Yugoslavia's 1946 federal constitution--the Constitution of the Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia--designated Kosovo as one of Serbia's two autonomous provinces, which, unlike Yugoslavia's six autonomous republics (Serbia, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia- Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro), lacked the constitutional right to secede from the Yugoslav federation. While less than eight percent of Kosovo's 2,100,000 inhabitants are Serbs, more than 90 percent are Albanian-speaking Kosovans, or Kosovars, a separate nationality group distinct from the Serbs and culturally akin to the people of Albania. In 1974, Yugoslav president Marshal Josip Broz Tito, granted Kosovo a significantly greater degree of autonomy, giving the province legal standing almost equal to that of one of the six autonomous republics and permitting Albanian-language schools and observation of Muslim holy days within the province. The greater autonomy and other concessions granted to Kosovo in 1974, coupled with the unraveling of the Yugoslav federation, following the death of Tito in 1980 and the subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union, encouraged the Kosovans to demand even greater autonomy. Kosovan students began to demonstrate and riot, demanding complete independence for Kosovo.

In 1987, Slobodan Milosevic, leader of the Communist Party of Serbia but, for purposes of domestic political appeal, assuming the public posture characteristic of a Pan-Serbian ultranationalist, stirred up tensions between Serbs and Kosovans and employed anti-Kosovan, extreme Serbian nationalist propaganda in a successful bid to take over governing power in Serbia and in the Yugoslav federation. Two years later, Milosevic revoked Kosovo's autonomy, bringing the province under the direct control of the Serbian government in Belgrade. Suspending operation of Kosovo's legislature and executive, Milosevic stripped the provincial institutions of all their powers and functions and transferred them to the Serbian parliament and cabinet. Declaring Albanian an unofficial language, he had all Albanian-speaking Kosovans expelled from the schools, universities, and medical institutions in Kosovo. When the Kosovans vigorously protested these actions, Milosevic sent military and security-police units into Kosovo and imposed a police-state regime on the province.

In a plebiscite, or referendum, held in 1991, an overwhelming majority of the Kosovans voted in favor of complete independence and declared Kosovo to be a sovereign state. Milosevic overruled the decision of the Kosovan voters, asserting that Kosovo was an inseparable part of Serbia. Only Albania extended diplomatic recognition to Kosovo.

Holding elections in 1992, the Kosovans elected a parliament, and Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, a moderate, was elected president. Following the path of peaceful resistance to Serbian rule, Rugova established a system of educational and medical institutions that were operated by and for Kosovans--institutions parallel to those run by and for Serbs. The clinics, schools, and university provided by Rugova and his supporters were financed entirely by Kosovans living outside of Kosovo and Yugoslavia.

Milosevic refused to recognize the Kosovan elections as legitimate and sought to forcibly suppress the institutions operated by the Kosovans. His repression of the Kosovans intensified, becoming increasingly violent and high-handed. Kosovan political activists were arrested and imprisoned without trial.

As Milosevic stepped up his reign of terror in Kosovo, more and more Kosovans came to regard as futile Rugova's campaign of nonviolent resistance to the Serbs. Out of frustration over the ineffectiveness of the nonviolent approach, more and more of the younger, more militant Kosovans joined the emerging Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)--an underground guerrilla movement dedicated to complete independence for Kosovo and convinced that this goal could not be achieved without resort to armed rebellion.

Reinforcing this increasing determination of Kosovans to go for broke, demanding for Kosovo nothing less than the status of a sovereign, completely independent state and resorting to revolutionary violence in order to obtain that status, was Rugova's failure to secure U.S. support for his peaceful approach to persuading Milosevic to respect and observe Kosovo's right to autonomy. When Rugova, in 1995, went to Washington, D.C., and asked the U.S. Government to spearhead an endeavor to resolve by international mediation the conflict between Serbia and the Kosovans, the Clinton Presidency turned down the request.

