THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATIVE, USA
An Online Journal of Political Commentary & Analysis
Volume XII, Issue # 86, May 26, 2010
Dr. Almon Leroy Way, Jr., Editor
Government Committed to & Acting in Accord with Conservative Principles
Ensures a Nation's Strength, Progress, & Prosperity
RADICAL ISLAM: CAN JIHADIS BE REHABILITATED?
By Katherine Seifert
THE TERROR WAR & ENEMY CAMBATANTS CAPTURED & DETAINED: WHAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
SHOULD DO WHEN IT CLOSES THE GUANTANAMO BAY DETENTION CENTER -- WHERE THE DETAINEES SHOULD BE SENT &
WHAT SHOULD BE DONE WITH THEM -- A LOOK AT VARIOUS APPROACHES TO REHABILITATION & DE-RADICALIZATION --
RE-INDOCTRINATION OF CAPTURED ISLAMIST TERRORISTS & EASING THEM BACK INTO SOCIETY -- HOW EFFECTIVE ARE
SUCH PROGRAMS?
FULL STORY:
As U.S. policymakers become increasingly uneasy about the fate of the remaining detainees currently held at Guantánamo
Bay, greater attention is being paid to socalled jihadist rehabilitation programs that have been established abroad.
Numerous governments, including those of Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Singapore, Canada and Britain, have established
programs that seek either to rehabilitate Islamist terrorists or to prevent further radicalization of jihadist sympathizers.
Different states tailor their programs to the mores, laws, and needs of their societies. Muslim-majority countries
concentrate on radicals who have either crossed the line into actual terrorist activities or who are active members in
Islamist organizations deemed to be a threat to the state. Western initiatives focus, instead, on individuals who may seek
camaraderie with extremist groups online or at local mosques; their programs seek to forestall further radicalization. While
there is a clear divergence in approach, both must answer the same question: Have their efforts been successful or have
they merely released detainees into their respective societies who feign detoxification, but whose commitment to jihad has
merely gone underground? The wrong answer to this question poses a serious threat to global security, as well as local
security.
EGYPT'S "SOFT" APPROACH
In 1997, Egypt became the birthplace for a new approach to counterterrorism, when it allowed imprisoned members of the
Islamic Group (Al-Gama'a al-Islamiya, or GI), a violent offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, to meet and reevaluate their
core ideology, hoping they might renounce violence as the parent organization did in the 1970s. That year, imprisoned
leaders issued a cease-fire, and a few years later, after consulting with Islamic scholars from Al-Azhar University,
high-ranking members of the organization released twenty-five volumes of revisions to their philosophy, entitled
Tashih al-Mafahim (Corrections of concepts). [1] The revisions, for example, argue that Islam does not
permit killing or terrorizing non-Muslim civilians and discusses the dangers that Al-Qa'ida poses to Muslims worldwide. [2]
The group was also permitted to keep its leadership within the prison in the hope that, once senior members renounced
violence, they would help convince others to follow a more moderate path. In 2007, imprisoned leaders of the Egyptian
Islamic Jihad (Al-Gihad al-Islami al-Masri, or GIM), another violent Islamist group founded in the late 1970s, followed in
the footsteps of GI by instituting what they called their own "collective reform." With the support of Egyptian security
authorities, incarcerated GIM leaders, including Founder Sayyed Imam al-Sharif (aka: Dr. Fadl), were allowed to hold
meetings with other imprisoned members. In May, 2007, Sharif publicly condemned violence, using the pages of the
influential London-based daily, Asharq al-Awsat to make his announcement. [3] In response, prison security
authorities began to separate those prisoners who objected to this new initiative from those willing to follow Sharif's
path and renounce violence. [4]
By encouraging extremists to reevaluate their groups' ideologies, Egyptian authorities were able to get leaders of GI and
GIM, ostensibly, to revise their strategies and steer members away from violence. At the same time, allowing the
leadership to stay intact may have helped legitimize these groups and their messages. Over the years, however, these
groups have splintered into factions, some of which refuse to acknowledge these nonviolent reforms. For example,
prominent Muslim Brotherhood member Essam el-Erian, who had apparently wearied of reform initiatives for not
providing solutions to members waiting on real-world reform, complained:
"We welcome these revisions because we have called
for many years to stop violence…. But these revisions
are incomplete. They reject violence, but they don't
offer a new strategy for reform and change." [5]
Although Egypt's counter-radicalization program has been called "the most extensive of any Arab country," [6]
accurate recidivism rates for formerly imprisoned members of these terrorist organizations are hard to come by. One
source notes that the program has not been "actively pursued." [7] Meanwhile, the Egyptian government has released
hundreds of prisoners whose once-militant leaders renounced violence. [8]
It is far from clear whether these jailhouse conversions are part of a collective effort to fake cooperation and ensure a
quick release of members, or whether they are sincere. Despite this, other Muslim-majority countries are now following
the Egyptian example, using counselors and clerics to de-radicalize terrorist detainees and trying to make sure that the
"right" message is taught.
