29. Under the U.S. Constitution, the states regulate elections and set voter qualifications. The states regulate federal elections as well as state and local elections. The states set the legal qualifications, or requirements, that must be met by persons before they are allowed to vote in elections --federal elections as well as state and local elections. In each state, the state legislature sets voting qualifica- tions for participation in elections for the state legisla- ture, other state elective offices, that state's Senators and representatives in Congress, and that state's presiden- tial electors. In each state, the state legislature pre- scribes the times, places, and manner of holding elections to fill the foregoing offices. 30. Congress has used its superceding authority to (1) set age and residency requirements to vote in federal elections, (2) establish a uniform day for all states to hold elections for members of Congress and for presidential electors, and (3) give American citizens who reside outside the United States the right to vote for members of Congress and presidential electors in the states in which they previously lived. 31. AMENDMENT 14: Prohibits voting qualifications that have no reasonable relation to the ability to vote and thereby deny equal protection of the laws. AMENDMENT 15: Prohibits voting qualifications based on race, color, or previous condition of servitude. AMENDMENT 19: Prohibits voting qualifications based on sex, or gender. AMENDMENT 24: Prohibits voting qualifications (for partici- pation in federal elections) based on failure to pay a poll tax or any other tax. AMENDMENT 26: Prohibits denial of citizens 18 years of age or older the right to vote on account of age. Each of the foregoing federal constitutional amendments con- tains an Enforcement Clause granting Congress the power to enforce the amendment by appropriate legislation. The En- forcement Clauses enhance the authority of Congress to enact voting rights legislation, to pass federal statutes protect- ing the right to vote. 32. The "liberty" protected by the Due Process Clauses includes immunity from arbitrarily being thrown into jail or prison, without the government following proper procedures pre- scribed by law. In addition, it includes the right of the individual to contract, engage in any of the common occupa- tions of life, acquire useful knowledge, marry, establish a home and bring up childred, worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally enjoy those common law privileges long recognized as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. 33. The "property" protected by the Due Process Clauses includes ownership of real estate, things, and money. Also included are rights that may be conferred by state law, e.g., certain kinds of licenses, protection from being fired from some jobs except for just cause, and, according to certain pro- cedures, protection from deprivation of certain pension rights. 34. Procedural due process (1) places limits on how governmental power may be exercised, (2) pertains to the procedures of the law, and (3) mainly limits the executive and judicial branches of government. Substantive due process (1) places limits on what government may do, (2) pertains to the con- tent, or substance, of the law, and (3) mainly limits the legislative branch of government. 35. Since 1937, the Supreme Court has largely refused to apply the Substantive Due Process Doctrine in reviewing laws regu- lating economic activity. According to the Supreme Court, deciding what constitutes reasonable regulations of business and commercial activity is a responsibility of the legisla- ture, not the judiciary. The Court will not interfere with congressional or state legislative regulation of economic activity, as long as the Court can find a conceivable con- nection between a law regulating business and the promotion of the public interest. During recent decades, the Court has used the Substantive Due Process Doctrine to recognize and protect a right of personal privacy. 36. In the U.S. Constitution, there is no mention of the right to personal privacy. However, the Supreme Court has put to- gether some elements from Amendments 1, 4, 5, 9, and 14. And, on the basis of the combination of these elements, the Court has recognized the right of privacy as one of the civil liberties protected by the Federal Constitution. 37. In a 1986 decision, the Supreme Court refused to extend the right of privacy to relations between homosexuals. The Court refused to invalidate a Georgia law that made con- sensual sodomy, as practiced by homosexuals, a crime. Ac- cording to the Court, the fact that homosexual conduct oc- curred in the privacy of the home did not affect the result. However, the Supreme Court invalidated a provision of the Colorado Constitution which prohibited any legislative, executive, or judicial action at any level of state or local government designed to protect homosexuals. GROUNDS: The Colorado state constitutional provision violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The provi- sion identifies persons by a single trait and then denies them across-the-board protection. 