A popularly elected legislature could be trusted not to abuse political authority, but the executive and the judiciary could not be trusted to refrain from abusing authority.

While the constitutional grant authority to government should be sevely limited, that constitutionally limited authority should be concentrated in a popularly elected legislature. The legislature should be the supreme and dominant organ of government, and the executive and the courts should be subservient to the will of the legislature.

To protect the people from executive and judicial tyranny, the constitution must ensure rapid rotation in office by stipulating very short terms for executive and judicial officers and by imposing severe limitations on their eligibility for reelection.

To ensure majority rule, property qualifications for voting in elections for legislators and other government officers should be eliminated and the electoral franchise, or suffrage, extended to all free white male residents.

Radical democrats in late eighteenth century America tended strongly to favor simple, unchecked democracy -- unlimited or virtually unlimited rule by a single popular organ of government, e.g., a popularly elected unicameral legislature in which all or virtually all political authority was concentrated. Democratic radicals endeavored to lodge overriding political power in a single governmental organ dominated by a single majoritarian interest and to thereby facilitate quick and easy majority decision making in gobernment.

        The Radically Democratic Scheme of State Government Under the 1776 Pennsylvania Constitution. Seemingly determined on a complete abandonment of the past, a rejection of everything in Pennsylcania's colonial charter simply because it was part of the old proprietary governmernt, the constitution makers in Pennsylvania produced a constitution that provided for an unbalanced form of state government.

The Pennsylvania Constitution provided for a unicameral legislature with paramount powers -- a single-chamber legislature styled the "House of Representatives of the Commonwealth or State of Pennsylvania." The Constitution vested the "supreme legislative power" in the House of Representatives. There was to be no upper legislative chamber to protect minority rights and intereste by counteracting and counterbalancing the popular, or majoritarian, interest represented in the House of Representatives.

Members of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives were to be elected for one-year terms. The Representatives were to be elected by direct popular vote, elected by the voters in the counties and the City of Philadelphia. The voters in each county, as well as those in the City of Philadelphia, were to elect a number of Representatives in proportion to the number of taxable residents of the county or city. There were to be no property qualifications for either the voters voting in elections to choose Representatives nor for the elected Representatives holding the the House seats to which they were elected.

In short, the House of Representatives was to be popularly elected via a broad-based electoral franchise approasching universal free white adult manhood suffrage, and was to be based on the principle of legislative representation according to population -- representation in proportion to each local election district's population.

The Pennsylvania Constitution provided for a plural executive -- a many-headed top executive authority in the state government. The Constitution vested "supreme executive power" in a popularly elected, twelve-member Executive Council, including a President and Vice-President chosen from the twelve elected Council members. Every three years, the qualified voters in each of Pennsylvania's eleven counties, as well as those in the City of Pennsylvania, were to elect one member of the Executive Council. The President and Vice-President of the Council were not to be popularly elected to those positions, but were to be chosen by a method of indirect election. They were to be elected from the Council membership by a joint ballot of the Council and the House of Representatives sitting and voting in the same room.

The President of the Executive Council was by no means the equivalent of the governor in another state or in Pennsylvania prior to the American Revolution. The President was little more than presiding officer at meetings of the Council. In decisions of the Council, the President, as well as the Vice-President, was a single member with a single vote -- one voice in a plural body of twelve.

The authority of the Executive Council as a whole was severely restricted. The Council was given the power to appoint judges, naval officers, Judge of the Admiralty, Attorney-General, and all other civil and military officers, except those whose appointment or election was vested in the House of Representatives of in the voters. The Council's power of appointment was rather weak, since certain offices were filled by the legislature and numerous others by the voters.

As mentioned above, the Pennsylvania Constitution provided for a wide franchise approaching universal free white adult manhood suffrage. Under the Constitution, all freemen twenty-one years old or older, who had resided in the state for at least one year and paid public taxes during that time, and all men who had reached the age of twenty-one years and were the sons of resident freeholders, but had not paid taxes, were entitled to vote in elections for Representatives, members of the Executive Council, and other popularly elected government officeholders.

To ensure rapid rotation in government office, the Constitution provided that a Representative was not to serve more than four one-year terms, and a member of the Executive Council was not to serve more than one three-year term in any given seven-year period.

As regards the Pennsylvania judiciary, the judges of the Supreme Court of Judicature were to be paid fixed salaries, were to serve seven-year terms, and were to be eligible for reappointment at the ends of their respective terms. However, they were to be removable for misbehavior at any time by the House of Representatives. In Pennsylvania, judicial independence stood on a rather weak foundation.

        Pennsylvania's Radically Democratic State Government in Operation. With concentration of the powers of government in a popularly elected unicameral legislature, with weak executive and judicial institutions and with a lack of divided and balanced political authority, the Pennsylvania House of Representatives soon demonstrated the truth of the conservatives' contention that a government, though democratic, could be just as tyrannical -- if not more so -- than an autocracy, where unlimited power was in the hands of one person, or an oligarchy, where such power was in the hands of a small group. The actions of the Pennsylvania legislature showed that there was such a thing as popular despotism, or tyranny of the majority, that no one and no group of people, not even a popular majority and its elected representatives, could be trusted with undivided, unchecked, and unbalanced political power. With concentrated and unrestrained power placed in the same hands, the temptation of imperfect human beings to abuse that power and rule society in a tyrannical fashion is entirely too strong to resist.

The House of Representatives in Pennsylvania deprived Quakers of the right to vote in elections, ignored the right of the individual to freedom of speech and freedom of religion, disregarded and violated the right of the individual to trial by jury in criminal cases, and intimidated and manipulated the courts.

