's access to Middle Eastern petroleum. The Iraqi dictator's movement of troops toward and military build-up along Kuwait's border also demonstrated Hussein's complete lack of trustworthiness and his determination to violate the terms of the ceasefire agreement ending the Persian Gulf War.

On October 15, The U.N. Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, adopted Resolution 949, which--

Condemned Iraq's "military deployment in the direction of the border with Kuwait;"

Demanded "that Iraq immediately complete the withdrawal of all military units recently de ployed to southern Iraq" and return them "to their original positions in Iraq;"

Demanded "that Iraq not again utilize its military or any other forces in a hostile manner to threaten either its neighbors or United Nations operations in Iraq;"

Demanded "therefore that Iraq not redeploy to the south the units referred to" above "or take any other action to enhance its military capacity in southern Iraq...."

In order to obtain the Iraqi regime's voluntary (though begrudging) compliance with U.N. Resolution 949, President Clinton put into effect Operation Vigilant Warrior, ordering units of the United States Central Command (formerly, the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force) at MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, Florida, deployed to the Middle East to join forward deployed USCENTCOM units and allied forces already in the region. By late October, additional U.S. military units, including an aircraft carrier group, cruise missile ships, reinforcing Air Force squadrons and two Army brigades, had been deployed to the Middle East. The U.S. reinforcements ordered by the President involved deployment of more than 28,000 troops and 200 aircraft into the region.

In the face of the strong and determined U.S. response during Operation Vigilant Warrior, Saddam Hussein backed down, withdrew all Iraqi military units recently deployed to southern Iraq, and redeployed them north of the 32nd. parallel. In early November, President Clinton, after having received confirmation of the withdrawal and redeployment of Iraqi forces, considered the Middle Eastern crisis defused and ordered redeployment of the U.S. forces he had sent to the Middle East during the crisis.

ii. Operation Desert Strike

After Operation Vigilant Warrior, Iraqi aggression subsided for a couple of years. In the late Summer and early Fall of 1996, however, Saddam Hussein began to take military actions which demonstrated that his predisposition toward making mischief in the Middle East had not really abated. With his inclination toward mischief as strong as ever, he was again up to his old tricks.

In August, 1996, the Iraqi despot sent his military forces into the Kurdish region of Iraq, seeking to regain political control over Iraqi territory north of the 36th. parallel--the region which, following Iraq's defeat in the Persian Gulf War, the U.S.A. and its allies turned into a no-fly zone and a safe haven for Hussein's Kurdish opponents, banning Iraqi aircraft from the region's air space and allowing the Kurds to enjoy de-facto autonomy under Western military protection. Iraqi military forces, on Hussein's orders, invaded the region north of the 36th parallel, captured Irbil (a key city in the region), and pursued and attacked Kurdish refugees fleeing Hussein's wrath and extermination program. President Clinton responded to the Iraqi aggression by initiating Operation Desert Strike

Operation Desert Strike was not the vigorous U.S. military response that, on the surface, it might appear to have been. Instead of attacking and taking out the Iraqi tanks that were invading and overrunning Iraqi Kurdistan, the Clinton Presidency elected to attack anti-aircraft and training sites in southern Iraq and extend the southern NFZ to the 33rd parallel. Hence, the U.S. response was to take action affecting Iraqi military positions and matters far from the battlefield in northern Iraq. In short, President Clinton abandoned the Kurds and failed to live up to the U.S. obligation to protect and defend against Iraqi aggression the region north of the 36th. parallel, where thousands of members of groups opposed to Hussein's regime were operating--organized groups aided and promoted by the U.S. government and functioning under the guidance of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

Why did President Clinton opt for such an inept response to Iraq's aggression against the Kurds? In terms of American domestic partisan politics, the events of August and September, 1996, were most inconvenient for the Clinton Presidency and the Democratic Party. The events were occuring at a time entirely too close to the coming November federal elections. Clinton wanted to keep the issue of U.S. military engagement with Iraq out of the debate in the 1966 presidential and congressional elections. So he sought to avert an inconvenient confrontation with Iraq's ground forces--a confrontation likely to be quite messy and therefore damaging to the incumbent President and other Democratic candidates in the federal elections--and, at the same time, avoid leaving himself open to criticism to the effect that, in the face of Iraqi aggression, he behaved like a timid soul lacking intestinal fortitude, a week-kneed and indecisive leader who drew back from the crisis and took no action whatsoever against the aggressor.

