THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATIVE, USA
An Online Journal of Political Commentary & Analysis
Volume XIII, Issue # 154, June 13, 2011
Dr. Almon Leroy Way, Jr., Editor
Government Committed to & Acting in Accord with Conservative Principles
Ensures a Nation's Strength, Progress, & Prosperity
LEBANON'S ISLAMIST STRONGHOLD
By Dr. Hilal Khashan
TRIPOLI: IS THE NORTHERN LEBANESE CITY A BASE FOR ISLAMISTS? DOES THE CITY POSE A DIRECT
THREAT TO SYRIAN SECURITY? TRIPOLI'S HOPELESSLY FRAGMENTED & PRIMARILY NON-COMBATIVE SALAFI
MOVEMENT -- THE CITY'S PROLONGED POLITICAL MARGINALIZATION & ECONOMIC DEPRIVATION -- TRIPOLI'S TRANSITION
FROM TOLERATION OF RELIGIOUS & CULTURAL DIVERSITY TO ISLAMISM, JIHADISM, & MARIONITE MILITARIZATION --
THE LEBANESE CIVIL WAR & ITS AFTERMATH -- SUBSEQUENT CONFLICT -- THE CURRENT POLITICAL & ECONOMIC
CONDITION OF TRIPOLI -- WHAT IS REQUIRED TO DECONSTRUCT THE PHENOMENON OF TRIPOLI'S ISLAMIC RADICALISM?
FULL STORY:
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has apparently retained the hope of a military return to Lebanon, from where he
summarily withdrew in 2005, following the Rafiq Hariri assassination. In a 2008 interview with a Lebanese newspaper,
he accused the northern city of Tripoli of becoming a base for Islamists who posed a direct threat to Syria's
security. [1] More recently, Rifat Eid, head of Tripoli's Alawite Arab Democratic Party, described the City as the
"Lebanese Kandahar." [2]
These charges could not be further from the truth. Far from posing a threat to its immediate neighborhood, let alone
to Syrian security, Tripoli's hopelessly fragmented Salafi movement is primarily non-combative, its more militant
groups having long been defeated and pacified. Its devout and conservative nature notwithstanding, this movement
is very much a cathartic reaction to the City's prolonged political marginalization and economic deprivation. To
exaggerate the threat of Tripoli's Salafis is tantamount to fattening the sheep before the slaughter.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
From its founding by the Phoenician seafarers in the eighth century BCE to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918,
Tripoli maintained its status as one of the foremost cities in the eastern Mediterranean. During the Arab-Islamic era, its
port was second only to Alexandria's, serving at different periods as the economic lifeline of Aleppo, Damascus, and
Baghdad.
This privileged status came to an abrupt end in the wake of World War I, when Tripoli's inclusion in Lebanon —
against the will of its Muslim population, which would rather have been included in Syria — instantly marginalized the
City. In its place, Beirut rose to prominence as the capital of the new political entity and the major site of its economy.
Likewise, for some Maronite nationalists, Tripoli's inclusion in Lebanon threatened the slight Christian majority
reported by the 1932 population census. The leader of the National Bloc, Emile Edde, for example, demanded the
incorporation of Tripoli and its environs into Syria in order to preserve Maronite political predominance. [3]
For their part, the French, who created modern Lebanon as an essentially Christian state, had little interest in
maintaining the leading political, social, and commercial standing of predominantly Sunni Tripoli, and the City's
economic suppression during the French mandate (1920-1943) became a tacit policy of the Lebanese state after
independence. Still, Tripoli managed to reemerge as a provincial hub, unencumbered by the stress of the country's
Beirut-based divisive confessional politics, serving the economic, educational, medical, and commercial needs of
northern Lebanon and northwestern Syria. This, however, was not due to government policy, but rather to private
investments by northern Lebanese and the influx of Syrian capital after the introduction of nationalization measures in
that country.
FROM RELIGIOUS & CULTURAL TOLERANCE TO JIHADISM
Tripoli is often referred to as the seat of Lebanon's multifaceted Salafi trend, whose genesis coincides with the
withdrawal of the last French mandate troops from the country in 1946. Home to the first Salafi reformer Rashid Rida
(1865-1935), this profoundly conservative and devout city remained a rare oasis of religious and cultural diversity
until the mid-1970s. This was a place where, despite infrequent social, interfaith interaction, Christian missionary
schools proliferated and central roads and boulevards bore decidedly Christian names such as Nuns Street, Churches
Street, Archbishop Street, and Saint Elias Street. [4] In Tripoli, Islamic religiosity tolerated the existence of Lebanon's
only gambling club (known as Cheval Blanc Casino) long before the opening of Casino du Liban in 1959. Taverns and
cabarets stood alongside mosques and religious institutes without a hitch.