YEMENI ATTEMPTS
Yemeni judge Hamoud al-Hitar began visiting radical Muslim prisoners held in Yemeni detention centers and engaging
them in theological debates as early as 2000. [9] In 2002, he was named head of the Dialogue Committee, an initiative
called for by presidential decree, with a brief of rehabilitating imprisoned jihadists. [10] With ideology at the core of
radical organizations, Yemeni officials thought that, by dialoguing and correcting beliefs, violence would be rejected by
inmates, once freed. The Committee planned on selecting a small group of prisoners, questioning them about their views
on Islam, and challenging them to use Qur'anic texts to justify their resort to violence.
The results of the program have been poor, with Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh admitting to only a 60 percent
success rate. [11] Yemen has released five hundred prisoners, and many are known to have returned to their violent
pasts, [12] making Yemen one of Al-Qa'ida's top countries for recruits. The ineffectiveness of the Yemeni initiative lay in
the ease with which detainees could go through the motions of de-radicalization by signing a slip of paper, being
granted their freedom, and only being required to check in regularly with their parole officers. Dozens have returned to
violent jihad and have been recaptured by U.S. forces; the program has even become a joke among detainees. As one
detainee interviewed by Newsweek put it, "To be frank, everyone was making fun of [Judge Hitar]." [13]
The program was forced to shut down in 2005, but Yemen is now being pressured by U.S. counterterrorism officials to
create a new facility for detainees returning from Guantánamo Bay (nearly one hundred of the approximately 229
remaining detainees are from Yemen). [14] However, President Saleh refuses to commence construction on a center
without U.S. funds; he has claimed he was promised $11 million for the center. [15] According to one source, the
prisoners in the original program saw it as an insincere attempt to bolster Yemen's reputation as a country tough on its
terrorists. Saleh's current refusal to act bolsters the claim of one of Hitar's former students: "We all understood that it
was just extortion to take money from the Americans. They were just playing with us." [16]
THE SAUDI MODEL
The Saudi Arabian government also faced skepticism from its prisoners when it first began the Munasaha (advisory
committee) initiative in its prisons in 2004, but, since then, it has managed to convince detainees that the scholars who
run the program are respectable clerics rather than government puppets. [17] The Kingdom's overall strategy goes in
English by the name PRAC (for Prevention, Rehabilitation, and AfterCare) [18] and includes lectures arranged by the
Ministry of Education, as well as published material condemning violence, along with government-sponsored
programs aimed at deterring citizens from radicalism. Exactly how this is accomplished is not entirely clear, as the
Wahhabi interpretation of Islam, which serves as a basis for all these efforts, is arguably one of the most extreme
versions of the faith, as well as the official religion of Saudi Arabia. For example, the state cannot condemn jihad itself
as the concept is rooted in the Qur'an. Instead, Saudi clerics employed by the PRAC initiative are forced to
stipulate conditions under which it is acceptable to take up arms, instead of fully denouncing the practice. [19]
The Munasaha program is conducted in Saudi prisons, which have been updated to fit the needs of jihadist detainees.