3. Intercolonial & Interstate Efforts Toward Unity and Joint Action Prior to the U.S.     Constitution -- The Continental Congress and the Articles of Confederation.

Efforts toward concerted action by the states to deal with common problems during the revolutionary and immediate post-revolutionary periods included the the Constnental Congress of 1774-1761and the Articles of Confederation, the first attemp at a national constitution, which was in effect from 1781 to 1789. The Continental Congress, in fact, consisted of two congresses -- the First Continental Congress and the Second Continental Congress.

        The First Continental Congress (1774). Meeting in Philadelphia in 1774, the First Continental Congress was an intercolonial assembly composed of delegates sent from twelve of the thirteen colonies. The First Continental Congress, with Georgia not represented, drew up and adoped a resolution, the Declaration of Rights and Grievances. This resolution claimed for the colonial legislatures exclusive power to make and provide for the enforcement of laws within their respective colonies, with the colonial laws being subject to veto by the Crown only and totally immune to negation by act of Parliament.

The First Continental Congress convened in an atmosphere in which the colonists still considered themselves loyal British subjects and believed that they could reason with the British home government and obtain recognition of their rights and liberties under the British Constitution and under the colonial charters and royal commissions.

        The Second Continental Congress (1775-1781). The Second Continental Congress, an internalcolonial assembly that soon became an interstate assembly, began meeting in 1775, after the civil war between Britain and the colonies had begun. Composed of delegates from all thirteen states, the Second Continental Congress (1) drafted and adopted the Declaration of Independence, (2) conducted the War of the American Revolution, and (3) served as the de facto central government of the U.S.A. until tha adoption of the Articles of Confederation in 1781.

The Second Continental Congress had no formal-legal basis -- no constitutional foundation. It was an informal union or alliance of the states, an association of sovereign states held together by extreme emergency, by the common danger they faced and the consequent need for joint action to defend themselves against a common foe and prosecute the Revolutionary War to a victorious conclusion. The Second Continental Congress not only waged war, but also issued currency, borrowed and loaned money, exchanged diplomatic representatives with foreign governments, concluded treaties and military alliances, and performed other functions normally performed by the central government of a sovereign state.

While the delegates to the Second Continental Congress were chosen by their respective state legislatures, those legislatures had absolutely no conception that, by sending delegates to the Continental Congress, the states had given up any of their rights and powers to that body or must feel themselves bound by its decisions. In spit of this, the Second Continental Congress managed bring the war to a successful conclusion, win American independence, and play a crucial role in developing an American national consciousness, a common national identity and loyalty -- a spirit of American nationalism, or national patriotism, which led to the adoption of the Articles of Confederation in 1781 and, then, to the Federal Constitutional Convention of 1787, its drafting of the United States Constitution and submitting it to the thirteen states, and the Constitution's ratification by those states.

        The Articles of Confederation (1781-1789). The Articles of Confederation, which will be discussed in greater detail in Section B, Part Five, provided for a loosely-knit union of states and a very weak and impotent central government over the union. The union was nothing more than an association of virtually sovereign states. The unicameral Congress, based on the principle of equal representation of the states in that assembly, was given very limited powers, a very difficult procedure for obtaining the passage of legislation, and no effective means of enforcing its decisions. The Confederation central government lacked the power to tax and regulate interstate and foreign commerce and was unable to raise and maintain military forces for the common defense of the states. The existence and effective operation of the central government depended on the voluntary cooperation of the states, cooperation which each state was free to extend or withhold at will.

The loosely-knit union and weak central government set up under the Articles of Confederation were in accord with the political attitudes and beliefs of the radical democrats. In supporting this constitutional arrangement and adamantly opposing any efforts to form a more closely-knit union of states with a stronger and more powerful central government, the radical democrats were operating on the basis of two important assumptions:

Since sovereignty (ultimate and supreme political authority) resided in the people of each state and the state was the agent or instrumentality of the sovereign people, most of the constitutional powers of government in the United States of America must remain in the hands of the states. Any union or association of the thirteen states in a larger political organization designed to function as a central government for the U.S.A. as a whole must, of necessity, be an instrument or agent of the states, subordinate to their will and exercising severely limited powers.

Liberty could be much better protected and safeguarted in a small republic with a small population and a small, compact territory than in a large republic consisting of a large, diverse population dwelling in an extensive territorial area. In other words, the rights and liberties of the individual citizen were much safer under state and local governments than they would be under a central government exercising substantial authority over the entire U.S.A.

4. The American Political Order During theRevolutionary and Immediate     Post-Revolutionary Periods -- A Weak and Impotent Central Government and State     Governments Dominated by Their Legislatures.

        Political Attitudes That Shaped the Early American Political Order. The political attitudes that prevailed in America during the revolutionary and immediate post-revolutionary period drove the Americans to establish a political order in which the state governments were dominated by their respective legislatures and the central government was woefully weak and impotent. These prevailing American attitudes related to (1) centralized government, (2) distribution of governmental power between the central government and the states, and (3) the branch of government that should be trusted with important powers.

        The General Attitude of Americans Toward Centralized Government. The Americans were extremely feaful of centralized political power and any apparent attempt to set up a centralized government over the entire American nation.

        The Attitude of Americans Toward Distribution of Political Authority Between the Central Government and the States. The Americans identified tyranny with centralized government and liberty with decentralized government. In other words,the Americans associated liberty with the lack of a strong central government -- with a situation in which the thirteen states were sovereign or virtually sovereign. State rights and local self-government were the very definition of liberty.

        The Attitude of Americans Regarding Which Branch of Government Should Be Instrusted with Important Political Powers. While the American were distrustful of the executive branch of government and identified it with tyranny, they associated liberty with the legislature. Therefore, Americans were generally in favor of vesting the important powers of government in the legislative branch and leaving the executive too weak to threaten liberty.

