THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATIVE, USA
An Online Journal of Political Commentary & Analysis
Volume IX, Issue # 182, Oct. 1, 2007
Dr. Almon Leroy Way, Jr., Editor
Government Committed to & Acting in Accord with Conservative Principles
Ensures a Nation's Strength, Progress, & Prosperity
UNITED STATES BORDER SECURITY PROBLEMS:
A GAO REPORT TO CONGRESS
THE FULL STORY
By Gregory D. Kutz & John W. Cooney
AMERICA'S BORDER SECURITY: THE SECURITY OR INSECURITY OF U.S. BORDERS WITH MEXICO & CANADA -- REPORT
OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO) TO THE U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE -- SEPTEMBER 27,
2007, TESTIMONY REGARDING SECURITY VULNERABILITY AT UNMANNED & UNMONITORED U.S. BORDER LOCATIONS --
GAPING HOLES IN OUR BORDER SECURITY -- OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE MOVEMENT, WITHOUT DETECTION OR INTERDICTION,
OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS, CRIMINALS, TERRORISTS, RADIOACTIVE MATERALS, ILLEGAL DRUGS, & OTHER CONTRABAND
FROM MEXICO & CANADA INTO THE U.S.A.
WHY GAO DID THIS STUDY
The possibility that terrorists and criminals might exploit border vulnerabilities and enter the United States poses a serious
security risk, especially if they were to bring radioactive material or other contraband with them. Although Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) has taken steps to secure the 170 ports of entry on the northern and southern U.S. borders,
Congress is concerned that unmanned and unmonitored areas between these ports of entry may be vulnerable. In
unmanned locations, CBP relies on surveillance cameras, unmanned aerial drones, and other technology to monitor for
illegal border activity. In unmonitored locations, CBP does not have this equipment in place and must rely on alert citizens
or other information sources to meet its obligation to protect the border.
Today’s testimony will address what GAO investigators found during a limited security assessment of seven border areas
that were unmanned, unmonitored, or both — four at the U.S.A.-Canada border and three at the U.S.A.–Mexico border. In
three of the four locations on the U.S.A.-Canada border, investigators carried a duffel bag across the border to simulate the
cross-border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband. Safety considerations prevented GAO investigators
from attempting to cross north into the United States from a starting point in Mexico.
WHAT GAO FOUND
On the U.S.A.-Canada border, GAO found state roads close to the border that CBP did not appear to man or monitor. In
some of these locations, the proximity of the road to the border allowed investigators to cross without being challenged by
law enforcement, successfully simulating the cross-border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband into the
United States from Canada. In one location on the northern border, the U.S. Border Patrol was alerted to GAO activities
through the tip of an alert citizen. However, the responding U.S. Border Patrol agents were not able to locate GAO
investigators. Also on the northern border, GAO investigators located several ports of entry that had posted daytime hours
and were unmanned overnight.
On the southern border, investigators observed a large law enforcement and Army National Guard presence on a state road,
including unmanned aerial vehicles. Also, GAO identified federally managed lands that were adjacent to the U.S.A.-Mexico
border. These areas did not appear to be monitored or did not have an observable law enforcement presence, which
contrasted sharply with GAO observations on the state road. Although CBP is ultimately responsible for protecting federal
lands adjacent to the border, CBP officials told GAO that certain legal, environmental, and cultural considerations limit
options for enforcement — for example, environmental restrictions and tribal sovereignty rights.
SUMMARY OF SELECTED GAO BORDER SECURITY ACTIVITIES
Security Vulnerability: State roads close to the border; Investigator
activity: An investigator simulated the cross-border movement of
radioactive materials or other contraband into the United States from
Canada; Law enforcement response and additional observations:
* Suspicious activity was reported to the U.S. Border Patrol, but
responding agents were unable to locate GAO investigators and their
simulated contraband.
Security Vulnerability: Ports of entry with posted hours; Investigator
activity: investigators attempted to trigger a law enforcement response
by taking photographs of a port of entry that had closed for the night;
Law enforcement response and additional observations:
* A gate was placed across the road, but investigators observed it
would be possible to drive around the gate;
* U.S. Border Patrol responded 20 minutes after investigators were
caught on camera at the port of entry;
* Responding U.S. Border Patrol agent did not attempt to verify
identity of investigators or search their vehicle.
Security vulnerability: Federally managed lands adjacent to border;
Investigator activity: Investigators approached the U.S.A.-Mexico border;
Law enforcement response and additional observations:
* No visible law enforcement response;
* No observable electronic monitoring equipment;
* Investigators observed evidence of frequent border crossings into the
United States at this location.
