d. Intervention into the Ethnic Conflict in Bosnia (Continued)

During the Winter, Spring, and early Summer of 1995, a peaceful settlement of the Bosnian conflict seemed to be no closer to realization than it was when the U.S.A. and its NATO allies first intervened into the conflict. And the situation in Bosnia was continuing on its course of deterioration, despite the stronger and more drastic measures that NATO had in store for the Bosnian Serbs.

In May, 1995, NATO aircraft carried out air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs, following their repeated shelling of safe areas and repeated violations of the exclusion zones. On May 24, after the Bosnian Serbs failed to comply with the U.N. ultimatum to withdraw their heavy weapons from the Sarajevo area and exclusion zone, NATO aircraft struck an ammunition depot of the Serbs, who responded by launching mortar and artillery attacks on the safe areas, including the Sarajevo area.

On May 25 and 26, NATO warplanes (including four U.S. F-16s, two U.S. F-18s, two U.S. EF-111 electronic warfare aircraft, one U.S. HC-130 refueling aircraft, and two U.S. search and rescue planes) were involved in a raid on ammunition depots near the Bosnian Serb stronghold of Pale. The NATO aircraft attacked and destroyed the ammunition dumps, after the Serbs in the area disregarded the U.N. demand that they relinquish control of all heavy weapons in their possession.

In retaliation, the Bosnian Serbs seized 370 UNPROFOR personnel, taking them hostage, holding them at locations that were potential targets for NATO air strikes, and thereby using the captured UNPROFOR personnel as human shields in an effort to deter future NATO air raids. The remainder of the UNPROFOR personnel, who were isolated and in great danger at heavy weapons collection sites around Sarajevo, had to be removed from those sites. And this left the Serbs free to take over the sites and seize the heavy weapons.

On July 11, 1995, NATO was called on to defend the Srebrenica safe area, which was threatened by the Bosnian Serb Army's push toward the area. NATO aircraft struck Bosnian Serb targets identified by UNPROFOR. However, the Bosnian Serbs managed to overrun the Srebrenica and Zepa areas, killing thousands of Bosnian Muslims. NATO's response was to launch a month-long bombing campaign against the Bosnian Serbs.

At its meeting on July 25, the North Atlantic Council endorsed NATO military planning directed toward strongly discouraging any future Bosnian Serb attacks on the Gorazde safe area and, at the same time, guaranteeing timely and effective application of NATO air power, in the event that the Bosnian Serb Army remained undeterred and continued to attack the safe area. On August 1, the Council met and made similar decisions, as regards future Bosnian Serb attacks on the Sarajevo, Bihac, and Tuzla safe areas, again guaranteeing timely and effective use of NATO air power against the Bosnian Serbs, if they could not be deterred and proceeded to attack any of these safe areas.

The Bosnian Serbs remained unpersuaded and undeterred. On August 28, 1995, a Bosnian Serb artillery shell landed in a Sarajevo open market, killing 38 civilians and crippling or otherwise seriously injuring 85 others. According to the perceptions of U.S. and NATO leaders, this attack on Sarajevo's civilian inhabitants was the very last straw, occuring after a lengthy pattern of Bosnian Serb attacks on civilian targets in the safe areas and violations of ceasefires and other agreements to which the Serbs had been a party. NATO moved rapidly toward "disproportionate retaliation," simultaneously launching Operation Deliberate Force and Operation Dead Eye--the two military contingency plans that had been formulated toward the end of 1994.

Operation Dead Eye disrupted and put out of commission the Bosnian Serbs' air defense network. In carrying out Operation Deliberate Force, NATO air power, supplemented by artillery fire, was used in a massive pounding of Bosnian Serb heavy weapons, ammunition dumps, command and control facilities, military support facilities, lines of communication, and other supporting infrastructure.

Out of a total of 3,515 sorties flown by NATO aircraft in Operation Deliberate Force, 2,318 (65.9 percent) were flown by U.S. aircraft. Most of the U.S. flights were from Aviano and other military bases in Italy, while 18 were flown from U.S. aircraft carriers in the Adriatic Sea.