38. The police may arrest a person without a warrant in a public place, provided there is probable cause--i.e., a fair proba- bility that the person has committed a crime or is about to commit a crime. No later than two days after making the ar- rest, the police must take the arrested person to a magis- trate (a low-level judge) so that the judge, not just the police, can decide whether probable cause existed to justify the warrantless arrest. 39. It is unconstitutional to shoot an apparently unarmed, flee- ing, suspected felon unless the police officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious injury to the officer or to others. When feasible, the police officer must first warn the sus- pect: "Halt or I'll shoot." 40. Not every time the police stop a person to ask questions and/or to seek that person's consent to a search of his per- son and/or possessions is there a seizure or detention re- quiring probable cause or a warrant. When the police do so in a noncoercive manner, there is no seizure or detention requiring probable cause or a warrant. So long as a reason- able person would feel free to disregard the police and go about his business, the encounter is consensual and no rea- sonable suspicion is required. The encounter will not trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny unless it loses its con- sensual nature. The encounter becomes coercive and the Fourth Amendment comes into play if the person refuses to answer questions or consent to a search and the police, by either physical force or a show of authority, restrain the movement of the person, even though there is no arrest. Under these circum- stances, the police must have some objective justification for the restraint and/or search beyond mere suspicion. 41. Administrative searches do not require search warrants. Rules governing the conduct of such searches are more len- ient than the rules governing searches by police investigat- ing crimes. In 1997, the U.S. Supreme Court held that ad- ministrative searches conducted without grounds for suspi- cion of particular individuals are constitutional in certain limited circumstances. 42. The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of (1) blood and urine tests of rail employees involved in train accidents, (2) blood and urine tests of customs officials who are directly involved in drug interdiction and/or who are required to carry firearms, and (3) random testing of high school students engaged in interscholastic athletic competions. However, the Court invalidated a Georgia statute requiring candidates for designated state offices to certify that they had taken a drug test and that the test result was negative. GROUNDS: The State of Georgia failed to show why this invasion of privacy was necessary. 43. A police search without consent is unreasonable and there- fore unconstitutional unless the search has been authorized by a valid search warrant issued by a magistrate after the police state under oath that they have probable cause to justify issuance of the warrant. The magistrate must per- form this function in a neutral and detached manner and not serve as a rubber stamp for the police. 44. In cases subsequent to MIRANDA V. ARIZONA (1978), the U.S. Supreme Court has modified the Miranda ruling in order to deter perjury, i.e., lying under oath. The Court allows evidence obtained contrary to the Miranda guidelines to be used to attack the credibility of defendants who offer tes- timony at their trials that conflicts with their statements to the police. 45. The basic requirements of procedural due process stipulated in the Sixth Amendment include the right of the accused to (1) a speedy and public trial, (2) an impartial jury, (3) trial in the area where the crime was committwd, (4) notice of the charges, (5) be confronted with witnesses against him, (6) use of the subpoena to obtain favorable witnesses, and (7) have the assistance of counsel for his defense. 46. Federal law provides that, in a federal criminal trial, the petit jury must consist of 12 jurors and arrive at its deci- sion by unanimous vote. The accused is allowed to waive his right to a jury trial. Generally, the petit jury is the judge of the facts, or evidence, presented at the trial. The petit jury, or trial jury, decides on the guilt or inno- cence of the defendant. Under the Sixth Amendment, the mem- bers of the trial jury must be selected from the state and district in which the alleged crime was committed. 47. Incumbency is a greater advantage for U.S. Representatives than it is for U.S. Senators. Incumbent Senators are more widely known through the media, but so are many of their challengers. Since candidates for the U.S. Senate are far more visible than candidates for the U.S. House of Represen- tatives, senatorial candidates cannot easily duck tough is- sues. Incumbent Senators normally face tougher competition than do House incumbents running for reelection, the Sena- tors facing challengers who often are already well known or who raise and spend significant amounts of political money.