THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATIVE, USA
An Online Journal of Political Commentary & Analysis
Volume X, Issue # 160, July 2, 2008
Dr. Almon Leroy Way, Jr., Editor
Government Committed to & Acting in Accord with Conservative Principles
Ensures a Nation's Strength, Progress, & Prosperity
EUROPEAN CONVERTS TO TERRORISM
By Milena Uhlmann
EUROPEAN ISLAMISTS: THE SECURITY RISK POSED BY NATIVE EUROPEANS WHO CONVERT TO ISLAM & EMBRACE
A RADICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RELIGION -- THE INVOLVEMENT OF MUSLIM CONVERTS IN ISLAMIST TERRORIST
ATTACKS ON EUROPEAN SOIL -- THE GROWING THREAT TO EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACIES & THE
CHALLENGE IT IS PRESENTING TO EUROPEAN SECURITY AGENCIES & POLITICIANS -- WHAT ROLE SHOULD THE EUROPEAN
UNION PLAY IN MEETING THE CHALLENGE?
FULL STORY:
Conversion to Islam among native Europeans is on the rise. Many converts live at peace within their native societies;
some convert only for marriage, and reject neither contemporary culture nor Europe's Judeo-Christian values. A minority,
however, embraces radical interpretations of Islam and can pose a security risk. The involvement of Muslim converts in
recent terrorist attacks has raised concern in Europe about these "converts to terrorism." While intelligence agencies
and security services track international communications and guard borders, such homegrown terrorists pose just as
potent a threat to the security of Western constitutional democracies. European security services and politicians remain
unprepared to handle this growing phenomenon.
A GROWING PROBLEM
In Europe, there is very little hard data on conversion to Islam, due to the difficulty of gathering proper statistics. Because
Muslim communities usually have an informal structure and no formal clergy, most do not keep records. In France, for
instance, state agencies do not record citizens' religious affiliations; to do so, French officials say, would counter France's
commitment to secularism. In German registration offices, Muslim residents are included in a pool of "diverse religious
affiliations." [1] German converts apparently account for only a small portion — between 12,000 and 100,000 — of
Germany's total Muslim population of 2.8 to 3.2 million, [2] which itself comprises less than 4 percent of the total
population of Germany. In 2006, the Federal Ministry of the Interior commissioned a study from the Zentralinstitut Islam -
Archiv Deutschland (ZIIAD) to determine the number of converts, but, amid suspicion over the ZIIAD's methodology,
discounted as exaggerated its findings and ended its relationship with the institute. [3]
Nevertheless, it appears that both conversions and Islamist outreach to converts is increasing. Thomas Hamza Fischer,
Founder of the Islamisches Informationszentrum (IIZ) in Ulm, a city in Baden-Württemberg known for its radical Islamist
scene, died fighting in Chechnya. [4] The IIZ's journal, Denk mal Islamisch (Think Islamic) is geared to
converts, addressing issues such as emotional and personal support. The police, the German Federal Office for the
Protection of the Constitution (FOC), as well as the Islamisches Informationszentrum's neighbors say that more German
converts have visited the center since Summer, 2007, than they had in seasons past. [5] Apparently anticipating a ban by
the Bav1arian Ministry of Interior, the IIZ dissolved in October, 2007. [6]
In recent years, police and intelligence services have become increasingly aware of the threat of homegrown terrorism. In
2003, Judge Jean Louis Bruguière, the former French Investigating Magistrate in Charge of Counterterrorism Affairs,
observed that Al-Qa'ida had increased its recruiting efforts in Europe and in particular was on the lookout for women and
converts to Islam. [7] In March, 2004, the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) released an analysis of
jihadi recruits' backgrounds, [8] and, the following year, the British Home and Foreign Offices released a similar study. [9]
In August, 2007, the New York Police Department released a report on radicalization within Western societies, focusing on
trends in homegrown terrorism and emphasizing the increasing role of converts in terror plots. [10] Wolfgang Schäuble,
Germany's federal Minister of the Interior, argues that the prevalence of homegrown jihadis is increasing. [11]
Germaine Maurice Lindsay, also known as Abdullah Shaheed Jamal, was one of four terrorists who detonated bombs on
the London Underground and on a bus in central London, July 7, 2005, killing fifty-six (including themselves) and injuring
more than 700. Lindsay, who changed his name after his conversion to Islam, was born in Jamaica.