Operation Deliberate Force began on August 30, 1995, and lasted three weeks, ending on September 20, when the refractory Serbs gave in and agreed to enter into serious negotiations with the Bosnian Croats and Muslims. Meanwhile, the tide began to turn in the Bosnian ground war, with the military advantage shifting from the Serbs to the Muslim- Croat alliance. During September, the Bosnian Serb seige of Sarajevo was lifted, and a Muslim-Croat military offensive drove back the Serbs and restored a considerable amount of territory to Muslim and Croat control. By the end of the month, Bosnian territory controlled by the Serbs had been reduced to about 49 percent of the total.

As a consequence of Operation Deliberate Force and its success in inducing the Bosnian Serbs to seriously negotiate a peace with their enemies, peace talks commenced on November 1 at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio. The outcome of these talks was the "Dayton Peace Accord," or "Bosnian Peace Agreement," which was initialed on November 21 by the leaders of Serbia (Slobodan Milosecic), Croatia (Franjo Tudjman), and Bosnia (Alija Izetbegovic). Three days later, Serbian leader Milosevic assured the other parties to the peace accord that Radovan Karadzic, leader of the Bosnian Serbs, would cooperate and urge his followers to comply with the terms of the accord. The peace agreement was formally signed by the Serbian, Croatian, and Bosnian leaders in Paris on December 14.

On December 15, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1031, which gave NATO a mandate to enforce the military aspects of the Bosnian Peace Agreement. On the same day, the North Atlantic Council formally approved the operational plan for enforcing the peace agreement--a plan calling for deployment to Bosnia of a NATO-led multinational military force, which was given the name "Implementation Force," or "IFOR." On December 16, deployment of the main body of some 60,000 IFOR troops (including 28,000 U.S. troops) commenced.

Once the IFOR troops arrived in Bosnia, they were to activate "Operation Joint Endeavor," which entailed performance of a number of important military tasks, including making certain that Bosnia's opposing forces--

Complied with the ceasefire agreement of October 5, 1995;

Withdrew from the four-kilometer-wide zone of separation, moved back to their respec tive areas, and remained there.

Seeing to it that heavy weapons were col- lected and stored at designated locations, referred to in the peace agreement as "can tonment/barracks areas";

Ensuring demobilization of military forces which could not be accomodated in the desig- nated cantonment/barracks areas--i.e., de militarization, or demobilization, of most of the military units of opposing ethnic factions;

Making certain that all combatants and ci vilians were released and transferred with out delay, in accordance with a plan to be developed by the International Committee of the Red Cross;

Maintaining control of Bosnian airspace.

While IFOR's mission was to execute the military aspects of the Bosnian Peace Agreement, a major goal of the military mission was to create secure conditions for other organizations to implement the civilian aspects of the peace agreement.

IFOR was given authority to carry out its mission vigorously, including the robust use of force, if necessary. In performing its military tasks and in providing security and support for organizations implementing civilian aspects of the peace accord, IFOR was to have unimpeded freedom of movement, control over airspace, and status of forces protection.

Many of the military personnel assigned to IFOR duty, mainly British and French troops, were already in Bosnia as members of UNPROFOR and, on termination of UNPROFOR's mandate, were transferred to IFOR. Since the U.S.A. had no ground-force units in Bosnia prior to December, 1995, the 28,000 American ground combat troops had to be transported to Bosnia, most of them from military bases in Germany, where they were stationed.

By December 20, 1996, IFOR had, for the most part, accomplished its mission in Bosnia. The war had come to an end, and the military forces of opposing ethnic factions had been separated and relocated in the designated cantonment/barracks areas. However, the peace agreement that the U.S.A. and NATO had imposed on the warring ethnic factions created a very fragile and uncertain peace. As regards demobilization of factional military units, the Bosnian Serbs managed to circumvent most efforts of IFOR to enforce the relevant provisions of the Bosnian Peace Accord. Moreover, IFOR was unable to provide the Commission for Displaced Persons and Refugees with the degree of security and support needed to make possible the latter's enforcement of those provisions of the accord guaranteeing refugees and displaced persons the right to return to their homes and either recover lost property or receive just compensation. In short, the peace agreement was and still is a war-breeding arrangement--an arrangement, like so many other international agreements concluded during the last two centuries, almost certain to be a source of future wars.