New prisoners are interviewed and examined for psychological problems, and their individual belief systems are
evaluated. Unlike typical prisons, each cell contains a television that transmits religious lectures, [20] and the inmates
are able to debate opinions with scholars via intercom. The Saudis claim that, from 2004 to 2007, only 3 to 5 percent of
parolees [21] in the Munasaha program have returned to extremist action, but it must be noted that the initiative itself is
self-selecting. [22] Reliable statistics have not been made available, and there are reasons to think the Saudis may want
to present a positive image for themselves, given their vulnerability to the charge that their own clergy are among the
most extreme. Those who participate in the program are those willing to renounce their beliefs; many were new recruits
to jihadist activity, and there is evidence to suggest they are as susceptible to persuasion by Munasaha counseling as
they were previously to extremist mentors. [23] Many in the program seem to have received a poor religious education,
unlike the hard-line jihadi leaders captured outside of the country and transferred to Saudi hands from Guantánamo.
In 2007, counseling for terrorists expanded in Saudi Arabia to several halfway houses, collectively known as the Care
Center, for post-prison continuation of rehabilitation. In November 2008, [24] Katherine Zoepf described the grounds
of the center, which included swimming pools, volleyball courts, PlayStations, and ping pong tables. Upon arrival,
detainees are given clothes, watches, and candy bars to ensure their comfort. Classes are offered which break down
terms such as jihad and takfir (condemning fellow Muslims as unbelievers) in ways that match the Saudi government's
definition of "correct" Islam (which views many non-Wahhabi Muslims as heretical). Instead of forbidding jihad, for
example, the program teaches the conditions under which it is acceptable (i.e. with the approval of the Saudi
government and the permission of one's parents). Family members are encouraged to visit the facility, and both the
detainee and a family member must sign a pledge renouncing violence before the prisoner's discharge. On release from
the program, the detainee is given several thousand dollars, a car, and sometimes additional money for marrying. [25]
Those deemed to be successfully reformed are encouraged to return to the Care Center and share their stories with
those currently enrolled in the program and mentor prisoners.
Should a parolee return to violence, the entire family may be punished. [26] When "graduates" Muhammad al-Oufi
and Said al-Shihri appeared in an Al-Qa'ida video in January, 2009, their families immediately released statements
denouncing them as "irreversible deviant members of society." [27] In the video, Oufi specifically mentioned the
program, warning of the Saudi attempts to reform extremists:
"We warn our fellow prisoners [from Guantánamo] about this
Care program.... We were used.... They tried to lead us away
from Islam. But thank God, we were able to escape their
power." [28]
One Guantánamo returnee expressed disgust at Oufi and Shihri's actions, saying:
"They have forgotten the effort extended by the state to set
them free. They [should] have been very grateful and thankful
to the government for the confidence it has placed in them,
instead of biting the hand extended to them. It shows that
they are untrustworthy and don't deserve this generous and
noble treatment." [29]
The Care Center program initially boasted a low recidivism rate. Then, in early 2009, the Saudis released a list of
eighty-five wanted terrorism suspects, [30] eleven of whom were graduates of the counseling initiative. Saudi officials
remain convinced that their program works and note a recidivism rate of 10-20 percent, [31] a number some claim is
inflated in part by the higher percentage of hard-line radicals who have come straight from Guantánamo Bay and by
the inclusion of those who have failed or refused to participate in the program but remain detained. A low recidivism
rate would be of real significance, given the central role of Saudi radicals in international jihad. But it is not clear how
graduates of the program who are not recidivists are able to retain their commitment to moderation while living within
normal Saudi-Wahhabi society, a society that is openly tolerant of levels of extremism that would be troubling in the
West.
Despite this, in July, 2009, the U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Department of Justice commended the Care Center
for its efforts at de-radicalizing detainees. [32] It is unclear what was behind this public praise, fueling speculation that
the Obama administration was seeking a quick way to fulfill its pledge to empty Guantánamo by January, 2010.
AMERICAN PROGRAMS IN IRAQ
The U.S. military contends that the programs it has developed have yielded positive results. [33] Initially, U.S. military
officials admitted that the detention centers they operated were breeding extremists; captured terrorists acted as
recruiters and were turning formerly moderate detainees into radicals. The development of a rehabilitation program
inspired by the Saudi model quickly followed this discovery. Task Force 134, the outfit charged with overseeing
Coalition detainee operations, staked out a new approach intended to incorporate detention into the broader U.S.
counterinsurgency strategy. The plan hinged on tactics that sought to segregate extremists, nurture moderates, and
ensure first-rate care and custody for every detainee. Each incoming detainee now undergoes a thorough background
check, and psychologists analyze education, skills, motivation and religiosity, enabling authorities to separate
recruiters, who may be looking for prisoners to radicalize, from the other inmates. [34]
Task Force 134, which oversees two camps for detainees, offers more than the theological debates upon which other
rehabilitation programs depend. Alongside religious discussions conducted by U.S.-vetted Iraqi imams, Iraqis are
taught to read and write (64 percent were found to be illiterate), [35] enabling them to read the religious texts for
themselves for the first time. [36] They also follow a curriculum that includes English, mathematics, and other
foundational classes. Work programs are another important feature of the Task Force 134 program, training Iraqis in
fields such as carpentry, masonry, welding, and textile manufacturing.
