THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATIVE, USA
An Online Journal of Political Commentary & Analysis
Volume XIII, Issue # 18, January 17, 2011
Dr. Almon Leroy Way, Jr., Editor
Government Committed to & Acting in Accord with Conservative Principles
Ensures a Nation's Strength, Progress, & Prosperity
SAAD HARIRI'S MOMENT OF TRUTH
By Dr. Hilal Khashan
LEBANON & THE POWER STRUGGLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST: LEBANON'S STRUGGLE FOR SOVEREIGNTY -- SYRIAN
INTERVENTION INTO LEBANESE POLITICS -- SYRIA'S WITHDRAWAL FROM & RETURN TO LEBANON -- THE IMPACT ON
LEBANON OF THE ASCENDANCY OF IRAN & ITS ARAB PROXIES -- LEBANON'S CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION,
DOMESTICALLY & INTERNATIONALLY -- THE ROLE OF SAUDI ARABIA IN UNDERMINING THE STRUGGLE FOR LEBANESE
SOVEREIGNTY & RETURNING LEBANON TO THE ERA OF SYRIAN DOMINATION
FULL STORY:
Recent developments in Lebanon have shown that the preconditions for restoring its sovereignty have not yet
materialized. The demise of the "Cedar Revolution" and the fragmentation of the "March 14 Coalition" have set the
country back to the era of Syrian domination. The crisis associated with the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq
Hariri and the formation of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) afford yet another stark demonstration that the
country remains a victim of regional encroachment and that the loyalties of its leaders remain as sectarian as ever.
TRAGEDY & HOPE
The assassination of Hariri in a powerful explosion on February 14, 2005, shocked and saddened many Lebanese,
especially Sunnis, who experienced a sense of deep personal loss. Outside Lebanon, Arab and world leaders expressed
exasperation at the untimely death of a self-made towering political figure. Beirut's Martyrs' Square, where Hariri was
buried outside the adjacent Al-Amin Mosque, became a rallying spot for the former Prime Minister's mourners and others
who wanted to voice their dismay at Syria's 29-year-old military presence in Lebanon. The daily rallies, mostly by
supporters of the Future Trend, the Lebanese Forces, and the Phalangist Party, soon gave rise to what became known as
the Cedar Revolution. Domestic pressure ensued for the implementation of U.N. Security Council resolution 1559 of
September, 2004, which, among other things, called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Lebanon. [1] Coupled
with widespread accusations of Damascus's role in the assassination — mainly emanating from Syrian President Bashar
al-Assad's distrust of Hariri's Saudi and Western connections and Hariri's displeasure with the Syrian push to give
then-President Emile Lahoud another term in office — the politically inexperienced Assad panicked.
SYRIA MAKES AN UNCEREMONIOUS EXIT
The pro-Syrian Lebanese government of Omar Karami promptly submitted its resignation [2] and was replaced on April 19,
2005, by an interim national unity government tasked with overseeing national elections within a month. Three weeks after
Hariri's assassination, Assad succumbed to the pressures coming from Lebanon and the West and announced his
intention to withdraw the 16,000 Syrian troops from Lebanon by the end of April.