The 2004 murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh, the Madrid train bombings the same year, and the following year's
attacks on London's Tube and bus system demonstrate that European citizens and residents can conduct horrendous acts
against their respective countries. The culmination of this trend will be the planning of and participation in such attacks by
European converts to Islam.
On September 4, 2007, the German security services arrested three men for plotting car bomb attacks in Germany targeting
the U.S. military base at Ramstein and pubs and nightclubs frequented by Americans. [12] Two of the three were
German-born converts to Islam. [13] This plot was not the first involving German converts. In 1997, Israeli security services
detained Steven Smyrek at Ben Gurion International Airport as he tried to enter Israel to survey possible Hezbollah terror
targets.[14] Christian Ganczarski, a Polish immigrant of German descent who had converted to Islam in 1986, played a major
role as the intermediary between Al-Qa'ida's leadership and the suicide bomber who carried out the 2002 bombing of a
Tunisian synagogue in Djerba, which killed twenty-one people. [15] In 2006, the German police arrested Sonja B., a
40-year-old German convert who sought to travel to Iraq with her 1-year-old son and to carry out a suicide attack. [16]
For Islamist terrorists, the European convert is a prized recruit, at ease in society, cognizant of informal rules and
opportunities, and able to move freely without arousing suspicion. Their citizenship enables them to travel freely under the
terms of the European Schengen agreement and, in many cases, the U.S. visa waiver program. [17] Richard Reid, a British
convert to Islam who attempted to blow up an airliner with explosives hidden in his shoes and boarded a flight to the
United States under the visa waiver program, highlighted the threat of European converts to terrorism to both their own
homelands and U.S. security. Short of requiring visas for British, French, and German passport holders, U.S. authorities
have requested that airlines provide detailed passenger rosters for incoming flights to the United States. European carriers
have followed suit.
IDENTIFTING TERRORIST CONVERTS
European security services are unsure of how to address the problem of radicalized converts, largely due to their
uncertainty about how to integrate competing security and civil liberties interests. On one hand, the abandonment of
passport control posts along internal European borders — the heart of the European integration process — needs to be
addressed; EU states must adjust to the fact that criminal enterprises span borders. On the other hand, the European
public distrusts any measure that might lead European institutions, let alone a European intelligence service, to increase
surveillance, especially given the opacity of EU decision-making.
At the national level, however, there is perhaps a greater sense of urgency in monitoring converts to terrorism. In
September, 2007, Günther Beckstein, the Bavarian Minister of the Interior, proposed registering and observing every
convert to Islam in Germany in order to determine whether the future Muslim would pursue a constitutional democratic
or an Islamist orientation. [18] This suggestion provoked an uproar. Critics said it put converts under general suspicion,
undercut religious dialogue, and contradicted the principle of religious freedom. Such populist tactics, though, are likely
to be counterproductive. Nothing is gained by placing converts under surveillance simply because they married a
Muslim or found religious satisfaction through Islamic theology. Such tactics might backfire if they alienate the convert,
and they would require a massive investment in intelligence gathering for a questionable return. They would also be
domestically unpopular: Europeans would certainly argue that turning all converts to Islam into terrorism suspects runs
counter to the ideals of European constitutionalism, representative democracy, and protection of individual rights.
Profiling potential terrorists, however, should not be taboo. Doing so requires an understanding of the mentality of both
the individual convert and of the group into which the individual converts. Many converts embrace their new faith with
zeal, and Islamist groups can channel this fervor into a process of quick radicalization. [19] New converts are often less
proficient in religious matters than religious leaders, but are eager to fill in the gaps, making them susceptible to
indoctrination by organizations like the Islamisches Informationszentrum.