According to the U.S. government, this education initiative has proven immensely successful; Iraqi parents whose
children have not been detained "have petitioned to enroll [them] in the program," [37] and some detainees have
stayed past their release dates to finish their studies. Between January and September, 2008, approximately one
hundred detainees were recaptured out of the over fifteen thousand released from the "Anti-Jihad U" (as some troops
refer to the program). [38] Major General Douglas Stone, formerly responsible for both camps, cited a recidivism rate of
detainees released early in the program's evolution at about 10-15 percent; however, in March 2009, he claimed the rate
had plummeted to about 1 percent, [39] a remarkable drop that should, perhaps, be viewed skeptically.
SINGAPORE'S APPROACH
The issue of releasing radical detainees into societies in which Muslims are a minority poses a separate set of problems.
After the 2001-2002 arrests of more than thirty members of the Southeast Asian branch of the terrorist group, Jemaah
Islamiyah (Islamic community), who were plotting attacks in Singapore, [40] the government there founded the Religious
Rehabilitation Group (RRG) to de-radicalize these terrorists. [41] With a Muslim population of 16 percent, Singapore
chose to act cautiously when rehabilitating offenders, working on amending their beliefs instead of administering harsh
measures. Nearly forty Islamic scholars and religious leaders make up a group dedicated to "deprogramming" detainees.
By approaching the jihadists on religious terms, the RRG seeks to treat the problem at its root. As one security officer
explained, "Once you have taken an oath of God, it will take another man of God to undo it." [42]
Counselors hold one-on-one sessions with inmates to challenge radical ideologies and meet with detainees' families to
ensure extremism has not "infected" other relatives. The government provides financial support for families, secures jobs
for the detainees once they are freed, and requires counseling after release. Forty former terrorists (two-thirds of
detainees since 2001) have been rehabilitated and released, and, as of May, 2009, it seems none have returned to
extremist activities. [43] The remaining third, deemed unready to reenter society, have been kept in the program. If these
figures are valid, they would suggest that Singapore's system is moderately effective. According to William Dobson,
former Managing Editor of Foreign Policy:
"A detainee in Singapore is not released until his case
officer, a psychologist, and the religious counselor
signs [sic] off. Even then the decision goes to the
Prime Minister's Cabinet to give its approval." [44]
Furthermore, Singapore's privacy laws allow for greater monitoring of individuals and help the government keep tabs on
those released.
THE U.K.'S OUNCE OF PREVENTION
Unlike programs in Muslim-majority countries and Singapore, or U.S. efforts in Iraq, the detoxification program
developed in Great Britain is geared towards preventive measures before high-risk individuals resort to violence. Its
success is even harder to determine, since there is no clear way of measuring whether someone with jihadist
sympathies would have actually crossed the line into terrorism.
The Channel Project, an English initiative developed in 2007 and run by the Association of Chief Police Officers, [45]
began in Lambeth (a section of London) and Lancashire and has expanded to eleven (soon to be fifteen) sites across
the United Kingdom. According to the British Home Office, more than two hundred individuals (some as young as
thirteen, others as old as fifty) have been referred to the program, which they state involves police officers working
alongside members of Muslim communities to identify those who seem particularly vulnerable to the teachings of
Muslim extremists. [46] The project first came to the public's attention when a teenager publicly detailed how he had
been "groomed" for jihad in a south London mosque. [47] Along with forty-five other young men, the youth received
rehabilitation sessions in an educational center attached to the same mosque in which he was first recruited for jihad.