Security Vulnerability: Federally managed lands adjacent to border;
Investigator activity: Investigator stepped over a 4-foot-high border
fence, entered Mexico, and returned again to the United States; Law
enforcement response and additional observations:
* No visible law enforcement response;
* No observable electronic monitoring equipment;
* No observed law enforcement presence despite proximity to border.
RECAPITULATION
The United States shares over 5,000 miles of border with Canada to the north, and 1,900 miles of border with Mexico to the
south. Individuals attempting to legally enter the United States by land present themselves to a Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) officer at one of the 170 ports of entry located along these borders. Any other method of land entry is
illegal. [1] Because CBP checks the identification of entrants into the United States and searches vehicles for contraband
at ports of entry, individuals entering the United States illegally may attempt to avoid screening procedures by crossing
the border in areas between ports of entry. The U.S. Border Patrol, which is part of CBP, is responsible for patrolling and
monitoring these areas to stop cross-border violators. However, given limited resources and the wide expanse of the border,
the U.S. Border Patrol is limited in its ability to monitor the border either through use of technology or with a consistent
manned presence. Commensurate with the perceived threat, there is a sharp contrast between how CBP distributes human
resources on the northern border, as opposed to the southern border. According to CBP, as of May, 2007, it had 972 U.S.
Border Patrol agents on the northern border and 11,986 agents on the southern border.
Given the potential security vulnerabilities on our borders, the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance expressed concern that
cross-border violators may attempt to enter the United States, possibly bringing with them radioactive materials or other
contraband, such as explosives, drugs, counterfeit money, and bogus credit cards. We were therefore asked to perform a
limited security assessment to identify vulnerable border areas where CBP does not maintain a manned presence 24 hours
per day or where there is no apparent monitoring equipment in place. The Committee on Finance also requested that, where
possible, our investigators attempt to simulate the cross-border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband to
demonstrate the existence of serious security vulnerabilities. To perform this work, our investigators visited seven border
areas that were unmanned, unmonitored, or both -- four at the U.S.A.-Canada border and three at the U.S.A.-Mexico border.
We identified these areas by reviewing information that is publicly available and by reviewing our previous work on border
security. [2] These areas were located in four states on the northern border and two states on the southern border. We did
not attempt to evaluate all potential U.S. border security vulnerabilities. Investigators used a global positioning system
(GPS) in some cases and geographic landmarks in others to determine the location of the border. In three out of four
locations on the U.S.A.-Canada border, investigators crossed into the United States from Canada carrying a duffel bag to
simulate the cross-border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband. Safety considerations prevented our
investigators from attempting to cross north into the United States from a starting point in Mexico.
We conducted our investigation from October, 2006, through June, 2007, in accordance with quality standards for
investigations, as set forth by the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency.
SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION
In four states along the U.S.A.-Canada border we found state roads that were very close to the border that CBP did not
appear to monitor. In three states, the proximity of the road to the border allowed investigators to cross undetected,
successfully simulating the cross-border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband into the United States from
Canada. In one apparently unmanned, unmonitored area on the northern border, the U.S. Border Patrol was alerted to our
activities through the tip of an alert citizen. However, the responding U.S. Border Patrol agents were not able to locate our
investigators and their simulated contraband. Also on the northern border, our investigators located several ports of entry
that had posted daytime hours and were unmanned overnight. Investigators observed that surveillance equipment was in
operation, but that the only preventive measure to stop an individual from crossing the border into the United States was a
barrier across the road that could be driven around.
In contrast to the northern border locations we visited, on a state road near the southern border, investigators observed a
large law enforcement and Army National Guard presence, including unmanned aerial vehicles. However, our limited
security assessment identified potential security vulnerabilities on federally managed lands adjacent to the U.S.A.-Mexico
border; we did not observe monitoring or a law enforcement presence during the time our investigators visited these areas.
The Department of the Interior (Interior) provided us with a memorandum of understanding between itself, the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) [of which CBP is a component], and the Department of Agriculture (USDA) documenting the
agreed approach to protecting federal lands along U.S. borders. Although CBP is ultimately responsible for protecting
these areas, officials told us that certain legal, environmental, and cultural considerations limit options for enforcement.
Northern Border
According to CBP, the ease and speed with which a cross-border violator can travel to the border, cross the border, and
leave the location of the crossing, are critical factors in determining whether an area of the border is vulnerable. We
identified state roads close to the border that appeared to be unmanned and unmonitored, allowing us to simulate the
cross-border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband from Canada into the United States. We also located
several ports of entry that had posted daytime hours and which, although monitored, were unmanned overnight.