        Source of the Early American Political Attitudes Supporting Lack of Balance in State Governments & Inadequate Political Authority in the Central Government: The source of American political attitudes dictating unbalanced state governments dominated by their respective state legislatures and a weak and impotent central government is to be found in the political experience gained during the colonial period -- the experience the colonial political elites acquired from having to deal with the problems and frustrations stemming from British efforts to govern the colonies. Early American political attitudes grew out of the colonists' perceptions of (1) the true character of the British Empire, (2) the constitutional relationship between the colonial governments and British home government in London, and (3) an apparent endeavor on the part of the home government to substantially and radically alter the character of the Empire and the relationship between colonies and home government. Especially important in the formation of the relevant colonial and early American political attitudes was the trouble the colonists, after 1763, had with the imperial government in London, trouble growing out the home government's attempt to tighten its administrative supervision and control over the colonies and exercise direct legislative and tax jurisdiction in the colonies -- implementation of the new imperial policy, which the colonists saw as an endeavor to establish a considerably more centralized imperial system, i.e., a far more centralized government for the whole British Empire, with the central government headquarted in London dictating policy governing many issues formerly decided by the colonial legislatures.

Reinforcing the political attitudes of early Americans were the experiences the colonists had had with colonial chief executives -- the struggle for power within each colony between the elective chamber of the colonial legislature and a non-elective chief executive with potent powers, a struggle in which the elective legislative chamber had represented the interests of the colonists in conflicts with the Governor, who represented the interests of the Crown or the Proprietor. Particularly important in reinforcing early American political attitudes was the unpleasant experience that the residents of royal colonies had had with very stern and sometimes brutal royal governors.

        The Early American Political Order and the Conservative Reaction: The defects of the early American political order became evident soon after political issues and controversies began to emerge under that order. The problems created by the absence of a strong and effective central government and by state governments dominated by their respective legislatures caused increasing political discontent among the more conservative elements within American Whiggery, the political faction that supported the American Revoluttion.

        Conservatism in Anglo-America During the Late 1700s. In English-speaking North America during the late eighteenth century, conservatism meant constitutional conservatism. And among the more conservative American Whigs, constitutional conservatism meant commitment to defense and preservation of traditional Anglo-American institutions of constitutional, representative government. In the year 1776, when most of the thirteen states drafted and adopted their first state constitutions, many conservative Whigs resisted the trend toward state legislative supremacy and deplored the establishment of state governmental systems which they perceved as deviating, in their fundamental features, very far from the governmental systems under which Anglo-Americans were governed during the colonial period and to which they were accustomed -- systems in which political authority was divided among the principal organs of colonial government, the Governor and the two chambers of the legislature, with no single center of power dominating the entire system. These early American conservatives saw legislature-dominated state government as deviating dangerously far from the established political institutions and practices of the colonial period. In general, the conservative preference was for a strong and independent chief executive and for a division and balance of political power between the two houses of the legislature and among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government.

American conservatives of the late eighteenth century favored institutional devices which functioned to slow down and make difficult governmental decision-making on issues of domestic public policy. To avoid governmental decisions and actions likely to undermine the unity, stability, and vitality of society, conservatives insisted on institutional devices that would force the government to proceed cautiously, at a slow pace, spending a considerable amount of time seriously debating and deliberating on proposed legislation and giving careful, prolonged consideration to the possible longterm effects of major innovations in domestic public policy. These devices included (1) a truly bicameral legislature, with each house having the power of absolute veto over action favored by the other house, (2) an independent chief executive possessing a strong veto over bills passed by the legislature, and (3) an independent judiciary, with judges enjoying security of tenure in office and answerable neither to the executive nor to the legislature for their decisions in legal cases and controversies coming before them for hearing and judgement.

American conservatives during the late 1700s generally preferred political arrangements which gave the wealthy and propertied minority within society a strong voice in major governmental decisions on public policy. Such arrangements included high property qualifications for voting in elections to choose government officeholders and even higher property owning requirements for the right to hold government office. A favorite device of conservatives was an upper chamber of the legislature which (1) was elected by some method of indirect election, (2) possessed the power of absolute veto over legislation supported by the popularly elected, lower chamber, and (3) was composed of members serving long terms and chosen from the "better element" within society. Such an upper legislative chamber, consisting of persons of high socioeconomic status owning substantial wealth and property, was expected to represent and be highly responsive to the views and interests of the wealthy and propertied classes, protecting the rights and vital interests of this "aristocratic" minority against the aims of any mob-minded, tyrannical popular majority that might win control of the lower house of the legislature and attempt to use the taxing and lawmaking authority of government to deprive the minority of its honestly acquired property and redistribute it among members of the economically less successful and less prosperous majority.

Conservatives believed that, in order to protect the minority from tyranny of the majority, the governmental system must contain a breaking action against unlimited majority rule. That is, they advocated state constitutional provisions which included within the framework of constitutional, representative government devices for delaying governmental decisionmaking -- devices for preventing quick action, for slowing down majority decisionmaking. Devices to break majority rule and provide opportunity for minority veto of governmental action favored by the majority -- e.g., strict legislative bicameralism (with each house of the legislature able to block and prevent passage of legislation supported by the other house), separation of powers coupled with checks and balances, and an "aristocratic" body incorporated into the governmental system -- were needed primarily for the purpose of protecting the rights and interests of the minority of persons owning substantial wealth and property. Such devices were to perform this function by ckecking and counterbalancing the representatives of the economically less well off popular majority -- i.e., counteracting and restraining officeholders in the "democratic," or "popular," organ of government, namely, the lower chamber of the legislature.