Nevertheless, President Clinton and other NATO heads-of-government declared that IFOR had successfully accomplished its mission. On December 20, therefore, IFOR was replaced by another U.N.-authorized, NATO-led multinational military force, one named "Stabilization Force," or "SFOR," and its mission code-named "Operation Joint Guard." SFOR was about half the size of IFOR, the former comprised of approximately 31,000 troops (including 8,500 U.S. troops).

The role of IFOR had been to "implement" the pease in Bosnia--i.e., impose a peace settlement on warring factions which were extremely reluctant to make peace with one another. The role of SFOR was to "stabilize" the peace--i.e., strive to prop up a peace settlement which was quite unsatisfactory to all the previously warring factions and which was in danger of collapse at any moment.

Originally, duration of the U.S. military presence in Bosnia was to be for a period of no longer than one year, with the period scheduled to have expired by the middle of December, 1996. Near the end of the one-year period, however, President Clinton announced that he was extending the exit deadline an additional 18 months. When SFOR replaced IFOR on December 20, Clinton had 8,500 U.S. troops in IFOR transferred to SFOR. Clinton indicated that, while some of the U.S. troops might be withdrawn on dates earlier than the new exit deadline, others would not be leaving Bosnia until June 1, 1998. As of September 13, 1999, there were more than 6,000 U.S. troops still in Bosnia.

Back in December, 1995, when the U.S. Congress was considering whether to grant or withhold its approval of the Bosnian Peace Accord and President Clinton's plan to contribute 28,000 U.S. ground troops to IFOR, the issue generated a high level of political controversy in the U.S.A.--controversy outside as well as inside Congress. Despite the President's December 3 speech, delivered in an attempt to rally public support for the planned deployment of U.S. combat troops on the ground in Bosnia, most Americans continued to doubt the wisdom of sending American troops to a feud-ridden country in an endeavor to implement a peace plan rather clumsily put together and completely lacking in stability and viability. In an ABC News public opinion poll taken after the President had delivered his speech, 57 percent of those polled opposed the plan to send troops, while 39 percent approved the plan. A CNS News poll taken before the speech found only 33 percent of the respondents favored the President's plan. A CNN/USA Today/Gallup pre-speech poll showed 49 percent opposed and 47 percent favoring the plan, while a post-speech poll taken by the same polling group showed a small plurality supporting the plan, with 46 percent in favor and 40 percent opposed.

In seeking to obtain congressional endorsement of his military and foreign policy initiative in Bosnia, Democratic President Clinton had to deal with Republican majorities in both chambers of Congress. Making the political situation even more difficult for the President was the fact that his congressional opposition, as regards the planned Bosnia deployment, included Democrats as well as most Republicans.

On December 13, 1995, one day before the formal signing and finalization of the Bosnian Peace Agreement, the U.S. House of Representatives, via a bipartisan and overwhelming majority vote (287-141), passed House Resolution 302--a simple (single-chamber) resolution, which expressed the House's "serious concerns and opposition" regarding Clinton's plan to send U.S. ground forces to Bosnia. In Section 1 of Resolution 302, the House stated its findings of fact as follows:

"... On October 30, 1995, the House of Repre sentatives agreed to H. Res. 247, which ex pressed the sense of the House of Representa tives that in the negotiations of any peace agreement regarding the conflict in the Repub lic of Bosnia and Herzegovina there should not be a presumption that the United States Armed Forces would be deployed to that country to enforce such an agreement, and that in any event, no United States Armed Forces should be deployed on the ground in the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to enforce such an agreement until Congress has approved such a deployment.