Refusal of the Clintonites, in 1995, to initiate and promote international mediation of the Kosovan-Serbian conflict proved to be a serious blunder, one that was quite costly to the U.S.A. and its Western allies. The Clintonites were taking what they perceived to be a moderate, reasonable, and strictly legal position regarding the Serbian-Kosovan conflict, the position that--

International borders in Europe were inviolable;

Kosovo, legally, was an integral part of Serbia and lacked the constitutional right to secede;

While the Kosovans should have the right to substan tial autonomy, they must exercise that self-governing power within the framework of the Serbian state;

The Western nations could not and would not support the Kosovan separatists' demand for full indepen- dence;

If the West supported the separatists, the result would be radicalization of the Kosovan resistance to Milosevic and further destabilization of the already very volatile situation in the Balkans.

By refusing Rugova's 1995 request, the Clinton Presidency undermined its own Balkan policy as well as the political position of Rugova in Kosovo. Failure of the U.S. Government to support Rugova was a major factor in the increasing radicalization of the Kosovan resistance movement--a potent variable influencing the Kosovan people to lose faith in Rugova's efforts at moderation and peaceful resistance and to rally to the support of the Kosovo Liberation Army--support of the KLA's commitment to waging revolutionary war to achieve its objective of outright independence.

Moreover, the U.S. refusal to intervene diplomatically on behalf of Rugova encouraged Milosevic to believe that America had grown weary of the conflict in Kosovo and, as a consequence, was abandoning Rugova and throwing him to the wolves. Milosevic figured that he could now crack down on the Kosovans, without provoking the U.S.A. and NATO into taking serious military action against his regime. In anticipating the West's reaction to his planned military offensive in Kosovo, Milosevic was grossly miscalculating, as he had done in Bosnia.

The overly cautious tactics employed by the Clinton Presidency, instead of preventing radicalization and further destabilization, did just the opposite; they actually caused radicalization of the conflict and further destabilization of the situation in the former Yugoslavia. With the Kosovans determined to seize independence and sovereignty by means of force and violence and with Milosevic equally determined to employ the same means to prevent the Kosovans from attaining even the most minimal degree of autonomy, much less independence and sovereignty, another Balkan war directly involving the U.S.A. was imminent.

Later in 1995, the KLA began an armed insurrection against the police-state regime that Milosevic had imposed on the Kosovan people. Withstanding and driving back Milosevic's security-police and units of the Yugoslav Federal Army, the KLA gained control of a small segment of Kosovo's territory. By Summer, however, the security police and federal soldiers had received Milosevic's order to use any and all means--including the most brutal--to stamp out the Kosovan rebellion.

In 1996, tensions between Kosovans and Serbs began to heat up again. Launching another campaign against Serbian domination, the KLA, with approximately 30,000 armed guerrillas, began to attack Serb policemen. In 1997, the KLA stepped up its campaign against Serb policemen, killing many of them and managing to win control over particular regions of Kosovo.

In early 1998, Milosevic retaliated in a merciless and savage manner, initiating a massive counteroffensive against the Kosovan people. Ignoring U.S. and NATO warnings not to do so, Milosevic dispatched to Kosovo Yugoslav/Serbian military and paramilitary units which, in carrying out their orders, massacred hundreds of Kosovan civilians in an effort to terrorize the Kosovans, to frighten them into submission and obedience.

Milosevic, however, underestimated both the military capabilities of the KLA and the resolve of the Kosovan people. The Serbian assault on the whole Kosovan population--entailing perpetration of such atrocities as using armored vehicles and anti-aircraft guns to fire on and destroy entire villages, burning down houses, murdering hundreds of civilians, and dispossession of survivors, forcing them to migrate under the worst possible conditions--had the effect of strengthening the resolve of the Kosovans to resist and overthrow Serb domination. The ranks of the KLA swelled, and the fighting continued. By the Summer of 1998, the KLA controlled sizeable portions of Kosovo's territory

Milosevic reacted to this debacle by launching a larger and more brutal offensive against the Kosovans. Yugoslav/Serbian security-police and military forces slaughtered more than 2,000 Kosovans and caused nearly 400,000 of them to flee their homes as refugees and displaced persons. This escalation of the Kosovan-Serbian conflict caught the attention of the U.S.A. and its allies, causing them grave concern and significantly mitigating their reluctance to intervene into the conflict. When NATO threatened Serbia with air strikes, Milosevic pulled most of his military and paramilitary forces out of Kosovo, giving assurance that he would neither renew his efforts to repress the Kosovan people nor redeploy his forces in Kosovo. Within weeks, however, Milosevic was making plans for a still larger and more brutal offensive and genocidal program against the Kosovans.