While President Clinton managed to keep the Iraq issue out of the 1996 elections and thereby enhance his reelection chances, Saddam Hussein quickly picked up on Clinton's very poorly camouflaged acquiescence in the despot's brutal suppression of the Kurds in northern Iraq. This greatly encouraged Hussein in his continuing endeavor to thwart, outmanuever, circumvent, and erode the determination and strength of the U.S.A. and its allies. With his expectations of future victories boosted, Hussein soon began a series of challenges to the system of U.N. sanctions, restrictions, and inspections imposed on his regime to prevent it from developing, producing, and stockpiling weapons of mass destruction. Hussein's increasing resistance to the U.N. WMD program and its implementation came to a head in January, 1998, when he expelled the U.S. members of UNSCOM, the U.N. weapons inspection team.

iii. Operation Desert Fox

In October, 1997, Saddam Hussein began to step up and intensify his efforts to obstruct and render ineffectual the U.N. weapons inspection program in Iraq. In doing so, he initiated a protracted military confrontation with the U.S.A. and its allies. Accusing the American program participants of operating as U.S. intelligence agents within Iraq, Hussein expelled most of the U.S. members of the weapons inspection team. In response, the U.N. Security Council threatened to reinstate economic sanctions against Iraq. Hussein ignored the threat.

On November 13, 1997, Hussein expelled the six remaining U.S. members of the inspection team. In protest, the United Nations recalled the other inspection team members. These events were followed by an American-British military build-up in the Persian Gulf. And the military build-up induced Hussein to back down temporarilly and readmit the weapons inspectors, including those from the U.S.A.

Hussein's submission was short-lived. Later in November, the Iraqi regime gave notice that it would not permit the U.N. inspectors to enter and inspect sites designated "palaces and official residences." Suspecting that these sites were being employed to camouflage Hussein's stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction, U.N. officials protested the denial of access to the sites.

In January, 1998, Hussein again expelled the U.S. members of the U.N. weapons inspection team. The United Nations again protested by withdrawing the other inspectors. A standoff ensued and tensions were heightened. The U.N. Security Council reimposed economic sanctions on Iraq. A U.S. military build-up in the Persian Gulf commenced.

In February, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan negotiated an agreement whereby the Iraqi regime allowed readmission of the U.N. inspectors and resumption of the weapons inspection program. In return for this concession, the Iraqi government was given assurance that the Security Council would consider lifting the economic sanctions.

The U.N. weapons inspectors returned to Iraq and resumed the inspections, which the Iraqi regime continued to hinder. In August, the regime severed all its ties with the inspection team, asserting that the Security Council had shown no signs of taking steps in the direction of removing the sanctions. In September, the Security Council, by a unanimous vote, decided not to consider or discuss removal of sanctions until such time as the Iraqi government had started cooperating with the inspection team. On October 31, Hussein terminated all work of the inspectors and, for the third time, expelled them from Iraq. On the same day, the U.S.A. and Britain warned Iraq of possible air strikes to compel its cooperation with the inspection program. An American-British military build-up in the Persian Gulf ensued.

On November 5, the Security Council adopted a resolution condemning Iraq for its failure to live up to the agreements it signed after the close of the Persian Gulf War. On November 11, the United Nations recalled most of the U.N. personnel assigned to Iraq.

Meanwhile, the U.S.A. and Britain continued their military build-up in the Persian Gulf. On November 14, Hussein, facing a situation in which B-52 bombers were already in the air and within 20 minutes of Iraqi sites targeted for attack, yielded and consented to the U.N. inspectors' return to Iraq. Hussein agreed to permit unconditional and unrestricted weapons inspections.

Hussein, however, had no intention of cooperating with the inspectors or allowing them to operate unrestricted and unimpeded. This fact soon became apparent to the inspectors.

On December 8, Richard Butler, head of the inspection team, reported that the Iraqi dictator was still obstructing the work of the inspectors. On the same day, the inspectors began to leave Iraq. On December 15, a formal U.N. report charged the Iraqi government with a consistent pattern of activity characterized by obstruction of the weapons inspection program. The U.N. report accused the Iraqis of persistently placing obstacles in the program's path, doing so through denial of access to records and inspection sites and through clandestine movement of equipment and equipment records from site to site.

On the basis of the information provided by Richard Butler on Secember 8 and by the U.N. report of December 15, President Clinton decided to order the U.S. Armed Forces into immediate action against Iraq. On December 16, U.S. military units, joined by British units, began to execute Operation Desert Fox, a massive campaign of air strikes against key military and security targets in Iraq--targets believed to be major contributors to Iraq's capacity to produce, store, and utilize weapons of mass destruction. Operation Desert Fox concentrated on such targets as airfields, command centers, and missile factories.

Other targets for attack included some upon which Hussein undoubtedly placed very high value. In Baghdad, the targets included such pillars of the regime as (1) the headquarters of Iraqi intelligence, (2) the barracks of Hussein's elite unit of bodyguards, the Special Security Organization, and (3) the headquarters of Hussein's political party, the Baath Party. In Tikrit, Hussein's home town, a Republican Guard barracks and his daughter's palace were hit. In Basra, a major oil refinery was struck.