The authors of the program state that it is designed to address not only the version of Islam that was taught to the
youths, but also includes activities designed to combat feelings of "estrangement from family or community," [48] this
despite mounting evidence that would-be and actual U.K. jihadists were integrated into British society. [49] There are
additional concerns about which instructors the British authorities may have chosen to steer the detainees away from
radicalism. Tariq Ramadan, for example, whose bona fides as a "moderate" have been sharply challenged, [50] was
hired by the government following the 7/7 London bombings to argue against terrorism to U.K. Muslims. [51]
While there are claims that, as of June, 2009, none of those individuals referred to the Channel Project has gone on to
commit an offense, [52] this is scarcely enough time to accurately assess the program's success. More telling is a recent
report that many incarcerated British Muslims are refusing to participate in rehabilitation sessions or court-ordered
courses dedicated to affecting attitudinal and behavioral changes in a detainee. As one prisoner explained, "It is an
established concept within the Sharia that a Muslim must not speak about the haraam — prohibited things — and
certainly should not advertise past mistakes to their peers." [53] Meanwhile, there are reports that Muslims in British
prisons are converting others and taking control of various criminal matters. [54]
Notwithstanding the uncertain efficacy of the Channel Project, the Scottish Preventing Violent Extremism Unit decided
to develop its own "tartanised" version of the program. In addition to radical Muslims, the program will target those
"lured into other forms of political violence, such as fanatics on the fringes of Scottish nationalism or the animal rights
movement." [55] Project organizers hope that community members such as teachers and parents will refer suspects for
"interventions." It is far from clear how successful such a program can be as it lumps together populations susceptible
to the promptings of religious figures with secular groups like the League Against Cruel Sports (anti-fox hunting).
CANADIAN EFFORTS
On the other side of the Atlantic, Sheikh Sayyid Ahmed Amiruddin presented a 12-step detoxification program to
members of various Canadian Muslim communities and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in December, 2008.
Amiruddin, a Sufi cleric, has been a vocal critic of the Wahhabist interpretations of Islam inserted into Qur'ans
imported from Saudi Arabia and has himself been criticized by his compatriots for betraying Canadian Muslims. [56]
The project emphasizes the importance of peace and tolerance in a secular community like Canada and counsels
against "a narrow-minded brand of the faith." [57] The plan was sponsored by Mohammed Shaikh, the imam of
Toronto's Al-Noor mosque, who, speaking of Muslim radicals, stated:
"Those addicted to alcohol are locked within a certain
thinking pattern that makes them rely on alcohol. The
same applies to extremists who can only think about
events around them in one way." [58]
Shaikh and Canadian Muslim convert Robert Heft have used Amiruddin's strategies in their Specialized
De-radicalization Intervention Program to stress interfaith acceptance and show that Al-Qa'ida's teachings are
theologically incorrect. [59] The steps included in the Heft detoxification program are intended to promote
understanding of other religions and explain how extremists misinterpret events in Islamic history to promote their
agenda. Some of these steps include "using verses from the Holy Koran that speak of peace and good conduct";
learning about Muhammad's "mercy, kind manner, humble attitude, wisdom, patience"; "using hadith … that provide
ethics and other moral training"; exploring stories from history to see the "contexts and underlying factors, not always
[to the] glory of God"; and exploring the "interconnectedness of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam." [60]
Heft and Shaikh hope members of the Toronto 18, a terrorist group that planned to carry out a three-day bombing
assault across Canada, [61] will be referred to the program upon their release from prison. They hope to reintegrate
these jihadists into Canadian society. Although the program has received coverage from several Canadian newspapers,
no recidivism rate has been published, as it has not officially released any graduates. This makes it impossible to
evaluate the effectiveness of the program.
CONCLUSIONS
The question for the U.S. government grows ever more pressing: When Guantánamo Bay closes, where should these
detainees be sent? And can the urge to return to violent action actually be suppressed by ideological counseling?
While it seems de-radicalization programs are helping to ease jihadist detainees back into society, former prisoners may
still possess ideological sympathies for terrorist groups and subsequently fall back into earlier, radical behaviors. The
Saudi program, previously praised by policymakers, has recently come under fire. Said al-Shihri, a Saudi program
"graduate" and former inmate at Guantánamo Bay, is the Deputy Leader of Al-Qa'ida in Yemen and has been linked to
the attempted airline bombing of a Detroit-bound airplane on Christmas day. [62]
Even if the Saudi program were considered an unequivocal success, not all countries can afford resource-intensive
initiatives like the Saudi Arabian "aftercare" program. Additionally, there is the issue of the nature of the Islamic norm
that released prisoners are expected to follow and how that might impact global security. The Saudi model, for example,
is based on a Salafi perspective, which has its own narrow version of who is and is not a kafir (apostate) and how such
reprobates should be treated.
