a. Intervention into the Civil War in Somalia (Continued)

The October 3, 1993, firefight in south Mogadishu was America's bloodiest military encounter in nearly 10 years. It was the bloodiest encounter since the terrorist bombing incident that occurred in Beirut on October 23, 1983--the incident in which 260 U.S. Marines and Navy Seamen (as well as 60 French soldiers), members of the international peacekeeping force deployed to Lebanon, were slaughtered when a TNT-laden suicide bomb destroyed the Marine headquarters and barracks at Beirut International Airport.

Why was the firefight in south Mogadishu such a disaster for the U.S.A.? What went wrong? Why were U.S. soldiers on the ground without armed vehicles? Why were they not backed up and protected by sufficient firepower from the air? To a very great extent, the source of the problems that plagued the Rangers in executing their mission was the fact that, prior to the firefight, the Clinton Presidency repeatedly denied the requests of the Special Operations team for Bradley Fighting Vehicles (on-ground armored vehicles) and for AC-130 gunships (propeller-driven aircraft designed to fly around battlefields and deliver highly accurate and destructive gunfire on enemy ground forces). U.S. Secretary of Defense Aspin, admitting that the refusal to make available the requested armored vehicles and gunships was a serious mistake, took full responsibility for the error and its disastrous results, even though he knew the real responsibility lay with Commander-in- Chief Clinton.

The U.S. military commanders in Somalia concluded that the October 3 disaster was, in part, caused by the unavailability of sufficient U.S. ground forces--ground forces sufficient to quickly and effectively come to the aid of and rescue of Rangers surviving the helicopter crashes and thus prevent them from being captured and slaughtered by the rampaging, murder- ous Somali mobs. If the Rangers had been provided with sufficient U.S. ground-force back-up and protection, the duration of the October 3 battle would have been substantially reduced and there would not have been so many casualties. The U.S. forces, according to General Howe, would have had enough "muscle, resources, and people" to effectively control the situation on the battlefield and minimize American casualties. Unmentioned, but clearly understood, was the reason for absence of enough U.S. ground forces in Somalia to back up and protect the Rangers: the action taken by President Clinton three months earlier--his ordering the withdrawal of most of the U.S. military personnel and equipment that had been present in Somalia before late March, 1993.

In Somalia, the Rangers and other Special Operations units deployed there performed excellently. They did their best, considering the handicaps to which they were subjected by the top political leadership in Washington, D.C. In the final analysis, the troops were forced to suffer the consequences of the shortsightedness and blunders of the Clinton Presidency, which was much more concerned with keeping its domestic political image well polished and enhancing Democratic candidates chances in the coming 1994 and 1996 federal elections than it was with properly equipping and providing the necessary back-up and protection for American troops sent into very dangerous situations overseas.

In geopolitical terms, the disastrous outcome of the October 3 firefight was costly to the U.S.A. and the Clinton Presidency. General Aidid and his political faction were unexpect- edly left with what appeared to be a military and political victory. In standing firm against the U.S. military onslaught and preventing the mission from being accomplished, Aidid and the USC/SNA emerged from the battle with an international reputation and an enhanced stature, both internally and externally. The outcome of the battle increased Aidid's political support within Somalia and encouraged terrorist groups, hostile states, and revolutionary conspiracies throughout the world. Within populations making up states, international movements, and other entities hostile to the U.S.A. and its national interests, there emerged the obvious conclusion: If the Somalis can successfully challenge the U.S.A. and neutralize its military might, we can do likewise. If others can defy and bring down "the great U.S.A.," so can we.

Moreover, President Clinton, immediately after October 3, made matters worse by assenting to Aidid's demand for a "Somali-based political settlement" and by publicly announcing that all U.S. military forces would be withdrawn from Somalia no later than March 31, 1994. Clinton seemed to be raising a diplomatic white flag. Undoubtedly, he was reinforcing the emerging conclusion that the U.S.A. had lost the war in Somalia, was now in the process of surrendering to the inevitable, and could be defeated by other groups, states, and movements seeking to thwart and seriously damage the American colossus.

In terms of American domestic politics, the events of October 3 were costly to the Clinton Presidency and its military policy in Somalia. The massacre of American troops in south Mogadishu, the desecration of their bodies by crowds of rampaging Somali barbarians, and the portrayal of these gruesome scenes on television sets throughout the U.S.A. upset the entire country. Congress and the general American public were outraged by the debacle. There were calls for immediate termination of the Somali mission.