As the Kosovan-Serbian conflict continued, sporadically at first, and then constantly, the U.S.A. and its NATO allies began taking the initial steps toward intervention into the conflict.

At the May 28, 1998, meeting of the North Atlantic Council, the defense ministers of NATO member-states (including U.S. Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen) officially defined two principal policy objectives with regard to the conflict in Kosovo. These two objectives were to (1) assist the "international community" in its endeavor to bring about a peaceful settlement of the conflict and (2) seek to enhance the stability and security of neighboring Balkan states, especially Albania and Macedonia.

At the North Atlantic Council's June 12 meeting, NATO foreign ministers requested an enumeration and evaluation of additional actions which NATO could take with respect to the growing crisis in Kosovo. This resulted in NATO's examination of numerous possible alternative cources of military action.

Three days later, NATO made an attempt to deliver a clear and unambiguous message to Milosevic:

Get out of Kosovo, or be blasted out. We are now present in your part of the world. We are right above you. And we are in a position to strike you--and, if necessary, destroy you.

The message, though unequivocal, was subtle in form. It was in the form of NATO warplanes in the sky above the Balkan Peninsula. For on June 15, NATO aircraft commenced military exercises over the Balkans.

Apparently, Milosevic failed to get the message. In early September, he launched his planned new offensive against the Kosovans, an extremely brutal military campaign characterized by the usual atrocities that Serbs had become accustomed to committing against non-Serbs--massacre of civilians, destruction of homes and villages, confiscation of property without compensation, and forced of migration civilian survivors. In response to these developments, the U.N. Security Council called for an immediate truce, to be followed by peace talks between Serbs and Kosovans. The North Atlantic Council, on September 24, issued an ultimatum to Milosevic, demanding that he cease the violence against Kosovans and warning the Serbian dictator that, if he failed to do so, Serbia and Serb positions in Kosovo would be subject to NATO air strikes.

Despite the U.N. and NATO initiatives, the Serbian military campaign continued. Hence, NATO continued its preparations for air strikes against the Serbs.

On October 2, the U.S. Government issued a blunt warning: If the Serbian offensive is not terminated forthwith, air strikes against the Serbs will be launched within two weeks.

On October 13, the North Atlantic Council approved Activation Orders for NATO air strikes against the Serbs. This action, along with diplomatic pressures subsequently brought to bear on Milosevic, induced him, at the eleventh hour, to accept a ceasefire agreement brokered by U.S. special envoy Richard C. Holbrooke. With Milosevic's acceptance of the agreement, the NATO air strikes were called off.

According to the terms of the October 13 truce, (1) the Serbian offensive was to be ended immediately, (2) the bulk of the Yugoslav/Serbian security police and military forces were to be withdrawn from Kosovo, (3) Yugoslav/Serbian troops remaining in Kosovo were not to interfere with the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes, and (4) the Milosevic regime was to allow the introduction of 1,800 unarmed international observers--observers who were to monitor compliance with the terms of the ceasefire agreement and who were to operate as the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), which had been authorized by the North Atlantic Council and which was to be established by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

Following Milosevic's acceptance of the October 13 agreement, large numbers of Kosovan refugees returned home, many of them to find out that the Yugoslav/Serbian troops had burned their homes and slaughtered their livestock. KVM observers arrived in Kosovo and began to monitor compliance with the ceasefire agreement. The U.S.A. and its allies hoped that a peaceful settlement of the Kosovo conflict had been achieved at last.

However, peaceful relations between Kosovans and Serbs was not yet in the cards. The animosity between the two nationality groups was so acute and the disagreement between them so bitter that it was impossible for the two groups to dwell in close proximity to each other under a common government and within the same territorial borders and, at the same time, be at peace with one another. The fighting and killing continued, and by early January, 1999, the truce had collapsed. The Yugoslav/Serbian offensive resumed, reaching a peak on January 15, when the Yugoslav Federal Army and Milosevic's Special Police attacked the small village of Racak, resulting in the deaths of 45 Kosovan civilians.