The programs developed in Muslim-minority countries may become serious assets in efforts to combat homegrown
radicalism. Graduates do not face quite the same temptation of returning to, or even taking up, violent action that they
might encounter in Muslim-majority states. Nevertheless, pressures are there as long as the Muslim communal
institutions in these countries vacillate between rejecting jihadist ideologies and sympathizing with their longterm
goals.
Government-provided figures on recidivism and signed pledges are not accurate gauges for the success of
de-radicalization efforts. The few success rates published by authorities cover such a short period of time as to be
close to meaningless. Accurate numbers collected over a prolonged period of time may eventually offer a truer
measure of achievement or failure, but, without a way of comparing the behavior of those who have undergone these
programs with those who have not, assessing success rates becomes an unconvincing exercise.
Monitoring of parolees' associations and Internet activities may, to a degree, help determine the success of these
programs, but, ultimately, the primary way to measure how many detainees leave the programs still radicalized and
dedicated to violence is if they resort to violence. While the limited data would indicate that the majority have not, they
can continue to support jihad in other nonviolent but effective ways: Groups such as Al-Qa'ida will always need
recruiters and fundraisers to help run their operations. Other parolees may seek the path of "soft jihad" by engaging in
frivolous lawsuits against opponents, shutting down forums for free speech and criticism, invoking hate speech laws,
and working to impose Shari'a in Western nations. By attacking the problem from both ideological and societal
perspectives, these programs may be aiding counterterrorism efforts. Time will tell as to their effectiveness. A healthy
amount of skepticism needs to be maintained before any program can be credited as a cure for jihad.
NOTES:
[1] The Straits Times (Singapore), Aug. 3, 2009.
[2] IslamOnline.net, July 9, 2007.
[3] Lawrence Wright, "The Rebellion Within," The New Yorker, June 2, 2008.
[4] Nicole Stracke, "Arab Prisons: A Place for Dialogue and Reform," Perspectives on Terrorism, 2007, no. 4.
[5] Wright, "The Rebellion Within."
[6] The Guardian (London) July 27, 2007.
[7] The Straits Times, Aug. 3, 2009.
[8] Holly Fletcher, "Jamaat al-Islamiyya," Council on Foreign Relations, May 30, 2008.
[9] Kevin Peraino, "The Reeducation of Abu Jandal," Newsweek, May 29, 2009.
[10] The Yemen Times (San'a), Aug, 12, 2009; Gregory D. Johnsen, "Yemen's Passive Role in the War on Terrorism," Terrorism Monitor (Jamestown Foundation), Feb. 23, 2006.
[11] Peraino, "The Reeducation of Abu Jandal."
[12] The Yemen Times, Aug. 12, 2009.
[13] Peraino, "The Reeducation of Abu Jandal."
[14] Time Magazine, Jan. 7, 2010.
[15] Peraino, "The Reeducation of Abu Jandal."
[16] Ibid.
[17] Lawrence E. Cline, "Changing Jihadist Behavior: The Saudi Model," Small Wars Journal, Apr. 10, 2009.
[18] Christopher Boucek, "Saudi Arabia's 'Soft' Counterterrorism Strategy: Prevention, Rehabilitation and Aftercare," Carnegie Papers, no. 97, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Sept. 2008.
[19] The New York Times, Nov. 7, 2008.
[20] Shiraz Maher, "A Betty Ford clinic for jihadis," The Sunday Times (London), July 6, 2008.
[21] Stracke, "Arab Prisons: A Place for Dialogue and Reform."
[22] Cline, "Changing Jihadist Behavior: The Saudi Model."
[23] Ibid.
[24] The New York Times, Nov. 7, 2008.
[25] The New York Times, Nov. 7, 2008.
[26] Peraino, "The Reeducation of Abu Jandal."
[27] The Saudi Gazette (Riyadh), Jan. 29, 2009, accessed Oct. 11, 2009.