In brief, endeavors to draft state constitutions providing devices to protect minority rights and prevent majoritarian tyranny were the work of conservatives. Conservatives sought to "restore," or "reestablish," the balanced government of the colonial period, or what they perceived to have been balanced government during the colonial era. They sought to restore government characterized by maintenance of a balance of power among major political institutions representing differing and competing interests within a system of constitutional, representative government.

When conservatives referred to the "popular majority," or "democratic majority," the people who were to elect the lower house of the legislature and whose interests were to be represented in that body, they meant the small landholders and the skilled craftsmen. Conservatives did not believe that persons owning no property at all should be granted the right to vote in elections. Not only did conservatives believe in high property qualifications for voting in elections to choose the chief execttive and the members of the upper chamber of the legislature (or the members of an electoral college that would choose the upper chamber), they also thought that persons voting in elections for members of the lower legislative chamber should be required to own property of a certain value, though of a lower value than the property owned by voters in the elections for chief executive and for membership in the upper legislative house or in the electoral college. Conservatives expected the small property owners -- the socioeconomic stratum then called the "middling element," or "middling sort," and what contemporary sociologists call "an early middle class" -- to control the lower house of the legislature, while the "better element" (the owners of substantial wealth and property) controlled the upper house and the chief executive's office. The "meaner sort" (those persons without property and without the ambition to acquire property honestly) would not vote in elections and would have no voice at all in the government.

Government, according to conservative expectations, would be in the hands of representatives of the property owners, both small property owners and large property owners. Each of the two main strata of society -- the large middle class of small property holders and the smaller upper or upper-middle class of large property holders -- would have a major share of the governing power. Each of the two classes would have a strong voice in governmental decision making and therefore the ability to protect its own interests.

How did late eighteen century American conservatives justify this set of political arrangements -- arrangements giving the property owning classes control of the government and excluding the propertyless lower stratum from the political process? The conservative rationale was that the person who owned some property, however large or small it might be, had a stake in society. The person owning property and therefore having a stake in society stood to lose a great deal from a breakdown of government and society. He stood to lose signicicantly more than the person who owned no property. This would make the property holders more responsible in political affairs. Limiting political participation -- i.e., voting in elections and holding public office -- to the property owners would make government significantly more responsible than it would be if the propertyless "meaner sort" were permitted to participate in the political process.

Giving the large property owners a major voice in governmental decision making would make the government even more responsible. The wealthy and propertied "better element" had a much larger stake in society. If a breakdown in society and government occurred, each member of the "natural aristocracy" stood to lose considerably more than any person who owned only a small amount of property. This would male large property holders even more responsible than the small property holders in their participation in politics and public affairs. The stability and viability of the political and social system would be ensured.

        The Conservative Reaction -- 1777-1780. By late 1776 and early 1777, a conservative reaction had begun to set in against state government dominated by the legislature and the legislature, in turn, dominated by the majority in the popularly elected lower chamber. Certain of the more conservative groups within the American Whig movement tended strongly to see the political situation in most states as one of unlimited rule by an irresponsible popular majority -- "popular despotism" and "simple, unchecked democracy" -- or one of absolute rule by the dominant elites and factions in the legislature, i.e., "legislative despotism," or oligarchy. These conservative Whigs gained more and more political supporters and allies, as many people, observing or hearing about state government in action in those states that had adopted their constitutions early in the process of state constitution making, became convinced that what they perceived to be a very dangerous trend toward political instability, chaos, mob rule, and loss of protection of private property rights and other civil liberties in the states had to be stopped.

Since New York and Massachusetts adopted their respective constitutions late in the game, the two states had the benefit of awareness of the mistakes other states had made in drawing up and adopting their respective state constitutions. The political leaders in New York and Massachusetts, operating within the context of a shift of American public opinion in favor of balanced government, with stronger and more independent executives and judiciaries, along with a greater balance of power between lower and upper houses of the legislature, set out to obtain the drafting, ratification, and adoption of state constitutions that provided for systems of divided and balanced political authority in state government. In their endeavor to bring this about, the New York and Massachusetts political leaders took advantage of and derived benefit from the conservative reaction -- the shift in the popular mood from democratic radicalism to constitutional conservatism.

Also benefiting from this conservative reaction were those American political leaders who would soon mount a drive to secure the adoption of a new national constitution to replace the Articles of Confederation and provide the U.S.A. with a stronger and more effective central government -- the drive that led to the Federal Constitutional Convention of 1787, the drafting of the United States Constitution, and its ratification and adoption in 1789.

The Federal Constitutional Convention and the formation of the American federal union with a strong central government will be discussed in Section B, Part Five. Here, we will deal with two early products growing out of the conservative reaction -- the New York Constirution of 1777 and the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780.

5. The New York Constitution of 1777 -- The Scheme of State Government:

The State of New York adopted a state constitution which had many important conservative features. The Constitution reflected rejection of the principle of legislative supremacy, provided for a comparatively strong governor, and established formidable barriers to unrestrained popular rule -- bulwarks against tyranny of the majority.

        The Governor of New York -- His Position and Power. The New York Constitution (1) vested in the Governor "the supreme executive power and authority of the state," (2) provided the Governor with a three-year term of office, which was a comparatively long term at the time, (3) set no limit on the Governor's eligibility for reelection, making him indefinitely reeligible, i.e., permitting him to serve as many terms as the voters were willing to elect him to serve, and (4) provided that the Governor would be chosen by statewide direct popular election, rather than chosen by appointment by the State Legislature.