The advent of religious organizations on a considerable scale during the 1950s and 1960s did not radicalize Tripoli or
reduce its toleration of religious and cultural diversity. Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood launched its activities in the City
in 1956 under the name of Ibadurrahman (Servants of God). In 1964, Fathi Yakan transformed the group into al-Jama'a
al-Islamiya (Islamic Group), which operated as a non-dissident and charitable movement. However, the repercussions
of the 1967 Six-Day War with Israel altered the city's collective psyche and swayed it toward Islamism. This coincided
with the militarization of the Lebanese Maronites, who were heartened by Israel's stunning victory, as they sought to
stem the growing tide of armed Palestinian groups. Lebanon was now on the fast track to civil war.
CIVIL WAR & RELIGIOUS MOBILIZATION
Tripoli had its share of the civil war, which raged in Lebanon from 1975 to 1989. Initial setbacks at the hands of the
Syrian-supported Maronite Mirada militia of then-President Suleiman Franjiyye and the inability of Tripoli's small
pan-Arab and Leftist parties successfully to confront them on the battlefield, encouraged the rise of jihadist movements.
Sheikh Salim ash-Shahhal, who in 1947 had founded the country's first Salafi movement, al-Jama'a Muslimun (literally
meaning "the group is Muslim"), transformed it into a modest military force in 1976 under the name of Nuwwat al-Jaysh
al-Islami (Nucleus of the Islamic Army). Other small groups such as al-Muqawama ash-Shaabiya (Popular Resistance),
Harakat Lubnan al-Arabi (Movement for Arab Lebanon) and Jundullah (Warriors of God) splintered from al-Jama'a
al-Islamiya and joined Tripoli's burgeoning Harakat at-Tawhid al-Islami (Islamic Unity Movement) under the leadership
of Sheikh Said Shaaban, who eventually transformed the City into an Islamic emirate between 1983 and 1985. [5]
Outward manifestations of modernity disappeared with the imposition of a total ban on the sale of alcoholic beverages,
as well as the shuttering of movie theaters, European-style roadside cafes, and tennis and golf courts.
Shaaban took advantage of the rising pan-Islamist sentiment among Tripoli's religious and conservative population. He
received a major boost from the success of the Islamic revolution in Iran, with which he identified, and from whose
financial largesse he benefitted. He also relied heavily on the financial and military support of Yasser Arafat's Fatah
movement, which maintained a strong military presence in Tripoli, especially in nearby Nahr al-Barid and al-Baddawi
Palestinian refugee camps. During Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon, Yakan created two guerrilla movements to combat
the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF): al-Mujahideen (The Jihadists) in Tripoli and al-Fajr (Dawn) in Sidon.
The Israeli eviction of the Palestine Liberation Organization from southern Lebanon and Beirut in 1982 and the Syrian
expulsion of Fatah guerrillas from Tripoli in 1983 were followed in 1985 by a withering assault by Syrian allies against
at-Tawhid forces, which ended in destroying the movement's military machine. The anti-at-Tawhid coalition included
the Baath Party, the Communist Party, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, and the Alawite Arab Democratic Party.
Syrian intelligence operatives and Lebanese Alawites raided at-Tawhid's stronghold in Bab at-Tibbane and massacred
some six hundred Sunnis. [6] This singular incident caused an enduring schism between Tripoli and the Syrian regime
and served as an impetus for the subsequent emergence of extremely radical jihadist groups, especially Usbat an-Nur
(Partisans of the Divine Light) of Sheikh Hisham ash-Sharidi, assassinated by Fatah operatives in 1991. [7] The more
lethal Islamist Abdulkarim as-Saadi took over the group and reintroduced it as Usbat al-Ansar (The Partisans League).