U.S. and British military assets utilized in Operation Desert Fox included (1) F-14 Tomcats, F/A-18C Hornets, and other U.S. Navy and Marine Corps jets launched from U.S. aircraft carriers in the Persian Gulf, (2) U.S. Air Force and Royal Air Force attack aircraft flying from bases in Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, and (3) Tomahawk cruise missiles guided by global positioning satellites and launched from U.S. Navy ships at sea as well as from U.S. Air Force B-52 bombers operating out of a base in Diego Garcia, a British island in the Indian Ocean.

The Tomahawk missiles launched from B-52 bombers were late-model cruise missiles with 2,000-pound and 3,000-pound warheads and with a much higher degree of accuracy than the cruise missiles used against Iraq in the Persian Gulf War in 1991. These Tomahawks are hard to spot and shoot down, since they are low-flying and produce a comparatively cool exhaust, which enables them to elude detection by heat-seeking antiaircraft missiles.

The goals of Operation Desert Fox, according to U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen, in a December 16 news briefing, were to (1) "degrade Saddam Hussein's ability to make and use weapons of mass destruction," (2) "diminish his ability to wage war against his neighbors," and (3) "demonstrate the consequences of flouting international obligations." [DEFENSELINK NEWS (December 16, 1998), p. 1.]

President Clinton terminated Operation Desert Fox after only three days, asserting that the 70-hour campaign of air strikes had accomplished its mission. Operation Desert Fox, according to the President, had "inflicted significant damage on Saddam's weapons of mass destruction programs, on the command structures that direct and protect that capability, and on his military and security infrastructure." [DEFENSELINK NEWS (December 21, 1998), p. 1.] U.S. Defense Department officials estimated that Iraq's missile program had been set back by at least 12 months. Spokesmen for the Clinton Presidency claimed that Hussein's military might had been substantially degraded.

While Operation Desert Fox may very well have degraded, or weakened, the war-waging capacity of the Iraqi military establishment, it had a similar impact on American military forces. How? Within the very brief period of three days, the U.S. Air Force exhaused the greater part of its supply of very expensive air-launched missiles. This was a harbinger of things to come in the near future--things to come in the Kosovo-Yugoslav War.

Before the end of December, 1998, U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf were, on President Clinton's orders, being drawn down to forces levels in the Gulf prior to the build-up for Operation Desert Fox. When the military draw-down began, the Iraqi regime had not yet been compelled to accept and cooperate with the U.N. weapons inspection program. Hussein perceived this development as Clinton's tacit recognition and acceptance of the fact that the weapons inspection program had come to an end and was not to be revived. This encouraged Hussein to continue playing his dangerous "game of chicken" with the U.S.A. and its allies:

Step 1: Defy the West and jeopardize its interests in the Middle East.

Step 2: Yield temporarily when threatened with or subjected to Western military attack.

Step 3: Renege on the international commitments which he made in order to avoid or end a Western military assault against his political regime and military/securityforces.

Since the end of Operation Desert Fox, the U.S.A. and its allies have waged a sustained low-level war of attrition against Iraq. U.S. and British warplanes continue to patrol the northern and southern no-fly zones. Iraqi radar and air defense installations continue to challenge and endanger the patrolling aircraft, which respond by striking the radar and air defense installations. Almost daily, American and British aircraft pound Iraqi targets with missiles and bombs.

The most frequently stated objectives of the low-grade war of attrition are to enforce the NFZs, wear down Iraqi military strength, and provide the Kurdish and Shi'ite minorities in Iraq with some measure of protection from Hussein's program of suppression and genocide. However, the war of attrition has an additional objective: bringing about the overthrow of Hussein and his replacement by another leader or group of leaders--a leader or leadership group less rambunctious and more favorably favorably disposed toward U.S. and allied interests in the Middle East. Governing elites in Washington and London hope that the air strikes against Iraqi targets will create or intensify political discontent within Iraq. They hope that, as a consequence of the air strikes, politically significant elements of the Iraqi population will come to perceive Hussein as a danger to his own people, to see him as an unwise and corrupt leader whose reckless conduct has gotten himself and his country into serious trouble--a predator and rogue-dictator who has run out of luck, who is now trapped and unable to protect his own territory and people.

In waging war against Iraq, President Clinton, thus far, has been acting in compliance with the reporting requirements of Section 4 of the War Powers Act and with those of Section 3 of the "Authorization for the Use of Military Forse Against Iraq Resolution" (Public Law 102-1, or the Persian Gulf Resolution). The President has been reporting periodically to Congress on the status of U.S. hostilities with the Iraqi regime and on other matters relating to the hostilities. [While Section 4 of the War Powers Act requires such reports to be made every six months, Section 3 of the Persian Gulf Resolution requires them to be made every 60 days.]