In providing for direct popular election of the Governor, the New York Constitution made the Governor largely independent of the Legislature. The State Constitution gave the Governor a separate and independent power base, a power base separate from and independent of that of that of the Legislature. The Governor was not dependent upon the Legislature for election and reelection, i.e., the Governor was neither chosen by nor directly responsible to the Legislature. Instead, he was chosen by and directly responsible to the voters of the entire state. Thus, the Governor had his own popular constituency; and this was a statewide constituency, which was quite different from the local constituencies of individual members of the Legislature. The electoral independence provided the Governor was a very large step in the direction of making the state governorship a very powerful office.

The New York Constitution gave the Governor what was, for that time, an exceedingly potent group of powers. The Governor was given authority to (1) serve as Commander in Chief of the State Militia and as Admiral of the State Navy, (2) convene the New York State Legislature on extraordinary occasions, i.e., call special sessions of the Legislature, (3) prorogue, or adjourn, the Legislature for limited periods, (3) grant reprieves and pardons to persons convicted of state crimes specified and defined in New York State law, (4) inform the Legislature on the condition of the State, (5) recommend to the Legislature matters for its consideration, and (6) take care that the laws of the State be faithfully executed.

The delegates to the New York State Constitutional Convention refused to hamstring the Governor by requiring him to share his constitutional decision-making and action-taking authority with an executive council. The powers granted to the Governor by the Constitution were to be exercised by him alone, without his needing the consent of the majority of members of a collegial body. Two exceptions to this constitutional arrangement were the Council of Appointment and the Council of Revision, both of which will be discussed below.

The New York Constitution's provision for a strong and independent chief executive was a conservative feature of the Constitution. Provision for a strong and independent governorship was, to a large degree, a return to to the colonial practice -- a return to the customary and traditional pattern of government in English-speaking North America.

        The New York Legislature -- Assembly and Senate. The New York Constitution provided for a bicameral state legislature, with both chambers of the Legislature to be chosen by direct popular vote. The lower chamber, styled the New York Assembly, was to consist of seventy members elected to serve one-year terms. The seventy members of the Assembly were to be elected from each county, with the voters in each county eventually choosing a number of members based on that county's population. Initially, the number of Assembly members a county elected was constitutionally fixed, but was to be corrected, or adjusted, on the basis of data subsequently obtained from seven-year censuses -- adjusted and reapportioned so that the number of representatives in the Assembly from each county would be justly proportioned to the number of qualified voter in the county.

The upper chamber of the Legislature, styled the New York Senate, was to consist of twenty-four members elected to serve four-year terms, staggered. The Senators were to be elected from four large senatorial districts within the State, with the terms of one-fourth of the twenty-four Senators expiring every year -- a different fourth each year. As in the case of the member of the Assembly elected from each county, the number of Senators elected from each senatorial district was, at first, constitutionally fixed (Southern District, nine; Middle District, six; Western District, six; and Eastern District, 3), but, after each seven-year census, the number was to be adjusted and reapportioned on the basis of the latest population data for the district, thereby assuring that the number of Senators from each district would be justly proportioned to the number of qualified voters in the district.

          Voter Qualifications -- Requirements for Participation in New York Elections. For a man to be eligible to vote in elections of members of the Assembly, he had to be a freeholder -- the owner of an estate in land -- and the freehold, or estate, had to be worth at least twenty pounds. To be qualified to participate in the election of Senators or the Governor, a voter was required to own a freehold worth at least 100 pounds title clear, i.e., a freehold worth at lease 100 pounds over and above all debts changed on the freehold.

The constitutional foundation and structuring of the New York Legislature, coupled with the property holding requirements for exercise of the electoral franchise, constituted a conservative feature of the Constitution. This was particularly true, as regards the New York Senate. The New York Assembly was designed to be chosen by the middle class of small property owners and controlled by that socioeconomic stratum, while the Senate was to be selected and controlled the upper or upper-middle class of large property holders. With strict legislative bicameralism -- with each chamber of the legislature having an absolute veto over legislative action favored by the other chamber -- the two classes of property owners could check and counteract each other, each stratum protecting its own rights and vital interests against irresponsible or tyrannical measures advovated by the other.

        The New York State Judiciary --State Judges and Judicial Indeperndence. In establishing the judicial branch of state government, the New York Constitution provided for a degree of judicial independence. The judges of the Supreme Court and the senior judge of each county court were to be entitled to hold their respective offices during good behavior or until "they shall have respectively attained the age of sixty years."

Providing a degree of judicial independence for the state judiciary was, of course, an important move in a conservative direction.

        Balanced Government -- A Balance of Power in the New York Governmental System. The New York Constitution of 1777 reflected the conservatives' belief in balanced government -- a system of government in which political authority is divided up and allocated among several separate and largely independent organs of government, governmental organs which represent constituents with varying and competing interests and have a vested interest in checking and opposing each other and thereby maintaining a balance, or equilibrium, of power in the governmental system and preventing any single institution of government or any single political faction or interest from dominating the entire system.

The 1777 New York Constitution was the first of the early American state constitutions to establish a true balance, or equilibrium, of power among the three branches of government, legislative, executive, and judicial. The Constitution not only granted to the Governor a relative potent set of powers, but also vested in the New York Legislature the full measure of the legislative power of the State of New York, Article II of the Constitution providing as follows:

". . . the supreme legislative power within this State shall be vested in two separate and distinct bodies of men; the one to be called the Assembly of the State of New York, the other to be called the Senate of the State of New York; who together shall form the Legislature, and meet once at least in every year for the despatch of business.