SAUDI VERSUS HEZBOLLAH RADICALIZING
Embittered by the 1985 events, Tripoli's Salafi movement gathered momentum with the end of the civil war, which
prompted many northern Lebanese clerics to return from Saudi Arabia, where they had been schooled in radical
Wahhabi-type religious training. In 1995, these Islamists killed Nizar Halabi, head of the pro-Syrian and Sufi-inspired
Jam'iyat al-Mashari al-Khayriya al-Islamiya (Association of Islamic Charitable Projects, known as the Ahbash),
triggering a harsh government response. Many Islamists fled to the Dinniye Mountain east of Tripoli and regrouped
into a 300-man strong radical movement. [8] Their excommunicatory ideology toward moderate Muslims and rejection
of non-Muslims in line with the religious edicts of Ibn Taymiyah, the famously radical medieval scholar, outraged the
government and invited its wrath. In January, 2000, the Lebanese Army routed the group, killed its leader Bassam
al-Kanj and apprehended dozens of combatants. Others sought refuge in Ein al-Hilwa Palestinian refugee camp near
Sidon. [9]
The Lebanese authorities pardoned jailed Salafis shortly after the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in
2005. In fact, Saad Hariri, who succeeded his slain father as leader of the Future Trend movement, opened up to radical
Sunni movements with the prodding of Riyadh, which wanted to ensure that Sunnis were capable of standing up to the
Iranian-backed Shiite Hezbollah. [10] Salafi movements sprang up in Tripoli's poor neighborhoods, such as Bab
at-Tibbane, as-Suwayqa, Abi Samra, and at-Tal. The sight of heavily bearded, armed young men and turbaned Salafis
striding in alleys made the once bustling City austere and unwelcoming. [11]
The Hariri assassination amounted to a coup that blunted the Saudis' thrust into Lebanon and reaffirmed the
preeminence of the Syrian-Hezbollah entente. Riyadh's response came in the form of arming Tripoli's Salafis so as to
allow them to stand up to Hezbollah. As noted by the Lebanese daily al-Akhbar, "the regional underpinnings
of Tripoli's surging jihadist Salafists are directly linked to the conflict between Damascus and Riyadh over controlling
Lebanon." Indeed, while being bankrolled by Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, "every single activity by
any Salafi movement is doomed to failure, if it doesn't receive Saudi support." [12] Saudi aid is presently funneled
through the Ministry of Religious Endowments and a number of private associations whose activities are closely
monitored by the government. [13] Philanthropic associations promoting jihad, such as al-Haramain, have been
discontinued after the 9/11 attacks.
The ease with which Hezbollah managed to defeat Hariri's al-Mustaqbal militia in Beirut in 2008 convinced the Saudi
leadership that they could not rely on northern Lebanese Salafis, who formed the backbone of the Prime Minister's
militia, to serve as a countervailing military force to Hezbollah. [14] They have thus curtailed most of their military
assistance and contented themselves with promoting as-Salafiya al-Ilmiya, or official Salafi, that eschews involvement
in politics. So did the other Gulf Cooperation Council states, which support Tripoli's as-Salafiya al-Irja'iya, [15] the
Salafi preaching group that separates belief and action and limits itself to the former.
The destruction of Fatah al-Islam by the Lebanese Army in the Nahr al-Barid Palestinian refugee camp in May to
September, 2007, delivered a crippling blow to as-Salafiya al-Jihadiya (Jihadist Salafi), whose remnants had gone
underground into sleeper cells. Having made its debut in the refugee camp in 2006, Fatah al-Islam doubled its initial
strength of 150 fighters within less than a year, as the Army intelligence's persecution of young, northern Lebanese
Sunnis, who asked for weapons to counter the Shiite power surge, drove them into the arms of the newly-established
militant group. The growth, however, of this millennial movement was preventable. Fatah al-Islam's rise attests to the
clumsiness of Lebanese Army intelligence and the heavy army and civilian toll during the Nahr al-Barid fighting.
Lebanese Salafis lay the blame on Hezbollah for refusing to involve them in confronting the IDF and its South
Lebanon Army surrogate, accusing Hezbollah of pretentiously labeling itself "al-Muqawama al-Islamiya" (Islamic
Resistance). [16] In response to the denial of their access to the anti-Israel military campaign, the Salafis directed their
energies against the national government.
In support of Hezbollah during the 2006 Summer war against Israel, Yakan, the leader of the Tripoli-based Islamic Group,
established the Islamic Action Front that included five pro-Syrian Sunni Islamic groups: the two factions of Tripoli's
at-Tawhid movement of Hashem Minqara and Bilal Shaaban, al-Fajr forces of Abdullah at-Tiryaqi, Abdel Nasser Jabri's
Islamic group in Beirut, and Zuhair Jaid in the Shuf Mountains. The front disintegrated shortly after Yakan's death when
cofounder Hashem Minqara deemed it no longer viable because some of its leaders were simply using it for political and
financial gain. [17]
When the fighting raged in Tripoli in May, 2008, between Sunnis and Alawites, the founder of the Salafi movement, Dai
al-Islam ash-Shahhal, exhorted "all committed Lebanese Muslim young men to prepare psychologically and logistically
to embark upon a new period [of armed resistance]." He made it clear that he was not looking for volunteers from abroad
but "direly needed financial assistance." [18] Later, as the final showdown loomed large in connection with the Hariri
assassination indictments, Shahhal warned Hezbollah against "inciting Sunni fratricide in order to render the sect
politically irrelevant." [19] Yet, for all his exertions, he failed to persuade the Saudis to resume their financial support for
rebuilding the Salafis' military machine.