In larger cities such as Berlin, advocates of various Islamic trends often recruit new converts. Among the most
aggressive are the Salafists. [20] Converts wanting to explore and learn more about their new religion are often attracted
to fundamentalist interpretations as they seek "pure" and "true" Islam. Jihadi websites reinforce this search — indeed,
this was how Sonja B., the would-be Iraq suicide bomber, discovered militant Islam. [21]
Foreign scholarships also provide a means of recruitment. After his conversion, but prior to becoming involved in
terrorism, Ganczarski, the German Al-Qa'ida intermediary, studied Islam on a scholarship at the University of Medina,
described by the Deutsches Orient-Institut as a "recruiting pool" for Islamists. [22] After his arrest, Ganczarski said there
had been a recruitment wave for such scholarships in Germany in the mid-1990s, focusing on young converts. After he
returned from Saudi Arabia, where he probably became radicalized, he went on to Chechnya and Pakistan. as well as
Afghanistan, [23] where he met Osama bin Laden. [24] Apparently, Saudi Arabia provided thousands of such
scholarships. [25]
The background of the convert is as important as the nature of the absorbing group. Those who convert to Islam for
practical purposes, for example, to marry a Muslim woman, seldom become extremists. Others are predisposed to
radicalism. Smyrek is an extreme example: He was always a radical and actively sought out Islamist terror groups in order
to become a suicide bomber.
The convert's socioeconomic background is another vital factor. Conversion is, in part, a migration from one worldview
to another, [26] described by sociologist Thomas Luckmann as a decision to go shopping in a supermarket of religious
goods. [27] As the individual tries to reconcile his old and new belief systems, he selects explanations that best meet
his needs. Sometimes, this involves the endorsement of terrorism as a means of righting perceived wrongs.
MOTIVES TO CONVERT
There seem to be three dominant motives behind the decision to convert to Islam: First is the search for a group that will
provide the convert with meaning and guidance — for example, by adherence to Shari‘a (Islamic law), which provides
rules that the convert believes are "not arbitrary," like man-made laws. [28] The assumption of religious faith often
involves a person's search for a higher purpose, a desire to cease living "from one party to the next or one basketball
game to the next." [29] The quest for social integration is another important factor: "When I meet brothers I have never
seen before, I feel at home right away and accepted," [30] explained one convert.
Second, a convert may seek a means by which he can articulate his criticism of Western society or share with others his
sense of alienation from the dominant culture:
"I became Muslim when Communism collapsed, and I didn't want
Capitalism. And you have to do something."[31]
Third, he may desire a way of life that allows the individual to express his views in his everyday routine, if only by praying
five times a day. ("I feel like I am living in a parallel society. But I feel marvelous."[32])
Because Islam often has a negative reputation in Europe, conversion to Islam enables the convert to project sentiments of
rebellion. Indeed, Olivier Roy, from the French Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, has suggested that radical
Islam is tantamount to a protest identity. [33] Some converts emphatically champion Islam as the best alternative to
post-industrial Western society. Such is the rationale for Murad Wilfried Hofmann, [34] a former German diplomat who
converted to Islam in 1980 and has since acted as an intellectual leader for German converts. Ayyub Axel Köhler, the
current Chairman of the Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland, who converted to Islam in 1963, has remarked that Islam is
a way of life and thus offers its adherents the chance to avoid the alienation of life in Western societies. [35] If the numbers
of conversions to Islam in the West are on the rise, the cultural criticism underlying such conversions becomes especially
relevant. Identity issues play an important role, as does globalization and modern communications, which have allowed the
exploration of new identities. When societies lose their coherence, threats increase from within. [36]
CONCLUSIONS
The European Union member-states face a new challenge today, one that transcends the traditional national security
paradigm that separates internal and external threats. In a federation of states on a scale as large as the EU, the aim of
promoting peace and stability is intertwined with the national interests of the member-states and their ability to collaborate
on ensuring the security of the larger whole. [37] The answer to questions about how to balance civil liberties with
legitimate security concerns remains elusive.
What makes a common policy so hard to achieve when it comes to the jurisdiction of the European Justice and Home
Affairs Council is the fact that judicial matters and law enforcement policy remain national rather than transnational efforts.
The independent framework for cooperation on justice and home affairs, set up with the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993, has
remained intergovernmental; decisions must be unanimous, creating a situation in which negotiations often carry on for
years and lead to complex legal restrictions. Even though the 9-11 attacks changed priorities and created the impetus for
institutional restructuring, EU member states remain unwilling to surrender sovereignty over internal security matters.
