THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATIVE, USA
An Online Journal of Political Commentary & Analysis
Volume VII, Issue # 147, July 11, 2005
Dr. Almon Leroy Way, Jr., Editor
Government Committed to & Acting in Accord with Conservative Principles
Ensures a Nation's Strength, Progress, & Prosperity
WASHINGTON MUST PLAN TODAY FOR
THE DEMOCRATIC IRAN OF TOMORROW
By Michael Rubin
A NUCLEAR ARMED IRAN DOMINATED BY HARDLINE ISLAMISTS BENT ON ATTACKING & DESTROYING THE U.S.A. & ITS ALLIES:
A FAST DEVELOPING SITUATION WHICH, UNLESS ABRUPTLY TERMINATED, WILL VERY SOON POSE A DIRECT &
IMMEDIATE DEADLY THREAT TO AMERICA & THE WEST -- THE NEED FOR THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION TO FORMULATE &
IMPLEMENT A CONSISTENT & EFFECTIVE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD IRAN, INCLUDING A REALISTIC STRATEGY FOR
UNDERCUTTING IRANIAN BALLISTIC MISSILE & NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS & ACHIEVING REGIME CHANGE &
DEMOCRATIZATION IN IRAN THROUGH DIPLOMACY & POLITICAL WARFARE, THROUGH PEACEFUL PENETRATION OF IRANIAN
SOCIETY, &, IF DEEMED NECESSARY, THROUGH U.S. PINPOINT MILITARY STRIKES
FULL STORY:
On June 25, 2005, obscure hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad swept to victory in Iran's run-off presidential election. In his first news
conference as President-elect of the Islamic Republic of Iran, he vowed to continue Iran's nuclear program.
"Today," Ahmadinejad proclaimed, "we can say that nuclear technology is our right."
A nuclear Islamic Republic would undermine any prospect for Iranian reform, Middle East peace, or a cessation of the regime's
sponsorship of terrorism. Yet, even as Ahmadinejad's victory has undercut hope that European Union diplomacy can resolve
disputes over enrichment in the Islamic Republic's nuclear program, the Bush administration still lacks a consistent policy on Iran.
Washington's chief concern is not that Iran would use nuclear weapons — although Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the former Iranian
President who lost the run-off election to Ahmadinejad, but who remains the second most powerful man in Tehran, threatened to
do just that on December 14, 2001. Rather, the administration's worry is that, with a nuclear deterrent, Iranian hardliners might feel
themselves immune from the consequences of their actions.
Washington's skepticism about Tehran's intentions is deep-rooted. In December, 2002, American intelligence confirmed the
existence of clandestine nuclear enrichment facilities in Iran. The Iranian government initially said that it had no outside assistance
with its centrifuge program, but, after tests by the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) found traces of weapons-grade
uranium on Iranian centrifuges, Iranian officials changed their story and said that the contamination came from imported equipment
not previously declared.
Likewise, the Iranian government revealed to the IAEA, on May 26, 2005, that, contrary to Tehran's previous insistence that it had
ceased plutonium work in 1993, such work had continued for another five years. And, on June 15, Rafsanjani told the BBC, "It's
possible that, at times, Iran has not reported its activities."
Suspicions over the Iranian government's intentions have also grown because of its refusal to ratify the nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty's Additional Protocol, drafted in response to the IAEA's failure to detect Saddam Hussein's pre-1991 nuclear weapons and
approved in May, 1997. More than 60 countries have ratified the new agreement, which subjects signatories to augmented reporting
requirements and also grants the IAEA increased powers of inspection. In exchange, countries have enhanced access to technology.
Tehran, though, found a loophole: By signing, but not ratifying, the additional protocol, it gained the agreement's benefits, but
remained outside the new inspection regime.
Statements by Iranian diplomats that the Islamic Republic's program is peaceful have been undercut by officials close to Supreme
Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. On May 29, hardline cleric Gholam Reza Hasani declared:
"An atom bomb... must be produced as well. That is because the Koran has
told Muslims to 'get strong and amass all the forces at your disposal to be strong.'"
While Hasani is unpopular with most Iranians, he remains a confidant of the Supreme Leader and a window into his thinking.
The Iranian public, for its part, has had mixed reactions to the government's nuclear program. While pursuit of nuclear power is
popular domestically, support among Iranians erodes sharply when they are asked, not about Iran's right to nuclear technology, but
about nuclear weapons. Shortly before the Iranian election, the Tarrance Group conducted a professional telephone survey of more
than 750 Iranians. A plurality of respondents said that an Iranian nuclear weapons arsenal would add to their anxiety and discomfort.
Last month, U.S. President George W. Bush reiterated that "the Iranian people deserve a genuinely democratic system in which
elections are honest and in which their leaders answer to them, instead of the other way around." The Bush administration, however,
shows little inclination to work toward such goals.
U.S. State Department Policy Planning Director Stephen Krasner, for example, tapped an ExxonMobil Middle East advisor to advise
him on Iran. She has since circulated papers friendly to the oil giant's policy of rapprochement and renewed trade with the Islamic
Republic.