In Congress, there were demands for a shakeup and housecleaning at high levels in the executive branch of the U.S. national government. These demands, made by both Democrats and Republicans, included calls for President Clinton to remove from office all executive officers and policy advisers serving under him and playing key roles in shaping and/or implementing the Somalia policy, including Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, National Security Adviser Anthony Lake, and U.S. Envoy Robert Gosende.

To save his own political hide and minimize Democratic losses in the coming 1994 congressional elections, Clinton started looking around for scapegoats to take the fall. Almost immediately, Gosende lost his position as U.S. Envoy to Somalia, recalled by Secretary of State Christopher, who apologized to the American public for not giving the Somalia affair greater personal attention. Late in 1993, Secretary of Defense Aspin resigned his position, citing "personal reasons" for his leaving public office. Clinton seemed to have come out of the situation smelling like a rose. However, his political party, in the November, 1994, congressional elections, lost majority control of both houses of Congress. And since January 3, 1995, Clinton has had to face Republican majorities in the Senate and House of Representatives.

Within a few months after October 3, 1993, President Clinton withdrew all U.S. troops from Somalia, doing so nearly three months earlier than the announced March 31, 1994, deadline. The U.N. peacekeeping force remained there for nearly two more years, the last of the peacekeepers withdrawing with the assistance of U.S. Marines. Thus ended one of the most mismanaged and ill-conceived military operations in the history of the U.S.A.

b. Military Action Against Iraq

In June of 1993, while the U.S. Quick Reaction Force and U.N. peacekeepers were bogged down in Somalia and were being subjected to armed attacks by Aidid's militia, President Clinton decided to initiate U.S. military action against Iraq, doing so without consultation with Congress or seeking its endorsement of the particular military action initiated, asserting that he was acting under the authority of various U.N. resolutions and the Persian Gulf Resolution (U.S. Public Law 102-1), the latter being the congressional joint resolution of January 14, 1991, passed by Congress on January 12, signed into law by the President on January 14 (two days before he ordered the launching of Operation Desert Storm), and still in force as American law. On Clinton's orders, U.S. air strikes, aimed at the Iraqi Intelligence Service headquarters in Baghdad, were launched on June 26. In justifying the cruise missile attack, the Clinton Presidency cited evidence that the Iraqi Intelligence Service had instigated and fostered a conspiracy to assassinate former U.S. President George Bush during his visit to Kuwait two months earlier (April 14-16).

In April, the Kuwaiti authorities had uncovered the assassination plot, arresting 14 Iraqi and Kuwaiti nationals for planning to put a 175-pound bomb in a location where it would have exploded and killed Bush as he was being presented an award honoring him as the leader of the Persian Gulf War coalition which drove the Iraqi invaders out of Kuwait. The Kuwaiti authorities immediately informed the U.S. government of the conspiracy and arrests. Receipt of the information was quickly followed by President Clinton's ordering the FBI and CIA to conduct a thorough investigation to find out whether Saddam Hussein had authorized and sponsored the plot. The investigation uncovered convincing evidence of links between the would-be assassins and the Iraqi Intelligence Service.

President Clinton perceived the situation as a major test of his mettle as U.S. Commander- in-Chief and leader of the Western powers. He suddenly abandoned his attempts to send Hussein a conciliatory and somewhat ambiguous message--a message to the effect that he thought Hussein could redeem himself with the U.S.A. and that, if he did so, Clinton would be open to normalization of U.S.-Iraqi relations. On the evening of June 23, when he met with his National Security Adviser and Deputy National Security Adviser, the National Security Council members and General Colin Powell, Clinton was determined to send Hussein a different message, one which, in the words of George Stephanopoulos, the President's Senior Political Adviser, would be "an unambiguous, unapologetic message ... but with weapons, not words." [George Stephanopoulos, ALL TOO HUMAN--A POLITICAL EDUCATION (Little, Brown and Company: Boston, 1999), p. 159.]

Those in attendance at the meeting, polled one at a time, unanimously recommended in favor of the President's plan for launching missile trikes against Baghdad. Scheduled for Saturday, June 26, the attack commenced at 4:22 p.m. (EDT), when cruise missiles were launched toward Baghdad from two U.S. Navy vessels positioned in the Persian Gulf--the destroyer USS Peterson and the AEGIS cruiser USS Chancellorville. Once the missiles had landed in Baghdad, President Clinton delivered from the Oval Office a public address announcing the military action he had initiated against Iraq and explaining why he had done so.

c. Intervention into the Political Turmoil in Haiti

In early 1994, while President Clinton was striving to extricate his Presidency and the U.S.A. from the military and political quagmire in Somalia, he initiated U.S. military action that could have involved American troops in a bloody civil war in Haiti.

