CYBERLAND UNIVERSITY OF NORTH AMERICA
Dr. Almon Leroy Way, Jr.
University President
And
Professor of Political Science & Public Affairs
Email: alwayjr@bellsouth.net or leroyway2@juno.com
Website Address (URL): http://www.geocities.com/way_leroy
1. Amendment 1.
2. Establishment Clause, in Amendment 1.
3. Free Exercise Clause, in Amendment 1.
4. Free Speech and Free Press Clauses, in Amendment 1.
5. Peaceable Assembly and Petition Clauses, in Amendment 1.
6. Habeas Corpus Clause; Article I, Section 9, Clause 2.
7. Attainder and Ex Post Facto Clauses; Article I, Section 9,
Clause 3.
8. Attainder and Ex Post Facto Clauses; Aritcle I, Section 10,
Paragraph 1.
9. Citizenship Clause, in Amendment 14, Section 1.
10. Due Process Clause, in Amendment 14, Section 1.
11. Equal Protection Clause, in Amendment 14, Section 1.
12. Article I, Section 2, Paragraph 1.
13. Amendment 17, Paragraph 1.
14. Article I, Section 4, Paragraph 1.
15. Amendment 15, Section 1.
16. Amendment 19, Paragraph 1.
17. Amendment 24, Section 1.
18. Amendment 26, Section 1.
19. Commerce Clause; Article I, Section 8, Clause3.
20. Due Process Clause, in Amendment 5.
21. Due Process Clause, in Amendment 14.
22. Amendment 4.
23. Amendment 5.
24. Self-incrimination Clause, in Amendment 5.
25. Grand Jury Clause, in Amendment 5.
26. Double Jeopardy Clause, in Amendment 5.
27. Amendment 6.
28. Amendment 8.
29. Takings Clause, in Amendment 5.
30. Article III, Section 2, Paragraph 3.
31. Article III, Section 3, Paragraphs 1 and 2.
1. Gitlow v. New York (1925).
2. Everson v. Board of Education (1947).
3. Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971).
4. Engel v. Vitale (1962)
5. The New York Times v. Sullivan (1964).
6. Miller v. California (1973).
7. Yates v. United States (1957)
8. Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969).
9. Washington v. Davis (l976).
10. Shaw v. Reno (1993) and Subsequent Related Cases.
11. Abrams v. Johnson (1997) and Miller v. Johnson (1995).
12. Plessy v. Ferguson (1896).
13. Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (1954).
14. Boling v. Sharpe (1954).
15. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States (1054).
16. Roe v. Wade (1972).
17. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey
(1992).
18. Roemer v. Evans (1996).
19. Mapp v. Ohio (1961).
20. United States v. Calandra (1974).
21. United States v. Leon (1984).
22. Blau v. United States (1951).
23. Mincey v. Arizona (1978).
24. Miranda v. Arizona (1966).
25. Graham v. Collins (1993).
1. Civil Liberties.
2. Civil Liberties.
3. Civil Liberties.
4. Civil Liberties.
5. Civil Liberties.
6. Civil Liberties.
7. Legal Privileges.
8. Legal Privileges.
9. Legal Privileges.
10. Federal Bill of Rights; First Ten Amendments.
11. Amendment 14.
12. Selective Incorporation.
13. Amendments 2, 3, 7 and 10, and the Grand Jury Requirements
of Amendment 5.
14. Selective Incorporation.
15. Lemon Test.
16. Endorsement Test.
17. Prior Restraint; Censorship Before Publication.
18. Vagueness Test.
19. Vagueness Test.
20. Least Drastic Means Test.
21. Content and Viewpoint Neutrality Test.
22. Political Advertising.
23. Unconstitutional.
24. Does Not Recognize Such a Right.
25. Does Not Recognize Such a Right.
26. Overturn Convictions and Order New Trials and Instruct
Judges to Impose Sanctions on Prosecutors and Police.