[28] Kelly McEver, "They Tried to Make Mohammed al-Awfi Go to Rehab," freedetainees.org, accessed Feb. 3, 2010.
[29] The Saudi Gazette (Riyadh), Jan. 29, 2009, accessed Oct. 11, 2009.
[30] The New York Times, Feb. 3, 2009.
[31] Boucek, "Saudi Arabia's 'Soft' Counterterrorism Strategy."
[32] "U.S. Officials Commend Saudi Detainee Rehabilitation Program," Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, Washington, D.C., July 8, 2009.
[33] Jeffrey Azarva, "Is U.S. Detention Policy in Iraq Working?" Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2009, pp. 5-14.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Judith Miller, "Anti-Jihad U.," City Journal (New York), May 2, 2008.
[36] Azarva, "Is U.S. Detention Policy in Iraq Working?"
[37] Ibid.
[38] Ibid.
[39] The Malaysian Insider (Singapore), Mar. 22, 2009.
[40] Valerie Chew, "Jemaah Islamiyah's bomb plot against diplomatic missions in Singapore, 2001/2002," Singapore Infopedia, National Library Board Singapore, Jan. 20, 2009.
[41] "About RRG," Religious Rehabilitation Group, Singapore, accessed Oct. 12, 2009.
[42] William J. Dobson, "The Best Guide for Gitmo? Look to Singapore," The Washington Post, May 17, 2009.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Ibid.
[45] The Prevent Strategy: Guide for Local Partners in England (London: U.K. Home Office, May 2008), p. 28.
[46] The Independent (London), Mar. 28, 2009.
[47] The Sunday Times, May 17, 2009.
[48] The Prevent Strategy: Guide for Local Partners in England, p. 28; The Sunday Times, May 17, 2009.
[49] See for example, The Telegraph (London), Nov. 8, 2008.
[50] Stephen Schwartz, "Tariq Ramadan Repudiated," The American Thinker, Aug. 28, 2009.
[51] The Guardian, Aug. 31, 2005.
[52] Scotland on Sunday (Edinburgh), June 14, 2009.
[53] The Telegraph, Jan. 11, 2010.
[54] BBC News, Mar. 12, 2010.
[55] Scotland on Sunday, June 14, 2009.
[56] Little Green Footballs, June 9, 2006.
[57] The Toronto Star, June 3, 2009.
[58] AlArabiya.net (Dubai), Mar. 11, 2009.
[59] CBS News, July 20, 2006; AlArabiya.net, Mar. 11, 2009.
[60] National Post (Don Mills, Ont.), Feb. 11, 2009.
[61] The Toronto Star, June 23, 2009.
[62] BBC News, Jan. 2, 2010.
LINKS TO RELATED TOPICS:
Islamism & Jihadism -- The Threat of Radical Islam
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Middle East -- Arabs, Arab States,
& Their Middle Eastern Neighbors
American Foreign Policy -- The Middle East
International Politics & World Disorder:
War, Peace, & Geopolitics in the Real World:
Foreign Affairs & U.S. National Security
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Islamist Terrorist Attacks on the U.S.A.
Osama bin Laden & the Islamist Declaration of War
Against the U.S.A. & Western Civilization
Islamist International Terrorism &
U.S. Intelligence Agencies
Counterterrorism & U.S. National Security
U.S. National Security Strategy
Katherine Seifert is an undergraduate at Bryn Mawr College and an intern at the Middle East Forum.
The foregoing article by Katherine Seifert was originally published in the Middle East Quarterly, Spring, 2010, and
can be found on the Internet website maintained by the Middle East Forum, a foreign policy think tank which seeks to
define and promote American interests in the Middle East, defining U.S. interests to include fighting radical Islam,
working for Palestinian Arab acceptance of the State of Israel, improving the management of U.S. efforts to promote
constitutional democracy in the Middle East, reducing America's energy dependence on the Middle East, more robustly
asserting U.S. interests vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia, and countering the Iranian threat.
(URL: http://www.meforum.org/2660/can-jihadis-be- rehabilitated)
Republished with Permission of the Middle East Forum
Reprinted from the Middle East Forum News
mefnews@meforum.org (MEF NEWS)
May 26, 2010
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Volume XII, 2010
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THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATIVE, USA
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