Investigators observed that surveillance equipment was in operation but that the only observable preventive measure to
stop a cross-border violator from entering the United States was a barrier across the road that could be driven around. CBP
provided us with records that confirmed our observations, indicating that, on one occasion, a cross-border violator drove
around this type of barrier to illegally enter the United States. The violator was later caught by state law enforcement
officers and arrested by the U.S. Border Patrol.
State Roads Close to the Northern Border:
We found state roads close to the U.S.-Canada border in several states. Many of the roads we found appeared to be
unmanned and unmonitored, allowing us to simulate the cross-border movement of radioactive materials or other
contraband from Canada into the United States.
Northern Border Location One:
On October 31, 2006, our investigators positioned themselves on opposite sides of the U.S.A.-Canada border in an
unmanned location. Our investigators selected this location because roads on either side of the border would allow them
to quickly and easily exchange simulated contraband. After receiving a signal via cell phone, the investigator in Canada
left his vehicle and walked approximately 25 feet to the border carrying a red duffel bag. While investigators on the U.S.
side took photographs and made a digital video recording, the individual with the duffel bag proceeded the remaining 50
feet, transferred the duffel bag to the investigators on the U.S. side, and returned to his vehicle on the Canadian side.
The set up and exchange lasted approximately 10 minutes, during which time the investigators were in view of residents
both on the Canadian and U.S. sides of the border.
According to CBP records of this incident, an alert citizen notified the U.S. Border Patrol about the suspicious activities
of our investigators. The U.S. Border Patrol subsequently attempted to search for a vehicle matching the description of
the rental vehicle our investigators used. However, the U.S. Border Patrol was not able to locate the investigators with
the duffel bag, even though they had parked nearby to observe traffic passing through the port of entry.
Northern Border Location Two:
Investigators identified over a half dozen locations in this area where state roads ended at the U.S.A.-Canada border.
Although investigators took pictures of the border area, they did not attempt to cross the border because of private
property concerns. There was no visible U.S. Border Patrol response to our activities and no visible electronic monitoring
equipment. CBP told us that the activities of our investigators would not be grounds for a formal investigation. Still,
according to CBP records, criminals are aware of vulnerabilities in this area and have taken advantage of the access
provided by roads close to the border. For example, there was an incident on January 25, 2007, in which an alert citizen
notified CBP about suspicious activities on the citizen's property, leading to the arrest of several cross-border violators.
Northern Border Location Three:
On November 15, 2006, our investigators visited an area in this state where state roads ended at the U.S.A.-Canada border.
One of our investigators simulated the cross-border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband by crossing
the border north into Canada and then returning to the United States. There did not appear to be any monitoring or
intrusion alarm system in place at this location, and there was no U.S. Border Patrol response to our border crossing.
Northern Border Location Four:
On December 5, 2006, our investigators traveled along a road parallel to the U.S.A.-Canada border. This road is so close to
the border that jumping over a ditch on the southern side of the road allows an individual to stand in the United States.
While driving the length of this road on the Canadian side, our investigators noticed cameras placed at strategic locations
on the U.S. side of the border. They also observed U.S. Border Patrol vehicles parked at different locations along the border.
At a location that appeared to be unmanned and unmonitored, one investigator left the vehicle carrying a red duffel bag. He
crossed the ditch and walked into the United States for several hundred feet before returning to the vehicle. Our
investigators stayed in this location for about 15 minutes, but there was no observed response from law enforcement. At
two other locations, investigators crossed into the United States to find out whether their presence would be detected. In
all cases, there was no observed response from law enforcement.
Ports of Entry with Posted Hours on the Northern Border:
We identified several ports of entry with posted daytime hours in a state on the northern border. During the daytime, these
ports of entry are staffed by CBP officers. During the night, CBP told us that it relies on surveillance systems to monitor,
respond to, and attempt to interdict illegal border crossing activity. On November 14, 2006, at about 11:00 p.m., our
investigators arrived on the U.S. side of one port of entry that had closed for the night. Investigators observed that
surveillance equipment was in operation, but that the only visible preventive measure to stop an individual from entering
the United States was a barrier across the road that could be driven around. Investigators stayed at the port of entry for
approximately 12 minutes to see whether the U.S. Border Patrol would respond. During this time, the investigators walked
around the port of entry area and took photographs. When the U.S. Border Patrol did not arrive at the port of entry, our
investigators returned south, only to have a U.S. Border Patrol agent pull them over 3 miles south of the port of entry. When
questioned by the U.S. Border Patrol agent, our investigators indicated that they were federal investigators testing security
procedures at the U.S. border. The agent did not ask for identification from our investigators and glanced only briefly at the
badge and commission book the driver offered for inspection. In addition, he did not attempt to search the vehicle, ask what
agency our investigators worked for, or record their names. According to DHS, the agent acted in a manner consistent with
operational protocol because he was satisfied with the credentials presented to him and did not have probable cause to
search the vehicle.