On March 8, Hezbollah orchestrated a pro-Syrian rally in downtown Beirut that attracted about 700,000 supporters, and the
broad anti-Syrian coalition responded six days later with a million-plus-strong rally in the same area. These major shows of
force yielded two polar political formations, the anti-Syrian majority "March 14 Coalition" and the pro-Syrian "March 8
Coalition." As the former group took the initiative and pursued a pugnacious anti-Syrian stance, its rival contented itself
with maintaining a low profile, while, at the same time, recounting "Syrian sacrifices in Lebanon." [3] Anti-Assad Sunnis
and Maronites lashed out in anger at hapless Syrian laborers in the country. Many of them became "victims of crimes,
including beatings, robberies, the setting on fire of tents where they live[d], and even killings." [4]
Leaders of the March 14 Coalition, especially the Lebanese Druze leader, Walid Jumblatt, and Saad Hariri, Rafiq Hariri's son,
mounted a scathing defamation campaign against the Syrian regime in general and President Assad in particular. Naming
Assad "the Damascus tyrant," Jumblatt said:
"This boy is controlling people's lives in Damascus and
killing free people in Lebanon. … If the tribunal is
hampered, we will all be a Nawaf [a Druze who
assassinated former Syrian president Adib Shishakli in
1964]." [5]
In one of his numerous attacks on the Syrian regime, Hariri accused Assad of smuggling Islamic extremists into Lebanon
"in order to spread chaos and commit terrorist acts that target army officers and civilians." [6] Addressing the Syrian
people, Hariri said, "Your truthfulness and brotherly love for us contrast the regime's cunning tactics and deception." [7]
He described Qasr al-Muhajerin (Assad's presidential palace) as Qasr al-Mutajerin (merchandisers' palace). [8]
SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON
The Hariri assassination generated a political upheaval that jolted the Sunni community and seriously undermined the
1989 Ta'if agreement, which had ended Lebanon's 15-year civil war. Since perpetrators of political crimes in Lebanon had
rarely been brought to justice, owing to the country's weak and inefficient judicial and law enforcement systems, the
Karami Cabinet succumbed to heavy public pressure, led by the Hariri family, and agreed to involve the United Nations
in investigating those who planned, financed, and executed the assassination. A U.N. fact-finding mission arrived in
Lebanon for background inquiries, and, on April 7, 2005, the Security Council formed the United Nations International
Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) to probe the assassination of the former Prime Minister. [9]
U.N. investigator Detlev Mehlis's preliminary report in October, 2005, provided evidence that implicated ranking Syrian
and Lebanese officials in the assassination. [10] Two months later, his follow-up report shed additional light on the
possible perpetrators of the crime, based on interrogation of new witnesses, investigation of the explosion scene,
intercepted telephone conversations, and Lebanese Internal Security Forces records. [11] Immediately after the
publication of the second report, the Lebanese government requested U.N. assistance in establishing "a tribunal of an
international character to prosecute the alleged perpetrators." [12] On May 30, 2007, the Security Council passed
Resolution 1757 to set up a Special Tribunal for Lebanon under the mandatory chapter VII, [13] after the divided
Lebanese government had failed to sign the agreement and statute for the tribunal. Syrian leaders considered the STL
a violation of the country's sovereignty, and Hezbollah condemned it as a Zionist conspiracy. [14]
THE ASCENDANCY OF IRAN & ITS ARAB PROXIES
Meanwhile, the U.S.A.-led wars in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) rid Hezbollah's creator and onetime patron — the
Islamic Republic of Iran — of its two sworn enemies, the Taliban in the east and Saddam Hussein in the west. The
ensuing quagmire in both countries effectively ended Iran's containment, allowing Tehran to wield paramount power in
Iraq, especially among the ruling Shiite majority, and to establish an important foothold in Afghanistan, particularly in
non-Pashtun areas. The indecisive outcome of the 2006 Summer war between Israel and Hezbollah further boosted Iran's
bid for regional preeminence, as evidenced by its continuing pursuit of a controversial nuclear program in defiance of
U.N. Security Council resolutions and intensifying international sanctions.
Hezbollah's influence has likewise surged in the aftermath of the 2006 war. During the war, it accused the then-Lebanese
Prime Minister Fouad Siniora of collusion with Israel, and, in November, 2006, all five Shiite members of Siniora's Cabinet
submitted their resignation in protest of his intention to sign the U.N. draft plan for the creation of the STL. In December,
Hezbollah and its allies in the Shiite Amal movement, together with former President Michel Aoun's National Patriotic
Trend, organized a prolonged protest in downtown Beirut and camped outside Siniora's office for several weeks. In May,
2008, Hezbollah invaded west Beirut and Jumblatt's stronghold on the Shuf Mountain, forcing the government to rescind
its decision to ban Hezbollah's landline communication network and to fire the Shiite chief of Beirut's international airport.
In the Palestinian territories, Damascus and Tehran have used their weighty influence with Hamas to derail all attempts at
achieving Palestinian reconciliation, complicating PLO-Israeli peace negotiations, and giving the Iranian-Syrian alliance
an additional bargaining chip in Middle East politics.
Iran's regional gains have also threatened the stability of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Geographic proximity, the
presence of large numbers of Iranian immigrants on the Arab side of the gulf, and the seeming inability of the GCC
countries to adequately incorporate their Shiite populations into the political system and the fabric of society offered
Iran a unique opportunity to collaborate with these communities at the expense of their Sunni counterparts.
In Kuwait, sectarian tensions have mounted following the rise of Sunni fundamentalism, with Shiites having second
thoughts about the ability of the ruling family to ensure their security and personal safety. Saudi Shiites are still
essentially quietist, though they are unlikely to remain impervious to the winds of change that are blowing in neighboring
countries, including a Huthi insurgency in Yemen.