27. Constitutional; Constitutionally Permissible.
28. Shield Laws.
29. Prurient Interest in Sex.
30. Fighting Words.
31. Seditious Speech.
32. Freedom of Assembly and Petition.
33. Public Forums.
34. Limited Public Forums.
35. Nonpublic Forums.
36. Household Censorship of Mail.
37. Civil Disobedience.
38. Minimum Burden on Speech Test.
1. Writ of Habeas Corpus. 2. Writ of Habeas Corpus. 3. Ex Post Facto Law. 4. Bill of Attainder. 5. Naturalization. 6. Unreasonable Classification. 7. Rational Basis Test. 8. Strict Scrutiny Test. 9. Heightened Scrutiny Test. 10. Suspect Classification. 11. Classification Based on Race or National Origin. 12. Classification Based on Sex. 13. Majority-Minority Congressional District. 14. Separate but Equal Doctrine. 15. Plessy v. Ferguson (1896). 16. Inherently Unequal Doctrine. 17. Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (1954). 18. Boling v. Sharpe (1954). 19. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VI, as Subsequently Amended. 20. De Jure Segregation. 21. De Facto Segregation. 22. State Police Powers. 23. Eminent Domain. 24. Regulatory Taking. 25. "Just Compensation," as Defined by the U.S. Supreme Court. 26. Procedural Process. 27. Substantive Due Process. 28. Search Warrant. 29. Probable Cause. 30. Expectation of Privacy Rule. 31. Exclusionary Rule. 32. Preliminary Hearing. 33. Grand Jury. 34. Indictment; True Bill. 35. Petit Jury; Trial Jury. 36. Federal District Judge. 37. United States Sentencing Commission.
1. Political Party.
2. Political Interest Group.
3. Political Action Committee.
4. Direct Primary.
5. Winner-Takes-All System.
6. National Party Nominating Convention.
7. Characteristics of the American Electoral System.
8. What a Non-incumbent Candidate Must Do to Become a U.S.
House Member.
9. Political Processes Involved in a Major American Political
Party's Nomination of Its Candidate for President.
10. What a Presidential Candidate Must Do to Become President of
the U.S.A.
1. Legal privileges are granted by government, usually by leg-
islative statute or by decision of an executive office or
agency carrying out statutory law. Under the law, a person
must meet certain qualifications before he or she is granted
a particular legal privilege. No one has a federal consti-
tutional right to the privilege. Once the privilege is
granted, however, the individual person covered by the rele-
vant statute and executive decision has a legal right to the
privilege granted. The individual cannot legally be denied
the privilege except for a "reasonable reason," i.e., for a
reasonable cause specified by a reasonable law. Moreover,
revocation of the privilege must be done by appropriate pro-
cedures.
2. Today, the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause imposes
on the states and their local subdivisions all the provi-
sions of the Federal Bill of Rights except (1) the provi-
sions of Amendments 2, 3, 7, and 10 and (2) the grand jury
requirements of Amendment 5.
3. The Supreme Court upheld the city action, ruling that no
violation of the Establishment Clause was involved.
GROUNDS: There was little danger that a reasonable person
would conclude that the city was endorsing religion.
4. The Supreme Court ruled that the city government's action
was a violation of the Establishment Clause. GROUNDS: In
this context, the city government gave the impression that
it was endorsing the display's religious message.
5. Introduction by state governments, state universities and
colleges, and public school districts of devotional exer-
cises into the curricula, extra-curricular activities, and
graduation exercises of tax-supported educational institu-
tions; sponsorship or encouragement of school prayer by pub-
lic school authorities; state laws forbidding the teaching
of evolution in the public schools or requiring the teaching
of "creation science."
6. Tax exemptions for church properties; employment of chap-
lains by state legislatures and the Congress; government
aid for students attending parochial and other religious
schools.
7. CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE: At the university and college
level, tax funds used to construct buildings and operate ed-
ucational programs, as long as the money is not spent di-
rectly on buildings used for religious purposes or on teach-
ing religious subjects; government aid to students who
choose to attend religious schools and become ministers and
priests; state tax laws allowing tax-paying parents to de-
duct or take a credit from their state income taxes for what
they paid for tuition and other costs to send their children
to elementary and secondary schools--private or public; use
of tax funds to provide students attending church-related
elementary and secondary schools with textbooks, standard-
ized tests, lunches, transportation to and from school, and
diagnostic services for speech and hearing problems; pro-
grams provding tax-supported teachers to teach remedial and
enrichment classes to disadvantaged students in both public
and parochial schools; the assignment of a sign-language in-
terpreter, paid for by public funds, to accompany a deaf
child to a parochial school.