"... On November 17, 1995, the House of Repre sentatives passed H.R. 2606, which provided that none of the funds appropriated or other- wise made available to the Department of De fense could be obligated or expended for the deployment on the ground of the United States Armed Forces in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina unless funds for such deployment were specifically appropriated by law.

"... Despite the expressed will of the House of Representatives heretofore mentioned, the President has chosen to proceed with the de ployment of approximately 20,000 members of the United States Armed Forces on the ground in the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to enforce the peace agree ment among parties to the conflict in the Re public of Bosnia and Herzegovina initialed in Dayton, Ohio, on November 21, 1995."

In Section 2 of Resolution 302, the House of Representatives stated its declarations of policy regarding the matter of the Bosnia deployment. The House declared that--

"... it reiterates serious concerns and op position to the President's policy that re sults in the deployment of 20,000 members of the United States Armed Forces on the ground in the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina;

"... it is confident that the members of the United States Armed Forces, in whom it has the greatest pride and admiration, will per form their responsibilities with professional excellence, dedicated patriotism, and exem plary courage...."

On the same day that the House of Representative adopted its simple resolution opposing the President's deployment of American troops to Bosnia but indicating its support of the troops put in harm's way, the U.S. Senate passed Senate Joint Resolution 44 and sent it to the House, requesting that body's concurrence with the Senate's decision. The Preamble to the Senate-passed joint resolution declared:

"... beginning on February 24, 1993, Presi dent Clinton committed the United States to participate in implementing a peace agree ment in Bosnia and Herzegovina without prior consultation with Congress;

"... the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, and the Federal Re public of Yugoslavia initiated the General Framework Agreement and Associated Annexes on November 21, 1995, in Dayton, Ohio, after repeated assurances that the United States would send troops to assist in implementing that agreement;

"... as part of the negotiations which led to the General Framework Agreement, the United States has made a commitment to en- sure that the Federation of Bosnia and Her zegovina [the Muslim and Croat entity in Bosnia] is armed and trained to provide for its own defense, and that commitment should be honored...."

The main body of S.J. Res. 44, would have Congress (1) indicating its unequivocal support for the U.S. troops being dispatched to Bosnia and (2) granting the President authority to deploy the troops there during a period of about one year. S.J. Res. 44 would have Congress stating that the deployment authority was being granted in order to enable the President to fulfill international commitments he had already made, as regards U.S. military assistance to NATO in implementing the Bosnian Peace Agreement and its Military Annex. The deployment authority would be subject to conditions specified in the joint resolution.

Section 1 of S.J. Res. 44 stated that--

"The Congress unequivocally supports the men and women of our Armed Forces who are carrying out their mission in support of peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina with pro fessional excellence, dedicated patriot ism and exemplary bravery, and believes they must be given all necessary re sources and support to carry out their mission and ensure their security."

Section 2 of the resolution imposed a limitation on the President's deployment authority, providing that--

"... Notwithstanding reservations ex pressed about President Clinton's deci sion to deploy United States Armed Forces to Bosnia and Herzegovina and recognizing that--

(1) the President has decided to deploy United States Armed Forces to implement the General Framework Agreement in Operation Joint En deavor citing American interests in preventing the spread of con- flict, maintaining its leadership in NATO, stopping the tragic loss of life, and fulfilling American commitments;

(2) the deployment of United States Armed Forces has begun; and

(3) preserving United States credi- bility is a strategic interest,

the President may only fulfill his com mitment to deploy United States Armed Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina for ap proximately one year to implement the General Framework Agreement and Military Annex, pursuant to this resolution, sub ject to the conditions" specified in Section 2.