Indeed, the Saudis, who for years dreaded a Shiite awakening coming from the east and north, have recently found
themselves contending with yet another threat from the south. During the Summer of 2009, the Saudi armed forces were
drawn into a difficult military confrontation with the Iranian-supported Huthis, who occupied a string of Saudi border
locations. Coupled with the undying al-Qa'ida domestic threat and the Kingdom's unresolved succession issue, Saudi
Arabia's ruling elite has been confronted with problems on all fronts.
SYRIA RETURNS WITH A VENGEANCE
Against this backdrop of heightened regional tensions, Assad made a bid to reclaim his country's regional standing,
repairing relations with Saudi Arabia — severely damaged following the Hariri assassination — by supporting Riyadh in
its fight against the Huthis and quietly rectifying the imbalance of Syria's power relationship with Iran. He calculated that,
just as Syria's weakened position vis-à-vis Iran stemmed from a string of inopportune developments (especially the
Syrian exodus from Lebanon), so Tehran's growing isolation increased its need for pan-Arab Damascus in order to
legitimize its regional encroachments. Moreover, given its key location, Syria was vital for maintaining the Iranian lifeline
to Hezbollah.
Bashar's strategy sought to emulate the role played by his late father after the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran war in 1980. Then,
Hafez al-Assad had convinced the nervous GCC states that he would use his good offices with Tehran to preserve their
territorial integrity and prevent the war from spilling over to their territory. Nearly thirty years later, mindful of the Iranian
penetration of Iraq and losing faith in the U.S. ability to protect them, the Saudis rediscovered the merits of the Assad
regime.
The Saudi Ambassador to Damascus confirmed the restoration of the two countries' relations following King Abdullah's
visit to Damascus in October, 2009, stating that "the steady communication and special relationship between the
custodian of the holy shrines and President Assad are exemplary for other Arab leaders to emulate." The Ambassador
added that the "fruits of the two countries' distinguished relations … are reflecting positively, especially in Iraq and
Lebanon."
Walid Jumblatt, whose father was murdered in 1977 by Syria's Lebanese proxies, quickly grasped the implications of the
nascent Syrian-Saudi entente. He defected from the Hariri-led March 14 Coalition shortly after the 2009 parliamentary
elections, stopped criticizing the Syrian regime and its Lebanese allies, and even issued "an unambiguous apology to
Syria" on Al-Jazeera satellite TV station.
Recanting his vitriolic criticism of Assad, Jumblatt explained that the foulmouthed words he had used to describe the
Syrian President had been wrong because they had been made at the spur of the moment during the difficult days
following the Hariri assassination. [15] He followed this by adopting Hezbollah's position regarding an international
inquiry into the assassination: "I wish the STL has not existed, and it is better for justice to expose the false
witnesses."[16]
Jumblatt's apology to Syria and the about-face of his political course sent a sobering but unmistakable message to Hariri
who had failed to form a cabinet until Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah interceded on his behalf with Assad. It was only
after Hariri received an official invitation to visit Damascus, five months after his March 14 Coalition had won a clear
parliamentary majority, that the opposition agreed to join his Cabinet in November, 2009. Even then, the Saudis
continued to put pressure on Hariri to accommodate the Syrian demands, claiming that there were clear limits to their
influence and that both Riyadh and Beirut must accept a greater role for Damascus in the affairs of its smaller neighbor. [17]
These limits manifested themselves in both Lebanon and Iraq. Although the Saudis had supported the coalitions of
Saad Hariri and former Iraqi prime minister Iyad Allawi, neither of them managed to form a cabinet on the basis of the
parliamentary majority they obtained at the polls. In Allawi's words: "It is illogical to expect the efforts of Saudi Arabia,
Egypt, and Syria to succeed in removing the hurdles in front of the formation of the Iraqi cabinet." [18]
The Saudis also reminded Hariri that King Abdullah's July, 2010, arrival in Beirut aboard the same plane as Syrian
President Assad was intended to underscore Riyadh's acquiescence in Damascus's superior role in Lebanon.[19] In an
interview with the Saudi-owned Al-Sharq Al-Awsat daily, Hariri apologized to Syria for having charged it with
murdering his father. "Accusing Damascus of the assassination was a mistake," he said.