Three years earlier, (in December, 1990), Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide had been elected President of Haiti, only to be forcibly overthrown by the Haitian military during September of 1991. With Aristide arrested and expelled from the country, power to govern Haiti was assumed by a military junta--a troika of military dictators led by General Raoul Cedras. After the junta's seizure of power, political and economic conditions within the country went from bad to worse. Faced with the certainty of continued political repression and severe economic hardship if they remained in Haiti, some 35,000 Haitians left the country in boats and attempted to enter the U.S.A. as refugees. Intercepted by the U.S. Coast Guard, most of the refugees were returned to Haiti. Beginning in late 1993, however, there occurred a new wave of Haitian boat people headed for Florida.

Concerned about the deteriorating situation in Haiti and the resurgence of refugee efforts to sneak into the U.S.A., the Clinton Presidency intensified its diplomatic and economic pressures on General Cedras to relinquish power and reinstate President Aristide. Cedras refused to do so and stepped up his reign of terror over the Haitian people.

By July, 1994, President Clinton had decided that military intervention into the Haitian political mess was unavoidable as well as morally justified. The Clinton Presidency pushed an authorizing resolution through the U.N. Security Council. The U.N. resolution, passed by the Security Council on July 31, authorized a multinational military force to invade Haiti, forcibly depose the Cedras junta, and restore governing power to democratically elected President Aristide.

Since President Clinton, without consulting with or seeking the approval of Congress, had already decided to send U.S. troops to Haiti and had issued the necessary orders, the American invasion force was en route to Haiti when the U.N. resolution was adopted. With the resolution's adoption, the Cedras junta gave in to U.S. demands. Hence, the necessity of an immediate and massive U.S. military assault on and bloody conquest of Haiti was obviated.

On September 18, 1994, the Cedras regime agreed that he and the other military leaders would step down and Aristide would resume governing power. As part of the agreement, 20,000 U.S. troops began to arrive in Haiti on September 19. On October 15, Aristide returned to Haiti and was reinstated as President. On March 31, 1995, responsibility for guaranteeing politican legitimacy and democratic governance in Haiti was turned over to a U.N. peacekeeping force. On April 17, 1998, the last U.S. combat troops departed from Haiti.

On September 7, 1994, when President Clinton met with his National Security Adviser and members of the National Security Council to discuss plans for the impending U.S. invasion of Haiti, he was concerned about the problem of obtaining congressional support for the invasion. A major purpose of the meeting was to help the President decide whether to seek congressional passage of a joint resolution authorizing U.S. military action in Haiti. Secretary of State Christopher argued against the President's requesting such a resolution from Congress, holding that, if Clinton took this course of action, he would be encouraging congressional interference with the President's constitutional powers as Commander-in- Chief, resulting in undue legislative restraints on exercise of those powers by Clinton and his successors. George Stephanopoulos, who was present at the meeting, has given the following account of the issue and its resolution:

"Colored by my years in the House [of Representatives], I believed that a president shouldn't send soldiers into combat without congressional support. But that principle was now being tested by hard reality: We didn't have the votes, not even close. Congress wasn't about to give the President political cover for an unpopular invasion, so restoring democracy in Haiti required sacrificing a bit of it here at home. I thought the cost was justified, but Congress would howl, and partisan ten- sions were so high that a few members might even argue for impeachment if American casualties mounted. To cover our flank, I suggested that the State Department draft a public 'white paper' making the case for unilateral presidential action. Like me, Clinton had just read in Doris Kearns Goodwin's new book that FDR had used this tactic when he circumvented Congress on lend-lease. He took the suggestion." [IBID, pp. 306-307.]

At the White House on September 13, President Clinton met with Democratic members of Congress to discuss the Haiti problem and what the U.S.A. should do about it. The meeting, however, was hardly a consultation with Congress or a move to lay the groundwork for an attempt to secure official congressional of the President's planned military initiative. The Capitol Hill Democrats attending the meeting were well aware that Clinton had already made up his mind and could not be persuaded to abort his projected invasion of Haiti, regardless of the number and intensity of the complaints uttered by congressional Democrats.

The success of the Haiti mission, which was accomplished smoothly and without effective Haitian resistance or mounting American casualties, functioned as a restraint on both Democrats and Republicans in Congress. The President dispatched U.S. combat troops to Haiti and kept them there for over four and a half years. Yet, Clinton's initiation and pursuit of his Haiti policy did not raise a major storm of congressional criticism and protest.