POVERTY-STRICKEN SALAFIS
Tripoli has no place on the Lebanese economic, developmental, and tourist map as its name "has become synonymous
with poverty, misery, and deprivation." [20] With free medical services virtually nonexistent, and minimum monthly
wages often as low as $170, compared to the average Lebanese wage of $335; with a youth unemployment rate of 45
percent and a truancy rate that exceeds 20 percent, it is not difficult to understand why Tripoli is such an ideal breeding
ground for Salafis. Whereas 28 percent of the Lebanese population is below the poverty line, in Tripoli, it is 57 percent. [21]
Annual per capita expenditure in Lebanon averages $2,700, but in Tripoli it is $1,700 — compared to $4,300 in Beirut. With
9,700 persons per square kilometer, it is overcrowded. [22]
Tripoli's economic decline dates back to the 1970s when the City suffered a number of severe blows: Iraq's construction
of the Basra offshore oil terminal and the Kirkuk pipeline terminal in Turkey's Ceyhan rendered Tripoli's terminal useless.
The City's decaying oil refinery, which previously provided about 40 percent of Lebanon's annual refined oil needs, was
permanently shut down in 1993. Its full rehabilitation at an estimated cost of $300 million can save the country up to $ 1.2
billion from the importation of refined oil derivatives. [23] Nevertheless, there is a long-standing Lebanese policy against
government investment in the City. In addition, Beirut receives 83 percent of Lebanon's total banking credit compared to
Tripoli's 2 percent. [24]
Since 1975, Tripoli has lost 80 percent of its economy. Forty percent was lost in 1989 alone, as a result of the Assad
government's decision to allow the Syrian private sector to import from the international market. While the civil war cut
off Tripoli from its traditional northern Lebanese, Christian market, the Syrians severed all economic and social ties
between the City and the cities of Homs, Hama, and Tartus. The scarcity of employment opportunities has negatively
shaped the worldview of many of Tripoli's young men and motivated them to seek salvation in religious extremism.
GLIMMER OF HOPE
Representatives from six moderate, northern Lebanese Salafi movements disapproved of Fatah al-Islam's militancy that
culminated in the May, 2007, all-out confrontation with the Lebanese Army. The joint statement they issued underlined
that Shari'a (Islamic law) stresses, among other things, the preservation of the pillars of dignified human living that
include religion, family honor, personal safety, and pecuniary assets. The unequivocal statement called for an immediate
end to the fighting, eviction of the radicals from the Nahr al-Barid refugee camp, and promotion of allegiance to state
authority. [25] Combating jihadists remind many Tripoli residents, including benign Salafis, of the three dark years of
terror when at-Tawhid reigned supreme in the City. Their religiosity notwithstanding, most Tripoli residents are averse to
the imposition of Shari'a rule in the City. [26]
People in Tripoli's depressed areas have little faith in the government and exhibit unmistakable disenchantment with the
willingness of the Lebanese political system to redeem them. [27] The City may be a bastion of the Salafi movement, but
its roots are essentially non-belligerent. Militancy is not entrenched as in some Shiite neighborhoods in Lebanon or in
Islamist societies like Yemen or Somalia. Deconstructing the phenomenon of Tripoli's Islamic radicalism is clearly a
function of integrating it economically and culturally in the Lebanese political system. It is quite remarkable that the City
has not turned far worse after more than ninety years of deliberate marginalization.
NOTES:
[1] Al-Bayraq (Beirut), Sept. 30, 2008.
[2] Asharq al-Awsat (London), Oct. 7, 2010.
[3] Meir Zamir, Lebanon's Quest: The Road to Statehood 1926-1939 (London: I. B. Tauris, 1997), p. 107.
[4] Ash-Shiraa (Beirut), Nov. 7, 2010.
[5] Asharq al-Awsat, May 25, 2007.
[6] Al-Mustaqbal (Beirut), Dec. 5, 2007.