"The false witnesses misled the investigation, and they
have caused harm to Syria and Lebanon. [They] … ruined
the relationship between the two countries and politicized
the assassination." [20]
Hariri's concessions, painful as they were, did not seem to satisfy Assad, who wanted nothing short of the Prime
Minister's unconditional capitulation.
Accordingly, in October, 2010, a Syrian court issued arrest warrants for thirty-three individuals, mostly members of
Hariri's political and administrative team, for having allegedly misled the Mehlis investigation. Brigadier General Jamil
al-Sayyed, former chief of the Lebanese General Security and one of Syria's foremost men in Lebanon, who had filed
the lawsuit underlying the warrants, went so far as to challenge Hariri "to take a lie detector test to find out if he stood
behind the witnesses who gave false testimony" that had led to Sayyed's imprisonment for four years. [21] Given his
close ties with Assad, who gave him a personal welcome whenever he visited Damascus, it is inconceivable that
Sayyed would dare attack Hariri without a green light from the Syrian President.
Indeed, Damascus's concerns about STL indictments seem to have all but disappeared, feeling as it does that the
Hariri assassination case has been substantially downsized. This has, in turn, left Hezbollah's leader Hassan Nasrallah
worried that Assad might let him "face the tsunami of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon on his own." [22] Muhammad
Raad, a Hezbollah parliamentary deputy, articulated the organization's concern when he bluntly told Lebanese
President Michel Suleiman, "We do not have officers who can spend four years in jail; we do not have anybody who
can spend four seconds in jail." [23]
It is in this context that one should assess Assad's insistence that Hariri denounce the STL. It is important for Bashar
to continue to convince the Iranians that he is able to extract concessions from the Saudis and their allies in Iraq and
Lebanon, for otherwise he might lose his self-assigned position of regional conciliator. Likewise, in keeping with his
new role of appeasing Damascus and Hezbollah, Jumblatt volunteered to claim that "there [was] no need for a tribunal
that leads to bloodshed." [24]
Hariri has already gone a long way in making concessions, and he is unlikely to start defying his Saudi patrons. After
all, Iraq and the Persian Gulf mean far more to King Abdullah than indicting Hariri's assassins. The essential building
blocks are in place for settling the STL standoff between Hariri on the one hand and Damascus and Hezbollah on the
other. Given the confessional nature of Lebanese politics, everything there must be resolved on the basis of
consensus, which means accommodation. The ongoing activity for laying the crisis to rest thus centers on finding a
formula that will satisfy Hezbollah, while allowing the Future Trend and Hariri to save face.
To find the winning formula, the regional powers are trying to square the circle with regard to the main stumbling
blocks: (1) the STL and the forthcoming indictments; (2) the Syrian arrest warrants; and (3) the charges of false
witnesses. The emerging compromise seems to consist of a Syrian cancellation of the arrest warrants, coupled with
Hezbollah dropping the false witnesses charges, and Hariri criticizing the weakening of Hezbollah as a "resistance
movement" by the U.N. report.
The Prime Minister will most probably avoid a personal denunciation of the indictments, but will not authorize
government officials to cooperate with the STL, thus effectively making the indictments worthless. As Jumblatt has
recently suggested, Hariri might content himself with finding the truth about his father's assassins without bringing
them to justice. Meanwhile, Hezbollah can continue to denounce the STL and claim that it amounted to nothing more
than a U.S.-Israeli conspiracy. This will allow all parties in Lebanon to interpret the indictments when published in
accordance with their interests, without reigniting the civil strife.
LOSING THE BATTLE FOR SOVEREIGNTY
French President Nicolas Sarkozy has stated that the key to Lebanon's sovereignty remains in Syria's willingness to
exchange diplomatic missions with its neighbor. When, in 2009, Damascus finally agreed to open an embassy in the
Lebanese capital, Sarkozy often boasted that this achievement was of "his own making, and that his policies have
succeeded." [25]
Sarkozy and his Western, like-minded politicians, who think that engaging Syria and ending its isolation provide
sufficient incentives to induce it to leave Lebanon, are dead wrong. Damascus appears to have a constitutional fixation
on its smaller neighbor. Eager to claim a regional power status for their country, Syrian leaders have long considered
Lebanon an integral and legitimate part of their patrimony.