Another problem is that differing national judicial systems create structural disincentives to collaboration. [38] The upshot
is that there remains significant, informal cross-border cooperation, [39] and, for that matter, informal intelligence collection
and sharing. As long as the Constitutional Treaty — which would centralize the Justice and Home Affairs portfolios so
that European Union institutions and law would become paramount to state law in these cases — remains un-ratified, this
is not likely to change.
The creation of the post of the EU Coordinator for Counterterrorism after the 2004 Madrid attacks was a step in the right
direction, but the Coordinator lacks the mandate and resources to span national boundaries. As Wolfgang Münchau,
Associate Editor of Financial Times, has noted, "Terrorists in Europe think more European than many of Europe's
homeland security-related agencies." [40]
Ultimately, European states are responsible for their citizens. If individual states remain unwilling to cede certain aspects
of their sovereignty to the kind of European institutions that could more effectively monitor Islamist activities across
Europe, their ability to collaborate on security will suffer, and ultimately their security itself will suffer. In order for this
process to move forward, the EU needs to begin a dialogue that addresses the security problems that arise from the
Islamist community, rather than denouncing discussions of the problem as "Islamophobic."
NOTES:
[1] See Thomas Lemmen, Islamische Organisationen in Deutschland (Bonn: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2000), p. 18.
[2] Deutscher Bundestag, "Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Große Anfrage der Abgeordneten Dr. Jürgen Rüttgers, Erwin Marschewski (Recklinghausen), Wolfgang Zeitlmann, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion der CDU/CSU," Nov. 8, 2000, p. 4-5; Johannes Kandel, "Organisierter Islam in Deutschland und gesellschaftliche Integration," Politische Akademie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Referat Interkultureller Dialog, Bonn, Sept. 2004, p. 1.
[3] Der Spiegel (Hamburg), Jan. 15, 2007; Süddeutsche Zeitung (Munich), Jan. 12, 2007; Mohammad Salim Abdullah, telephone interview with author, Jan. 27, 2007; Die Zeit (Hamburg), Apr. 19, 2007.
[4] "Islamisten-Szene. Die Radikalen von Ulm," Spiegel Online, June 30, 2007.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Spiegel Online, Oct. 2, 2007.
[7] Robert Leiken, Bearers of Global Jihad? Immigration and National Security after 9/11 (Washington, D.C.: The Nixon Center, 2004), p. 107.
[8] "Background of Jihad Recruits in the Netherlands," Algemene Inlichtingen-en Veiligheidsdienst (AIVD), Mar. 10, 2004.
[9] Times (London), July 10, 2005.
[10] Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, "Radicalization in the West. The Homegrown Threat," New York Police Department Intelligence Division, Aug. 2007.
[11] Der Tagesspiegel (Berlin), Sept. 5, 2007.
[12] "Terror-Razzia. Bombenbauer planten Terror-Anschlag mit vielen Toten," Spiegel Online, Sept. 5, 2007; "Terrorverdacht. Autobomben sollten US-Einrichtungen treffen," Welt Online (Hamburg), Sept. 5, 2007.
[13] "Terrorverdacht. Autobomben sollten US-Einrichtungen treffen," Welt Online, Sept. 5, 2007.
[14] "Steven Smyrek. Vom Kleinkriminellen zum angehenden Gotteskrieger," Das Erste Online (German public television), Jan. 14, 2004.
[15] Leiken, Bearers of Global Jihad? p. 109; "Deutscher wegen Djerba-Attentats angeklagt," SWR Online (Baden-Baden), Nov. 19, 2007.
[16] Der Tagesspiegel, Sept. 3, 2006.
[17] John L. Clarke, "European Homeland Security: Promises, Progress and Pitfalls," in Bertelsmann Stiftung Foundation, ed., Securing the European Homeland. The EU, Terrorism and Homeland Security (Gütersloh: Venusberg Group, 2005), p. 36.
[18] "Nach Fahndungserfolg. Beckstein will Islamübertritte überwachen lassen," Handelsblatt (Nordrhein-Westfalen), Sept. 6, 2007.
[19] Marc Sageman, Understanding Terrorist Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), p. 178-9.
[20] Author interview with Mujaheed, a 29-year-old convert, Berlin, Nov. 22, 2006.
[21] Der Tagesspiegel, Sept. 3, 2006.