Moreover, a balance of power was established between the two chambers of the New York Legislature, between what conservatives saw as the interests of the popular majority represented in the Assembly and the interests of the aristocratic minority represented in the Senate. The latter would safeguard the rights and vital interests of the minority by counteracting and counterbalancing the tendency toward, majoritarian tyranny, or simple, unchecked democracy, in the Assembly. According to conservative perceptions and expectations, the Assembly, with its members elected to very short terms, would undergo rapid changes in membership, be highly susceptible to intimidation by the popular pressures of the moment, and very likely to be spooked into passing hasty and unwise legislation -- measures that would seriously threaten minority rights and interests. With Senators elected to longer terms and with slower changes in the Senate's membership, the Senate would, to a great extent, be insulated from momentary popular pressures and would, in all probability, function as a conservative counterweight to a more radical Assembly, the Senate exercising the power of absolute veto over state legislation to prevent the enactment of hasty, unwise, and harmful legislation favored by the Assembly.

In short, momentarily popular legislative activity deemed to be radical by the aristocratic-minded conservatives in New York was to be restrained by the state governmental system established under the New York Constitution. This arrangement was in keeping with the attitudes, values, and beliefs of New York conservatives, many of whom had advocated a political order with many of the features of an oligarchy, including high property qualifications for the Governor and his Councilora and a Senate whose members would be elected to serve life terms.

        Major Defects of the New York Constitution -- The Council of Appointment and the Council of Revision. Two innovations, the Council of Appointment and the Council of Revision, were the main defects in the 1777 New York Constitution -- defects that were impossible to perceive prior to their implementation after the Constitution had been adopted and state government began to operate under the Constitution.

The Constitution provided that the Legislature was to annually appoint four Senators, one from each senatorial district, to sit with the Governor as a Council of Appointment, which would appoint state execitive officers and judges. The Governor was to preside at meetings of the Council of Appointment, but he was to have only a casting vote in the Council's decisions. This arrangement deprived the Governor of the political power that he would have derived from control of patronage and of subordinate executive officers who would have been beholding solely to the Governor for their respective appointments, and this lack of gubernatorial control weakened the Governor's ability to direct, control, and manage the executive branch of state government.

The New York Constitution, in order to prevent the Legislature's hasty and unwise passage of "laws inconsistent with the spirit of this Constitution, or with the public good," created the Council of Revision. Article III of the Constitution provided:

"the Governor for the time being, the Chancellor, and the judges of the Supreme Court, or any two of them, together with the Governor, shall be, and hereby are, constituted a Council to revise all bills about to be passed into laws by the Legislature; and for that purpose shall assemble themselves from time to time, when the Legislature shall be convened. . . . all bills which have passed the Senate and Assembly shall, before they become laws, be presented to the said Council for their revisal and consideration; and if, upon such revision and consideration, it should appear improper to the said Council, or a majority of them, that the said bill should become a law of this State, that they return the same, together with their objections thereto in writing, to the Senate or house of Assembly (in which soever the same shall have originated) who shall enter the objection sent down by the Council at large in their minutes, and proceed to reconsider the said bill. But if, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of the said Senate or house of Assembly shall, notwithstanding the said objections, agree to pass the same, it shall together with the objections, be sent to the other branch of the Legislature, where it shall also be reconsidered, and, if approved by two-thirds of the members present, shall be a law.

". . . if any bill shall not be returned by the Council within ten days after it shall have been presented, the same shall be a law, unless the Legislature shall, by their adjournment, render a return of the said bill within ten days impracticable; in which case the bill shall be returned on the first day of the meeting of the Legislature after the expiration of the said ten days."

The constitutional provision placing the executive veto power over legislation in the hands of the Council of Revision, a collegial body of which the Governor was a single member with a single vote, established a very cumbersome and restrictive procedure for vetoing acts of the Legislature and thereby weakened the ability of the chief executive to check and restrain the legislative branch of government.

However, creating the Council of Revision to exercise the executive veto over legislation was more a conservative than a radical move by the New York constitution makers. The large landowners were well aware that they could often control the Council of Revision and use that control to protect their own class interests. Hence, the Council of Revision exercising the veto was a bulwark for the traditional political and social order in New York and against radical change.

        The New York Constitution's Influence on the United States Constitution. The 1777 New York Constitution exerted considerable influence on the delegates to the Federal Constitutional Convention of 1787. The office of Governor of New York, as stipulated in the New York Constitution, was an important model guiding the Federal Convention delegates who drew up Article II of the United States Constitution -- the executive article of the Federal Constitution.

6. The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 -- The Scheme of State Government:

Like the New York Constitution of 1777, the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 reflected the conservatives' rejection of the principle of legislative supremacy, embraced their belief in balanced government, established strong barriers to straight majority rule, and provided for a truly bicameral state legislature, a comparatively strong chief executive, an independent judiciary, and a system of checks and balances among the three branches of government -- legislative, executive, and judicial -- and between the two houses of the legislature.

        The Massachusetts General Court -- A Bicameral State Legislature. Part Two, Chapter 1, Section 1, Article I, of the 1780 Massachusetts Constitution provided:

        "The department of legislation shall be formed by two branches, a Senate         and House of Representatives; each of which shall have a negative on the         other.

        The legislative body . . . shall be styled the General Court of Massachusetts."

        The Masachusetts House of Representatives. The House of Representative, the lower and more numerous chamber of the General Court, was to consist of members popularly elected annually, and seats in the House were to be apportioned among the towns on the basis of population, with the voters in each town entitled to choose at least one Representative and, beyond that, a number of Representatives based on the town's total number of legal residents. In other words, representation in the House of Representatives was to be based of the principle of representation according to population.

All money bills (tax and appropriations bills) were to originate -- be first introduced -- in the House of Representatives, but the Senate was to have the right to propose or concur with amendments to revenue and appropriations bills, as well as in cases of other types of legislative bills.