The slaughter at Racak was the stimulous for the U.S.A. and its allies to bring representatives of the warring parties together to negotiate a settlement of the conflict. The settlement proposed by the Western powers called for wide autonomy for Kosovo and introduction into the province of NATO ground forces to enforce the terms of the settlement. Milosevic refused to consent to such an arrangement.

On January 18 and 19, NATO threatened Milosevic with air strikes. On January 20, the U.S. aircraft carrier, USS Enterprise, was deployed to the Adriatic Sea.

On January 29, Yugoslav/Serbian troops attacked a suspected KLA stronghold and killed 24 men, most of whom were civilians.

On January 30, the North Atlantic Council, meeting at the ambassadorial level, authorized NATO air strikes against Serb positions and installations in Serbia and Kosovo, unless Milosevic, within a week, agreed to negotiate with the Kosovans. The Council, on the same day, issued a warning to both Milosevic and the KLA: Begin negotiations right away and arrive at a peace agreement within three weeks, or face the consequences--namely, NATO air strikes against militarily significant targets within territory under your control.

These actions on the part of NATO's supreme decision-making body resulted in both sides in the conflict reluctantly entering into negotiations at Rambouillet (near Paris), the first round of talks occurring February 6-23 and the second round taking place March 15-18. The proposed peace settlement presented by U.S. mediator Christopher Hill called for granting Kosovo broader autonomy for a three-year period and allowing the political parties to make arrangements for what would occur after the end of the period. The U.S. proposed peace plan included provision for a Kosovan constitution, holding elections, and an international ombudsman to hear and resolve complaints. In addition, the peace plan stipulated that the Milosevic regime was to permit up to 30,000 NATO troops to be deployed to Kosovo to enforce the terms of the peace settlement.

On March 18, at the end of the second round of peace talks in Rambouillet, the Kosovan delegation, which included representatives of the KLA, signed the proposed agreement, and the talks ended without the signatures of the Serbian delegation.

Immediately following the failure and breakup of the Rambouillet peace conference, Yugoslav/Serbian security-police and military forces escalated the fighting in Kosovo. Milosevic sent additional troops and modern tanks into Kosovo, in a flagrant violation of the peace agreement of October 13, 1998. The Serbian military and paramilitary forces conducted a systematic offensive against the Kosovans, tens of thousands of whom began to flee their homes.

On March 20, the KVM monitors, no longer able to perform their function, due to Yugoslav/Serbian forces' interference with and obstruction of KVM activities, were evacuated from Kosoco.

Two days later, Richard Holbrooke went to Belgrade in a last, unsuccessful attempt to persuade Milosevic that it was in his and Serbia's best self-interest to stop the offensive against the Kosovans and accept and observe the terms of the Rambouillet peace accord. Holbrooke conveyed to Milosevic the final U.S.A.-NATO either-or warning: Either cease hostilities and sign and abide by the proposed peace agreement, or suffer NATO air strikes. Milosevic refused to end the hostilities and accept the peace agreement, asserting that he would never allow NATO military forces to be stationed in Kosovo or any other territorial area over which Yugoslavia possessed sovereignty.

NATO and U.S. Government officials, on March 22, announced that the decision had been made to wage a longer and more thoroughgoing aerial-warfare campaign than was originally planned, if Milosevic's intransigence forced the alliance to launch air strikes against the Serbs. According to Ken Bacon, spokesman for the U.S. Department of Defense, the revised war plan was designed to allow NATO military forces the increased flexibility needed to conduct a "coherent and seamless air campaign."

On March 23, Holbrooke reported that his efforts to induce Milosevic to cease military action against the Kosovans and accept the Rambouillet peace agreement had failed. On the same day, the North Atlantic Council again authorized air strikes against Serbia and against Serb military positions in Kosovo and elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia. Then, Javier Solana, NATO Secretary-General, issued the order authorizing and commanding U.S. Army General Wesley K. Clark, NATO's Supreme Commander in Europe (SACEUR), to commence air strikes against the Serbs.