[22] Ahmet Senyurt, "Djerba-Anschlag: Zentralrat der Muslime gerät ins Zwielicht," Welt Online, May 6, 2003.
[23] Senyurt, "Djerba-Anschlag: Zentralrat der Muslime gerät ins Zwielicht."
[24] Leiken, Bearers of Global Jihad? p. 109.
[25] Brian Eads, "Saudi Arabia's Deadly Export," Reader's Digest (Australia), Feb. 2003.
[26] Stefano Allievi, Nouveaux protagonistes de l'islam européen. Naissance d'une culture euroislamique? Le rôle des convertis (San Domenico di Fiesole, Italy: European University Institute, 2000), p. 7.
[27] Thomas Luckmann, The Invisible Religion (New York: Macmillan, 1967), p. 98.
[28] Author interview with Taleb, a 27-year-old convert, Potsdam, Nov. 26, 2006.
[29] Author interview with Mujaheed, a 29-year-old convert, Berlin, Nov. 22, 2006.
[30] Author interview with Paul, a 53-year-old convert, Berlin, Dec. 1, 2006.
[31] Telephone interview with Salim, a convert from North Rhine-Westphalia in his fifties and editor of a German-speaking Islamic newspaper run mostly by converts, Dec. 19, 2006.
[32] Author interview with Alex, a 17-year-old-convert, Potsdam, Nov. 24, 2006.
[33] Olivier Roy, Der islamische Weg nach Westen. Globalisierung, Entwurzelung und Radikalisierung (Munich: Pantheon, 2006), p. 308.
[34] For example, see Murad Wilfried Hofmann, Islam als Alternative (Munich: Diedrichs, 1999), p. 8.
[35] Ayyub Axel Köhler, Islam Kompakt (Köln: Al-Kitab Verlag, 2000), p. 10.
[36] Gert-Joachim Glaeßner, "Nationale und europäische Politik im Spannungsfeld von Sicherheit und Freiheit," in Erwin Müller and Patricia Schneider, eds., Die Europäische Union im Kampf gegen den Terrorismus. Sicherheit vs. Freiheit (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2006), p. 113.
[37] Ibid., p. 110.
[38] Wilhelm Knelangen, "Die innen- und justizpolitische Zusammenarbeit der EU und die Bekämpfung des Terrorismus," in Müller and Schneider, eds., Die Europäische Union im Kampf gegen den Terrorismus, pp. 140-62.
[39] Daniel Keohane, The EU and Counter-terrorism (London: Centre for European Reform, 2005), p. 2.
[40] Wolfgang Münchau, "Europe Must Tackle Terrorism," Financial Times, July 10, 2005.
LINKS TO RELATED TOPICS:
Europe, European States, Politics, & Public Policy
Islamism & Jihadism -- The Threat of Radical Islam
Page Three
Page Two
Page One
Middle East -- Arabs, Arab States,
& Their Middle Eastern Neighbors
American Foreign Policy -- The Middle East
International Politics & World Disorder:
War & Peace in the Real World
Page Two
Page One
Islamist Terrorist Attacks on the U.S.A.
Osama bin Laden & the Islamist Declaration of War
Against the U.S.A. & Western Civilization
Islamist International Terrorism &
U.S. Intelligence Agencies
Counterterrorism & U.S. National Security
U.S. National Security Strategy
Milena Uhlmann is a research associate at the Institut für Europäische Politik (Institute for European Politics), Berlin,
Germany.
The foregoing article by Ms. Uhlmann was originally published in the Middle East Quarterly, Summer, 2008, and
can be found on the Internet website maintained by the Middle East Forum, a foreign policy think tank which seeks to
define and promote American interests in the Middle East, defining U.S. interests to include fighting radical Islam,
working for Palestinian Arab acceptance of the State of Israel, improving the management of U.S. efforts to promote
constitutional democracy in the Middle East, reducing America's energy dependence on the Middle East, more robustly
asserting U.S. interests vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia, and countering the Iranian threat.
(Article URL: http://www.meforum.org/article/1927)
Republished with Permission of the Middle East Forum
Reprinted from the Middle East Forum News
mefnews@meforum.org (MEF NEWS)
July 2, 2008
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