[7] Asharq al-Awsat, May 25, 2007.
[8] Now Lebanon (Beirut), accessed Feb. 7, 2011.
[9] Al-Markazia (Beirut), accessed Dec. 2, 2010.
[10] Al-Akhbar (Beirut), June 8, 2010.
[11] Author interview with Rashid Jamali, former head of the Tripoli municipality, Tripoli, Dec. 18, 2010.
[12] Al-Akhbar, Sept. 5, Oct. 21, 2010.
[13] King Abdulaziz Foundation for Research and Archives, Riyadh, accessed Feb. 5, 2011.
[14] Al-Akhbar, Oct. 21, 2010.
[15] Hana Ulayan, "At-Tayyarat al-Wahabiyya fish Shamal: bayna an-Nahj ad-Dini wal Maghnatis as-Sisyasi," Harakat at-Tawhid al-Islami-Majlis al-Qiyada website, Dec. 16, 2010.
[16] In March 1978, Israel invaded southern Lebanon, established a narrow security zone, and created the Southern Lebanese Army (SLA). It dismantled the SLA and unilaterally withdrew from the security zone in May 2000.
[17] Al-Akhbar, Dec. 1, 2009.
[18] Asharq al-Awsat, May 13, 2008.
[19] As-Safir (Beirut), Jan. 2, 2010.
[20] Talal Khuja, "Tarablus bayna al-Qal'a al-Mughlaqa wa-l-Madina al-Maftuha," Middle East Transparent website, Oct. 27, 2010.
[21] Ash-Shiraa, Nov. 1, 2010.
[22] Author interview with Jamali.
[23] Al-Liwaa (Beirut), Jan. 10, 2011.
[24] Makram Sader, "Tatawur al-Qita al-Masrifi 1990-2010," Association of Banks in Lebanon, Beirut, Dec. 2010.
[25] Now Lebanon, May 22, 2007.
[26] Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati's website, accessed Feb. 7, 2011.
[27] Author interview with Jamali.
LINKS TO RELATED TOPICS:
The Middle East -- Lebanon as a Geopolitical Problem
American Foreign Policy -- The Middle East
The Middle East & the Problem of Syria
The Middle East -- Arabs, Arab States,
& Their Middle Eastern Neighbors
Islamism & Jihadism -- The Threat of Radical Islam
Page Three
Page Two
Page One
International Politics & World Disorder:
War, Peace, & Geopolitics in the Real World:
Foreign Affairs & U.S. National Security
Page Two
Page One
Islamist Terrorist Attacks on the U.S.A.
Osama bin Laden & the Islamist Declaration of War
Against the U.S.A. & Western Civilization
Islamist International Terrorism &
U.S. Intelligence Agencies
U.S. National Security Strategy
Dr. Hilal Khashan, Professor of Political Science and Chairman of the Department of Political Studies and Public
Administration at the American University of Beirut, is the author of many books and articles on Arab politics,
including Arabs at the Crossroads: Political Identity and Nationalism (University Press of Florida, 2000);
Arab Attitudes Toward Israel and Peace (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
Policy Focus Series # 40, 2000); Partner or Pariah? Attitudes Toward Israel in Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan
(Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Study # 41, 1996; Inside the Lebanese
Confessional Mind (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1992); and Monte Palmer, Mima Nedelcovych,
Hilal Khashan, and Deborah Monroe, Survey Research in the Arab World (London: Middle East and North
Africa Press, 1982).
Dr. Khashan holds the Bachelor of Arts in Political Scienece (University of Florida, 1977), the Master of Arts
in Government (Florida State University, 1978) and the Ph.D. in Government (Florida State University, 1980). His
graduate studies and research work at Florida State University was done under the supervision of Dr. Monte
Palmer.
The foregoing article by Dr. Khashan was originally published in the Middle East Quarterly, Spring, 2011, and
can be found on the Internet website maintained by the Middle East Forum, a foreign policy think tank which seeks to
define and promote American interests in the Middle East, defining U.S. interests to include fighting radical Islam,
working for Palestinian Arab acceptance of the State of Israel, improving the management of U.S. efforts to promote
constitutional democracy in the Middle East, reducing America's energy dependence on the Middle East, more robustly
asserting U.S. interests vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia, and countering the Iranian threat.
(URL: http://www.meforum.org/2948/lebanon-islamist-stronghold)
Republished with Permission of the Middle East Forum
Reprinted from the Middle East Forum News
mefnews@meforum.org (MEF NEWS)
June 13, 2011
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