While the Bush administration has committed itself to support European.Union diplomacy with Iran, few officials believe the effort
will succeed. Privately, many European diplomats say they believe it inevitable that Iran will get nuclear weapons — a tacit
admission that their diplomacy is insincere. Some French and German officials have argued that Washington poses a greater threat
than Tehran. By not demanding a timeline for diplomacy, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has allowed Europe to filibuster
as Tehran runs down the clock.
Meanwhile, as the Iranian nuclear threat grows daily, it becomes ever more clear that certain policies will simply not work. For
example, expecting United Nations sanctions against Iran when oil hovers at $60 per barrel is pure fantasy. Any policy based on
such an expectation is doomed to failure.
As for Europe's prescription of economic engagement, it will neither help reform nor take the edge off the Islamic Republic's
excesses, considering the structure of the Iranian economy. Perhaps a third of Iran's gross domestic product — and the bulk of its
industry — are in the hands of bonyads, or "revolutionary foundations," whose heads are appointed by Khamenei. Enhancing
business with Iran would inject capital directly into hardline coffers, bolstering their relative power. The beauty of Bush's "Axis of
Evil" speech was that, without violence, it shook investor confidence in the Islamic Republic, and hit the pocketbooks of the
regime's elite.
No American official has called for invasion nor, despite accusations to the contrary, has there been any proposal to employ the
Mujahidin al-Khalq — an organization guilty of terrorism against Iranians, Iraqis, and Americans — in pursuit of regime change.
The White House nevertheless has a number of policies that could empower Iranians to the point where they win the same rights
for themselves that Georgians, Ukrainians, Lebanese, and even Bhutanese have won in the past year.
A democratic Iran might not abandon its nuclear program, but neither would it sponsor anti-American terrorism, undercut the
Middle East peace process, or deny Israel's right to exist. Democratization, therefore, can take the edge off the Iranian threat.
A good start would be Iran's labor unions, which Tehran seeks to license and control. Iranian workers complain of rampant regime
corruption. Hundreds of textile plants have gone bankrupt in recent years, according to the Islamic Republic's own press. In one
instance, a bonyad sold a plant; the new owner then laid off the workers and sold the land for his personal profit. Protests at one
Isfahan textile mill led to the deployment of security forces. Iranian pilgrims in Iraq spoke of deteriorating conditions and
increasing tensions in Iran's oil fields. Pollution has cut the lucrative Iranian caviar harvest.
There is no reason why — as Poland prepares to mark the 25th anniversary of the Solidarity Movement — Europeans and
Americans should support labor at home, in Latin America and in Southeast Asia, but deny aid to Iranian workers.
Washington should also take steps to bolster Iranian civil society. The January 30 elections in Iraq established voter participation
as a measure of Middle Eastern government legitimacy, yet most Western journalists have accepted for last month's election voter
participation figures issued by Iran's Interior Ministry.
Iranians visiting Iraq, however, contradict their government's statistics. While the Iranian government bragged about a 50% turnout
in 2004 parliamentary elections, pilgrims suggested that, in most provinces, the figure was less than 15%. The State Department
should consider funding organizations capable of conducting independent surveys to reduce reliance on Tehran's often imaginary
numbers.
America and Europe can also do much more to encourage that most cherished of Western values, freedom of speech. Iran hosts the
world's third-largest blogging community. While authorities began cracking down on young web journalists in August, 2004, Iranian
youth are bold. They should have access to digital cameras and other equipment. Because the regime shuts down the cell phone
network during demonstrations, student leaders should have satellite phones. Iranian satellite networks based in Los Angeles and
elsewhere can also play an important role because of their immunity from regime intimidation.
As they near the 100th anniversary of their Constitutional Revolution, Iranians are increasingly bold in their demands for democracy.
Washington should spare no effort to support them, cynical and counterproductive European resistance to democratization
notwithstanding.
Should non-violent options fail, however, Bush may decide that pinpoint military strikes are the only mechanism by which to
undercut the Islamic Republic's ambitions. And yet, his administration has yet to develop alternative strategies to fulfill his stated
policy goals. As Iranian authorities pursue their race for nuclear weapons, American officials remain fumbling at the starting line,
unsure of which direction to run.
In 2002, Condoleezza Rice delayed post-Saddam Iraq planning for fear of undercutting United Nations diplomacy. The Bush
administration should not make the same mistake twice. European Union efforts are nice, but the White House should not place all
its eggs in a French basket.
LINKS TO RELATED TOPICS:
The Middle East & the Problem of Iran
Military Weaponry & International Security
The Threat of Radical Islam
War & Peace in the Real World
Islamist Terrorist Attacks on the U.S.A.
Osama bin Laden & the Islamist Declaration of War
Against the U.S.A. & Western Civilization
Islamist International Terrorism &
U.S. Intelligence Agencies
U.S. National Security Strategy
Michael Rubin, a former staff adviser for Iran and Iraq in the Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense, is a resident scholar at the
American Enterprise Institute and Editor of the Middle East Quarterly.
The foregoing article by Michael Rubin was originally published in Forward, July 8, 2005, and can be found on the Internet
website maintained by the Middle East Forum.
Republished with Permission of the Middle East Forum
Reprinted from the Middle East Forum News
mefnews@meforum.org (MEF NEWS)
July 8, 2005
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