For their part, the Saudis are anxious to contain the region's Sunni-Shiite divisions and seem willing to compromise
Lebanon's sovereignty to this end, considering the country "a tug-of-war needed to resolve regional crises of more
import to them." [26] By the same token, Lebanon's geostrategic position provides an ideal arena for its near and distant
neighbors to extend their regional influence and to challenge the West and Israel, while taking advantage of this soft
state. The Lebanese never miss an opportunity to complain that their neighbors do not leave them alone. But the fact
that Lebanon's sectarian leaders do not know how to play politics without having a foreign sponsor attests to the sad
truth that the roots of the country's lack of sovereignty are primarily internal and are embedded in its anachronistic,
confessional political system.
NOTES:
[1] "The Situation in the Middle East," UNSC resolution 1559, Sept. 2, 2004.
[2] CNN News, Feb. 28, 2005.
[3] Voice of America, Mar. 8, 2005.
[4] Agence France-Presse, Mar. 14, 2008.
[5] Ya Libnan (Beirut), Dec. 28, 2006.
[6] The Daily Star (Beirut), Sept. 29, 2008.
[7] Al-Riyadh, Aug. 18, 2006.
[8] Ibid.
[9] "Report of the International Independent Investigation Commission Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1595 (2005): Chronology of Events, Mid-2004-September 2005," (Mehlis report), United Nations, New York, p. ii.
[10] BBC News, Oct. 21, 2005.
[11] Ya Libnan, Dec. 20, 2005.
[12] "Handbook on the Special Tribunal for Lebanon," International Center for Transitional Justice, New York and Beirut, Apr. 10, 2008, p. 9.
[13] "The Situation in the Middle East," UNSC resolution 1757, May 30, 2007.
[14] Al-Qabas (Kuwait), Sept. 30, 2010.
[15] Al-Diyar (Beirut), Dec. 13, 2009.
[16] Al-Khaleej (UAE), Sept. 27, 2010.
[17] Ariel Farrar-Wellman, Robert Frasco, "Saudi Arabia-Iran Relations," IranTracker, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., July 20, 2010.
[18] Al-Iraq News (Baghdad), Aug. 1, 2010.
[19] Al-Quds al-Arabi (London), July 31, 2010.
[20] Asharq al-Awsat (London), Sept. 6, 2010.
[21] LCCC (Lebanese-Canadian Coordinating Council) English Daily News Bulletin, Sept. 18, 2010.
[22] Asharq al-Awsat, July 25, 2010.
[23] Al-Akhbar (Beirut), July 26, 2010.
[24] Al-Nahar (Beirut), Oct. 4, 2010.
[25] Al-Hayat (London), Oct. 6, 2010.
[26] Al-Safir (Beirut), Oct. 5, 2010.
LINKS TO RELATED TOPICS:
The Middle East -- Lebanon as a Geopolitical Problem
American Foreign Policy -- The Middle East
The Middle East & the Problem of Syria
The Middle East -- Arabs, Arab States,
& Their Middle Eastern Neighbors
The Middle East & the Problem of Iran
Islamism & Jihadism -- The Threat of Radical Islam
Page Three
Page Two
Page One
International Politics & World Disorder:
War, Peace, & Geopolitics in the Real World:
Foreign Affairs & U.S. National Security
Page Two
Page One
Islamist Terrorist Attacks on the U.S.A.
Osama bin Laden & the Islamist Declaration of War
Against the U.S.A. & Western Civilization
Islamist International Terrorism &
U.S. Intelligence Agencies
U.S. National Security Strategy
Dr. Hilal Khashan is Professor of Political Science at the American University of Beirut. His most recent publication is
"The Evolving Security Threat in the Middle East," in N. S. Sisodia and S. Kalyanaraman, eds., The Future of War
and Peace in Asia (Magnum, 2010).
The foregoing article by Dr. Khashan was originally published in the Middle East Quarterly, Winter, 2011, and
can be found on the Internet website maintained by the Middle East Forum, a foreign policy think tank which seeks to
define and promote American interests in the Middle East, defining U.S. interests to include fighting radical Islam,
working for Palestinian Arab acceptance of the State of Israel, improving the management of U.S. efforts to promote
constitutional democracy in the Middle East, reducing America's energy dependence on the Middle East, more robustly
asserting U.S. interests vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia, and countering the Iranian threat.
(URL: http://www.meforum.org/2820/saad-hariri- moment-of-truth)
Republished with Permission of the Middle East Forum
Reprinted from the Middle East Forum News
mefnews@meforum.org (MEF NEWS)
January 17, 2011
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