As regards the conditions to which the deployment authority was to be subject, Section 2 of S.J. Res. 44 contained a requirement for presidential determination:

"... Before acting pursuant to this reso lution, the President shall make available to the Speaker of the House of Representa tives and the President pro tempore of the Senate, his determination that--

(1) the mission of the NATO Imple- mentation Force and United States Armed Forces deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina will be limited to im plementation of the military provi sions of the Military Annex to the General Framework Agreement and measures deemed necessary to pro tect the safety of the NATO Imple mentation Force and United States Armed Forces;

(2) an integral part of the suc- cessful accomplishment of the United States objective in Bosnia and Herzegovina in deploying and withdrawing United States Armed Forces is the establishment of a military balance which enables the Federation of Bosnia and Herzego vina [the Muslim and Croat entity within the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina] to provide for its own defense without depending on the United States or other outside forces; and

(3) the United States will lead an immediate international effort, separate and apart from the NATO Implementation Force and consistent with United Nations Security Coun- cil Resolution 1021 and the General Framework Agreement and Associated Annexes, to provide equipment, arms, training and related logistics as sistance of the highest possible quality to ensure the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina can provide for its own defense, including, as necessary, using existing military drawdown authorities and requesting such additional authority as may be necessary."

Subsequent sections of S.J.Res. 44 would require the President to submit reports to Congress on (1) his plan to assist the Muslim and Croat entity within Bosnia to provide for its own defense, (2) the status of the deployment of U.S. Armed Forces in Bosnia, and (3) the status of implementation of the civilian and other non-military as pects of the Bosnian Peace Accord.

The Senate's passage of S.J. Res. 44 by a 69-30 vote was hardly a ringing endorsement of President Clinton's Bosnia policy or an unqualified vote of confidence in his leadership of the U.S.A. in the areas of military and foreign affairs. The wording of the resolution clearly indicated that the Senate intended that Congress express strong support for the American troops being sent to Bosnia, while very grudgingly authorizing the President to deploy the troops there. When Republican Senators Robert Dole and John McCain were drafting the resolution, in consultation with the White House, the Republican majority in the Senate insisted on wording which would make congressional authorization of the military deployment appear as reluctant and grudging as possible. In accordance with Republican demands, the resolution contained language which emplasized that--

Congress had strong reservations regarding President Clinton's decision to send U.S. ground forces to Bosnia to enforce a seri ously flawed peace agreement;

During the time when the President was par ticipating in, manipulating, shaping, and nudging along the Bosnian peace process, Congress was never consulted on the matter of deployment of U.S. troops;

The decision to deploy American troops to Bosnia was a decision made by the Presi- dent alone, and he alone should be held responsible for the decision and its con- sequences;

Congress, left out of the decisionmaking process and informed of the troop-deploy ment commitment after the commitment had already been made, was placed in the very difficult and uncomfortable position of having to choose between two undesirable alternatives--(1) authorizing an ill-con ceived military mission and (2) voting against authorization and thereby under mining the credibility and leadership of the U.S.A. in international relations;

S.J. Res. 44 was an expression of support for American troops placed in harm's way, not a declaration of policy approving the President's decision to send the troops to Bosnia.

During the Senate's consideration of S.J. Res. 44, Senate Majority Leader Dole, in a speech from the floor of the chamber, made the following remarks:

"We are not voting on a decision to send American troops to Bosnia. That decision has been made. It was made 2 years ago by the President of the United States. Without consulting Congress, the Presi- dent of the United States made that deci sion.

"So we say to those soldiers who may be on early duty there at 4:00 a.m. in the morn ing, in the bitter cold--from those of us in the warmth of the U.S. Senate, free from any danger--we are about to cast a vote. We are about to cast a vote, Ser geant Jones or Private Smith, whoever it is, to indicate that we support your ef forts there. They may have some misgiv ings about why they are there, and we may have some doubts.

"So this is a very difficult debate for Members of Congress. It is a difficult debate because Congress was not part of the decisionmaking with respect to send ing troops. Congress was not consulted. Congress was told of the President's commitment to send troops after the com mitment was made. And then we were faced with the dilemma of undermining that commitment or acquiescing in a mil itary mission with serious flaws. And make no mistake about it, the President has said he made this decision and he takes responsibility. It was his deci sion to send troops and his decision alone.

"This resolution does not endorse the President's decision. It does not en dorse the agreement reached in Dayton. It does support our men and women in uniform."