CONSTITUTIONALLY IMPERMISSIBLE: State tax credits or deduc-
tions available only to parents of children attending pri-
vate, or non-public, elementary and secondary schools; tax
funds used in religious schools to pay teachers' salaries,
purchase equipment, produce teacher-prepared tests, repair
facilities, or transport students on field trips; public
school authorities permitting religious instructors to come
into public school buildings during the school day to pro-
vide religious instruction, even on a voluntary basis.
8. Compelling a person to accept any religious creed or theo-
logical position; denying any person any legal right or
privilege because of his religious beliefs or lack of them;
requiring religious oaths as a condition of government em-
ployment; making religious oaths a prerequisite to running
for elective government office.
9. The Free Exercise Clause protects against government in-
fringement of the rights to practice a particular religion
and to hold particular religious beliefs. However, the
Clause provides less protection for the right to practice a
religion than for the right to hold particular religious be-
beliefs. The U.S. Supreme Court will uphold a law alleged
to infringe on religious practice if the law does not single
out and ban religious practices because they are engaged in
for religious reasons.
10. The Supreme Court has been and still is most suspicious of
laws requiring government censorship of expressive materials
prior to publication. The Court, in some cases (most of
which related to military and national-security matters),
has upheld the constitutionality of prior restraint, or cen-
sorship, imposed by government on expression. In the area
of domestic and non-military public policy, the Court has
upheld the right of high school authorities to exercise con-
trol over the style and content of high school student news-
papers.
11. The Supreme Court has maintained and still maintains that
laws must not allow the executive agencies and offices which
enforce the laws so much discretion that they could discrim-
inate against persons and groups whose views they dislike.
According to the Court, laws must not be so vague that per-
sons are afraid to exercise constitutionally protected
rights. In 1948, the Supreme Court declared void for vague-
ness a state statute prohibiting "sacrilegious" movies and
publications of "criminal deeds of bloodshed or lust ... so
massed as to become vehicles for inciting violent and de-
praved crimes."
12. The Supreme Court maintains that government censorship of
the mail is unconstitutional. In implementing this posi-
tion, the Court has invalidated a federal statute directing
the Postmaster General to detain foreign mailings of commun-
ist political propaganda and deliver these materials only
upon the addressee's request. The Court has also invali-
dated a federal statute authorizing postal authorities to
exclude from the mails materials they consider obscene.
13. The Supreme Court does not acknowledge that journalists
have a federal constitutional right to ignore legal requests
(such as subpoenas) and withhold information from govern-
mental bodies (such as grand juries and legislative investi-
gating committees). In 1972, the Court ruled that, if a
privilege to ignore legal requests and withhold information
is to be granted to news media persons, it should be done by
statutes of Congress and the state legislatures.
14. While refusing to acknowledge a federal constitutional right
of journalists to know, the Court has conceded that there is
a First Amendment right of the press, along with the public,
to be present at criminal trials.
15. Prior censorship of motion-picture films to prevent the
showing of obscenity is not necessarily unconstitutional.
However, laws calling for submission of films to a govern-
ment review board are constitutional only if there is a
prompt judicial hearing. The burden is on the government to
prove to the court that the particular film in question is
obscene.
16. Distribution of religious and political pamphlets, leaflets,
and handbills is protected by the First Amendment. So, too,
is the use of sound trucks and billboards. Accordingly, the
U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a state or municipality cannot
restrain the distribution of leaflets merely to keep its
roads and streets clean.
However, the Supreme Court upheld a Tennessee statute pro-
hibiting solicitation or votes and distribution of campaign
literature within 100 feet of the entrance to a polling
place. In this decision, the Court upheld a government reg-
ulation that applied to political speech in a public forum.
The Court held that the 100-foot limit protected the in-
tegrity of the vote and the secrecy of the ballot.
17. The First Amendment does not prevent the Federal Communica-
tions Commission from imposing sanctions (e.g., fines) on
television and radio stations that broadcast filthy words,
regardless of whether those filthy words meet the legal
definition of "obscenity."
18. The First Amendment does not prevent the Federal Communica-
tions Commission from refusing to renew a broadcasting sta-
tion's license if, in the FCC's opinion, the broadcaster has
not served the public interest.