The House of Representatives was to have the power to adjourn itself, but for no longer than two days at a time. The Senate was to have the same power.

The Massachusetts House of Representatives was designed to function as the "popular," or "democratic," chamber of the legislature. It was expected to represent the interests of the many (the most numerous socioeconomis element) within society -- the common people who owned no private property of any great consequence, i.e., the small landholders and the skilled craftsmen.

        The Massachussets Senate. The Senate, the upper and smaller chamber of the General Court, was to consist of forty Senators elected annually by direct popular vote from thirteen senatorial election districts. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts was to be divided into thirteen senatorial districts and, in each district, the voters residing there were to choose a number of Senators based on the amount of state taxes paid by the residents of the district. Thus, the Senate was to be apportioned on the basis of taxable wealth, rather than on the basis of population. The principle governing representation in the Senate was to be representation according to taxable wealth.

Like the upper house of the New York Legislature, the upper chamber of the Massachusetts General Court was founded on conservative principles. With representation in the Massachusetts Senate apportioned on the basis of taxable wealth and with a high property qualification for holding a seat in that body, the Senate was to have a special relation to wealth and property and was to function as the "aristocratic" chamber of the General Court. It was expected to represent primarily the interests of the wealthy and propertied minority in Massachusetts society -- persons of economic substance from the upper social classes. The Senate was intended to serve as a brake on straight majority rule -- a brake on unchecked rule by the the "popular," or "democratic," interest represented in the House of Representatives. The wealthy and propertied minority represented in the Senate was to be enabled to check and counterbalance the economically less-well-off majority represented in the House of Representatives.

Apportioning the Massachusetts Senate on the basis of taxable wealth and the conservative assumptions underlying this arrangement were to have an influence on the shaping of the provision for an upper house of the national legislature contained in the Randolph Resolutions, or Virginia Plan -- the set of proposals for a strong and effective central government for the U.S.A. as a whole which were written by James Madison and presented by Virginia Governor Edmund Randolph to the 1787 Federal Constitutional Convention.

        The Governor of Massachusetts -- His Position and Power. Under the 1780 Massachusetts Constitution, the Governor was made stronger than were the governors in those states which had adopted state constitutions earlier than had Massachusetts and New York. The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts declared the Governor to be the "supreme magistrate" of the Commonwealth -- i.e., the chief executive of the state.

The Governor was to elected by direct popular vote, in a statewide election. While the Governor was to be elected to serve a term of one year, he was to be indefinitely eligible for reelection. Thus, the Governor was provided with a political power base separate from and independent of that of the legislative branch of government.

The powers granted to the Governor included a strong veto over legislation passed by the General Court. A two-thirds vote in each chamber of the two chambers of the General Court was required for the legislature to enact a law over the Governor's objection and negative, i.e., override a gubernatorial veto.

The Constitution made the Governor Commander-in-Chief of all military forces of the Commonwealth and provided that he was to have "full power, by himself, or by any commander, or officer or officers, from time to time, to train, instruct, exercise, and govern the militia and [state] navy.

The Constitution gave the Governor the pardoning power -- the power to grant pardona to persons convicted of crimes against the Commonwealth, i.e., crimes defined by state law and committed inside the state's borders. The Governor was empowered, by and with the consent of the Council, to nominate and appoint all judicial officers, the Attorney-General, the Solicitor-General, and all sheriffs, coroners, and registers of probate. The Governor's appointment of these officers was subject to the approval or rejection of the majority of the Council, a collegial body operating within the executive branch of government.

The Governor, elected by the voters in a statewide election, was expected to represent the entire state, rather than a particular segment of the state's population. While each chamber of the General Court was to represent a particular interest or set of interests within Massachusetts society, the Governor was to represent the general interests, or general welfare, of the entire society. It was intended that the Governor be the one and only representative of the people of Massachusetts as a whole.

The foregoing expectation was derived the English idea of the "patriot King": Only the Monarch can represent the whole nation. The House of Lords represents one set of special interests -- those of the Nobility, the aristocratic minority within society. The House of Commons represents another set of special interests -- those of the "popular," or "democratic," majority within society.

As was the case with the Governor of New York, creation of a strong and independent chief executive in Massachusetts was, in large measure, a return to traditional Anglo-American governmental institutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Provision for a strong and independent chief executive, combined with the very high property qualification for holding the office of Governor, was an important conservative feature of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780.

        Qualifications for Voting in Elections and for Holding Public Office. To vote in elections to fill government offices, a man had to have a freehold estate worth three pounds in annual income, or any other estate worth sixty pounds in yearly income. To be qualified to hold a seat in the House of Representatives, one had to have freehold worth 100 pounds, or other estate worth 200 pounds. A Senator had to have a freehold worth 300 pounds, or other estate worth 600 pounds. The Governor had to have a freehold worth 1000 pounds.

        The Council. Under the Constitution, the Council was established as a collegial body to advise and assist the Governor in the performance of particular functions and duties. The Council was to consist of ten Councilors -- the Lieutenant-Governor and nine other persons chosen from the forty Senators. The nine Senators selected to be Councilors were to be elected by a joint ballot of the General Court meeting in joint session -- by a joint ballot of the Senators and Representatives assembled in one room. If the number of Senators willing to accept election to the Council was less than nine, the defficiency was to be made up from voters voting in the most recent election and willing to take seats on the Council.

The Governor was given "full power and authority, from time to time, at his discretion, to assemble and call together" the Councillors, and, with the Councillors, or at least five of them, "from time to time, hold and keep a Council, for ordering and directing the affairs of the Commonwealth, according to the laws of the land."

