The prerogative theorists claim that the three constitutional clauses cited above give the President inherent authority that has never been defined or enumerated. They argue that the power, in fact, cannot be defined, since the scope of this power, at any given time, is contingent upon the conditions and problems existing at that time.

The American theory of the presidential prerogative, as stated and defended by its exponents, is related to and derived from the theory of the royal prerogative in English and British constitutional history. The royal prerogative, claimed by the English/British Crown during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, was--in the words of seventeenth-century political philosopher John Locke, in Second Treatise of Civil Government (1690)--the broad, sweeping authority of the Monarch to act for the good of the Kingdom and its people "without the prescription of law" and "sometimes even against it." American theorists, in general, do not perceive the presidential prerogative under the U.S. Constitution to be as broad or sweeping as the royal prerogative claimed under the English/British Constitution of the 1600s and 1700s. In 1865, however, U.S. President Abraham Lincoln, a theorist and practitioner of prerogative theory, came very close to using Locke's words describing the royal prerogative-- "without the prescription of law" and "sometimes even against it--when Lincoln sought to justify the extraordinary measures taken by him to deal with the Southern states' secession from the Union, the outbreak of the Civil War, and the emergence of antiwar, secessionist, and pro-Confeder- ate movements in areas of the U.S.A. outside the eleven states of the Confederacy. These extraordinary measures, taken by Lincoln early in his Presidency, were adopted by presidential fiat, without the legitimacy and support of prior congressional authorization, and in some instances, in clear violation of key provisions of the Federal Constitution. The Civil War President claimed that, under the Constitution, his positions as national Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief and his sworn duty to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution gave him the right, in a grave crisis or emergency threatening the existence of the American nation, to become a quasi-dictator and take extreme measures which, in the absence of such a national crisis or emergency, would be illegal and unconstitutional.

In American political and constitutional history prior to the Presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt, major advocates and practitioners of presidential- prerogative theory include Alexander Hamilton and Presidents Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, and Woodrow Wilson.

Hamilton, as statesman and prerogative theorist, argued that a very broad construction should be applied to Clause 1 of Article II, Section 1, of the Constitution. He maintained that the general grant of "the executive Power" to the President embraced many inherent functions and powers comprising a broad presidential prerogative.

As President, Jackson maintained that, under Clauses 1 and 8 of Article II, he possessed an inherent power to act decisively and forcefully to enforce U.S. national laws, to preserve and protect the U.S. Constitution, and to defend the American nation against all foreign and domestic threats to its safety and existence.

President Lincoln, in expounding his theory of "constitutional dictator- ship," held that Article II, Section 1, Clauses 1 and 8, and Section 2, Clause 1 attached to the Office of President a set of inherent powers, a broad prerogative enabling the President to legitimately and constitution- ally become a virtual dictator during time of extreme national crisis or emergency, when the U.S.A. was faced with a real and serious threat to its safety and survival as a free, independent, and unified nation. According to Lincoln's perception, the language of the U.S. Constitution was deliberately vague and ambiguous and offered considerable room for enlargement of the President's executive and military authority during time of great danger to the nation. The President, during such a time of great danger, can legitimately expand "the executive Power" to the degree he believes necessary. In short, the President, in time of an extreme national crisis or emergency posing a serious threat to the very existence of the U.S.A., has the inherent power and duty to take dictatorial measures-- extraordinary measures which might be unconstitution- al under more normal and less critical conditions. Presidential measures, otherwise unlawful, would become lawful by becoming essential to the protection and preservation of the U.S. Constitution, through protection and preservation of the American nation.

President Franklin Roosevelt and all presidents succeeding him--Republican as well as Democratic presidents, Conservative-leaning as well as Liberal-leaning presidents--have subscribed to the prerogative theory of presiden- tial power and have used the theory to develop and legitimize an independent war-making power for the Office of President and/or to enlarge the President's internal police powers (e.g., power to suppress domestic disorders, to prevent or settle nation-wide industrial strikes and other labor-management conflicts threatening to paralyze the economy and/or jeopardize the war effort, and to forcibly impose and accelerate court-ordered racial desegregation on the public schools). They have relied, in particular, upon Lincoln's conception of inherent powers attached to the presidential office by Article II, Section 1, Clauses 1 and 8, and Section 2, Clause 1, of the U.S. Constitution.

Examples of FDR's successors utilizing prerogative theory to develop and legitimize an independent presidential war-making power include Dwight Eisenhower, Lyndon Johnson, and Richard M. Nixon.

In 1955, when President Eisenhower recommended to Congress that it pass the Formosa Resolution to provide political support for (as well as share in the responsibility for and domestic political risks of) any measures taken by the President to defend Taiwan and the Pescadores against Chinese Communist aggression, he was very careful to insist that "the authority for some of the actions which might be required would be inherent in the authority of the Commander-in-Chief." While seeking legitimacy-enhancing congressional support in the form of a joint resolution, Eisenhower wished to avoid the appearance of conceding that his exercise of the presidential war powers was dependent or limited by congressional action. Eisenhower, like all other presidents of the contemporary era, believed that inherent in the President as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief were broad powers that could not be constitutionally circumscribed by congressional legislation or rendered inoperative by the failure or refusal of Congress to pass a joint resolution requested by the President.

President Lyndon B. Johnson, waging war in Vietnam without the benefit of a congressional declaration of war, took the position that, under the Consti- tution, the President possessed inherent powers, which, most importantly, included the power to make war. In a 1966 Department of State Bulletin, Leonard Meeker, a spokesman for the Johnson Presidency, maintained that inherent in the roles of the President as Commander-in-Chief and national Chief Executive was the power to--

"deploy American forces abroad and commit them to military operations when the President deems such action necessary to maintain the security and defense of the United States.... If he considers that deployment of U.S. forces to South Vietnam is required, and that military measures against the source of Communist aggression in North Vietnam are necessary, he is constitutionally empowered to take these measures."