19. Congress may ban, by statute, telephone and email messages
which meet the U.S. Supreme Court's definition of "obsceni-
ty." If the messages are pornographic, but fall short of
the legal definition of "obscenity," Congress may not ban
them. Non-obscene pornographic messages, no matter how in-
decent, are protected by the First Amendment and may not be
prohibited by Congress or any other governmental body.
20. Government may legitimately use the content of x-rated
movies and other pornographic (but not obscene) materials as
the basis for placing them in a different classification
from other motion pictures. Also, cities may constitution-
ally regulate, through zoning laws, where "adult" motion-
picture theaters may be located.
Sexually explicit materials either about minors or aimed at
them are not protected by the First Amendment. State and
local governments, provided they act under narrowly drawn
statutes and ordinances, can ban the knowing sale of "adult"
magazines to minors, even if such materials would not be
considered legally obscene if sold to adults. State and
local governments can make it a crime to depict sexual con-
duct by children, even if the depicted behavior would not be
considered obscene if performed by adults.
There is a recognized public interest in protecting children
and underage adolescents from harmful materials. However,
the government's interest in protecting minors from harmful
materials does not justify the government's doing so in a
manner that results in broad suppression of speech addressed
to adults.
21. Government regulations applying to traditional public forums
must be enforced evenhandedly, and government action must
not be motivated by what is being said, rather than how and
where and by whom it is being said. Viewpoint may not be
made the basis of distinguishing between those allowed and
those not allowed access to limited public forums. As long
as people use nonpublic forums within the normal bounds of
conduct, they may not be constitutionally restrained from
doing so.
22. In general, civil disobedience, even if peaceful, is not a
constitutionally protected right. The U.S. Supreme Court
has refused to read a right of civil disobedience into the
First Amendment Peaceable Assembly and Petition Clauses, nor
into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
23. The Supreme Court has declared unconstitutional provisions
of state and local laws that prohibit protesters from peace-
fully, even if forcefully, expressing their views. However,
the Coust has sustained two types of state court injunctions
--(1) injunctions that keep anti-abortion protesters outside
of a buffer zone around abortion clincs and (2) injunctions
that were issued because of prior unlawful conduct by the
anti-abortion protesters. To be upheld as constitutional,
such state court injunctions must pass the Minimum Burden on
Speech Test established by the Supreme Court. The injunc-
tions must burden no more speech than is necessary to serve
a significant government interest, e.g., ensuring public
safety or protecting the right of women to go into an abor-
tion clinic.
24. The right to assemble to petition the government for a re-
dress of grievances does not include the right to trespass
on private property. A state may protect property-owners
against those who attempt to convert private property to
their own use, even if they are doing so to express ideas,
Under guidelines set by the Supreme Court, (1) privately
owned shopping malls are neither public streets nor places
of public assembly, (2) no one has a constitutional right to
use such a mall to hand out political leaflets, picket for
political purposes, or otherwise exercise First Amendment
freedoms, but (3) states and cities may legally obligate
the owners of shopping malls to permit their use for peace-
ful political purposes, e.g., distributing handbills and
getting people to sign petitions.
25. Habeas corpus prevents arbitrary arrest and imprisonment,
the fearful knock on the door and the disappearance of the
person seized. A prisoner must be released unless suffi-
cient cause to detain him can be shown.
26. Congress may not suspend the right to a writ of habeas
corpus, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the
public safety may require it.
27. The constitutional prohibition of ex post facto laws ensures
that the individual person is free to do those things not
specifically forbidden by existing law, without fear of
future punishment, due to a future change in the law. The
prohibition prevents abuse of power by popular majorities,
legislative majorities, and public officers and bodies in
the executive and judicial branches of government. Without
the prohibition, government officeholders might retroactive-
ly apply new laws for vindictive and tyrannical purposes.
28. The constitutional prohibition of bills of attainder ensures
that an American legislature cannot legally exercise the
judicial function of ascertaining and pronouncing guilt and
declaring the punishment. The legislature is limited to
passing general laws, including general laws defining crimes
and prescribing the punishment which the courts may mete
out. Specific applications of the general law are left to
the courts. The prohibition of bills of attainder protects
individual freedom and enhances separation of powers.
Continued on Second Page, ANSWERS,