        The Massachusetts Judiciary. Under the 1777 Massachusetts Constitution, provision was made for a system of independent courts. Judges of the state courts were to be appointed by the Governor, with each of his judicial appointments subject to the consent, or approval, of a majority of the Councilors sitting with the Governor as the Council. All duly appointed, commissioned, and sworn judges were to hold their respective judicial offices during good behavior, being subject to removal by the Governor only upon a gubernatorial address to the two chambers of the state legislkature, such action on the part of the Governor requiring the consent of a majority of the Council.

To the extent that the foregoing arrangement ensured judicial independence, it was a conservative feature of the Massachusetts Constitution.

        Balanced Government and Mixed Government. Rejecting simple, unchecked democracy and domination of the governmental system by the legislature, the Massachusetts Constitution provided for a balance of power among the principal organs of state government. The governmental system of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts was constructed on two closely related conservative political principles and devices -- (1) balanced government and (2) mixed government.

        Balanced Government. As previoussly mentioned, balanced government is a constitutional arrangement under which the powers of government are distributed among several separate and largely independent governmental organs which represent constituencies with varying and competing interests and have very strong incentives to block, check, and restrain one another, thereby maintaining a balance of power in the governmental system and keeping any one interest or faction from dominating the entire system.

        Mixed Government. Mixed government is a system of government constitutionally structured to represent different socioeconomic classes and interests within society, such as monarchy, aristocracy, and commoners. In early American constitutional and political history, mixed government was a governmental system deliberately designed to provide for representation of both property and numbers of people -- representation according to wealth as well as representation according to population. The upper house of the legislature was intended to represent wealth and property. And the lower chamber was expected to represent population.

Mixed government is an example of limited government in which the limitation on power comes as much from a balance of interests and forces within the governmental system as from constitutional provisions specifically prohibiting the government's exercise of particular powers, e.g., the prohibitions contained in constitutional provisions guaranteeing and protecting individual rights and liberties.

        John Adams and the Concepts of Balanced Government and Mixed Government. John Adams was instrumental in getting the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention to provide for a state government founded on a combination of the principles of balanced government and mixed government. The idea was not original with Adams. In addition to Adams, political philosophers who, in the Modern Era, have contributed significantly to development of the concepts of balanced government and mixed government include James Harrington, in The Commonwealth of Oceana (1656), and Baron Montesquieu, in The Spirit of the Law (1748). Montesquieu's version of the relevant political theory is widely known as the theory of "separation of powers" and "checks and balances."

7. Significance of the New York and Massachusetts Constitutions:

The significance of the New York and Massachusetts Constitutions lies in their influence on (1) the other states when, in later years, the issue of state constitutional amendment and revision was given consideration and (2) the Framers of the Constitution of the United States. As regards their influence on the Framers, the two state constitutions served as models for consideration by the delegates to the Federal Constitutional Convention of 1787. The New York and Massachusetts Constitutions had a decisive influence on the work of the American Founding Fathers, on the Convention delegates' draft of the United States Constitution.

8. The Maryland Constitution of 1776 -- An Earlier Victory for Conservatism:

An important victory for the conservatives was won in Maryland in November, 1775, when that state's first constitution was adopted.

        The Maryland General Assembly --Senate and House of Delegates. The most significant feature of the Maryland Constitution was the careful differentiation between the method of choice of members of the upper house of the state legislature and the mode of selection of members of the lower house. Members of the Maryland Senate, the upper chamber of Maryland's General Assembly, were to be chosen for long terms, and by an indirect method of election. While the lower chamber, the House of Delegates, was to be chosen by direct popular election for short terms (elected annually by freemen having thirty pounds or fifty acres of land), members of the Maryland Senate were to be elected by an electoral college for five-year terms.

        The Electoral College and Election of the Senate. The electoral college that would choose the Maryland Senate was to be elected by the voters. In September, 1781, and every fifth year thereafter, the voters were to name two persons for each county, and one for each of the two cities (Annapolis and Baltimore), to be electors of the Senate. Three weeks later, the Electoral College was to meet and select from its own ranks or from the people at large fifteen Senators, nine from the western shore of Maryland and six from the eastern shore. To be eligible for election to the Senate, a man had to have resided in Maryland for three years and had to own property worth at least 1,000 pounds.

        Indirect Election of Senators -- The Most Conservative Feature. The whole arrangement for choosing members of the Maryland Senate was the most conservative feature of the 1776 Maryland Constitution. This arrangement was the antithesis of the system which the Pennsylvania radicals were adopting at the same time. Because of the arrangement adopted by Maryland, that state was well protected against the chief danger that arose in most of the states after 1776 -- the rash of unwise and destructive legislation demanded by viciferous, ill-educated voters.

        The Influence of the Maryland Constitution on the 1787 Federal Constitutional Convention. In 1787, leading delegates to the Federal Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia were favorably impressed by Maryland's indirect method of electing its upper legislative chamber. James Madison, in writing the Virginia Plan, which called for an indirectly elected upper house of the national legislature, was strongly in fluenced by the arrangement in Maryland. In Federalist Paper Number 63 (1787), Alexander Hamilton singled out for praise Maryland's indirect election of the upper house of its General Assembly.

        High Property Qualifications for Holding Public Office -- Another Conservative Feature. Another conservative feature of the Maryland Constitution lay in the high property qualifications for holding government office. Each member of the House of Delegates had to have property worth at least 500 pounds. Each Senator had to own property worth at least 1,000 pounds. The Governor had to have real and personal property of not less than 5,000 pounds in value, and a portion of this property had to be in a freehold estate worth at least 1.000 pounds.