CBP provided us with records concerning this incident. According to the records, the agent was dispatched because of the
suspicious activities of our investigators in front of the port of entry camera. The records indicated that, after this incident,
CBP staff researched the incident fully to determine whether our investigators posed a threat. By performing an Internet
search on the name of the investigator who rented the vehicle, CBP linked the investigators to GAO. CBP also provided us
with records that confirmed our observations about the barrier at this port of entry, indicating that on one occasion a
cross-border violator drove around this type of barrier to illegally enter the United States. The violator was later caught by
state law enforcement officers and arrested by the U.S. Border Patrol.
Southern Border
Safety considerations prevented our investigators from performing the
same assessment work on the U.S.A.-Mexico border as performed on the
northern border. In contrast to our observations on the northern
border, our investigators observed a large law enforcement and Army
National Guard presence near a state road on the southern border,
including unmanned aerial vehicles. However, our limited security
assessment also identified potential security vulnerabilities on
federally managed lands adjacent to the U.S.-Mexico border. These areas
did not appear to be monitored or have a noticeable law enforcement
presence during the time our investigators visited the sites. Although
CBP is ultimately responsible for protecting these areas, officials
told us that certain legal, environmental, and cultural considerations
limit options for enforcement.
State Road Close to the Southern Border:
On October 17, 2006, two of our investigators left a main U.S. route
about a quarter mile from a U.S.A.-Mexico port of entry. Traveling on a
dirt road that parallels the border, our investigators used a GPS
system to get as close to the border as possible. Our investigators
passed U.S. Border Patrol agents and U.S. Army National Guard units. In
addition, our investigators spotted unmanned aerial vehicles and a
helicopter flying parallel to the border. At the point where the dirt
road ran closest to the U.S.A.-Mexico border, our investigators spotted
additional U.S. Border Patrol vehicles parked in a covered position.
About three-fourths of a mile from these vehicles, our investigators
pulled off the road. One investigator exited the vehicle and proceeded
on foot through several gulches and gullies toward the Mexican border.
His intent was to find out whether he would be questioned by law
enforcement agents about his activities. He returned to the vehicle
after 15 minutes, at which time our investigators returned to the main
road. Our investigators did not observe any public traffic on this road
for the 1 hour that they were in the area, but none of the law
enforcement units attempted to stop our investigators and find out what
they were doing. According to CBP, because our investigators did not
approach from the direction of Mexico, there would be no expectation
for law enforcement units to question these activities.
Federal Lands Adjacent to the Southern Border:
Investigators identified potential security vulnerabilities on
federally managed land adjacent to the U.S.-Mexico border. These areas
did not appear to be monitored or have a manned CBP presence during the
time our investigators visited the sites. Investigators learned that a
memorandum of understanding exists between DHS (of which CBP is a
component), Interior, and USDA regarding the protection of federal
lands adjacent to U.S. borders. Although CBP is ultimately responsible
for protecting these areas, officials told us that certain legal,
environmental, and cultural considerations limit options for
enforcement--for example, environmental restrictions and tribal
sovereignty rights.
Southern Border Location One:
On January 9, 2007, our investigators entered federally managed land
adjacent to the U.S.A.-Mexico border. The investigators had identified a
road running parallel to the border in this area. Our investigators
were informed by an employee of a visitor center that, because the U.S.
government was building a fence, the road was closed to the public.
However, our investigators proceeded to the road and found that it was
not physically closed. While driving west along this road, our
investigators did not observe any surveillance cameras or law
enforcement vehicles. A 4-foot-high fence (appropriate to prevent the
movement of a vehicle rather than a person) stood at the location of
the border. Our investigators pulled over to the side of the road at
one location. To determine whether he would activate any intrusion
alarm systems, one investigator stepped over the fence, entered Mexico,
and returned to the United States. The investigators remained in the
location for approximately 15 minutes but there was no observed law
enforcement response to their activities.
Southern Border Location Two:
On January 23, 2007, our investigators arrived on federally managed
lands adjacent to the U.S.A.-Mexico border. In this area, the Rio Grande
River forms the southern border between the United States and Mexico.
After driving off-road in a 4x4 vehicle to the banks of the Rio Grande,
our investigators observed, in two locations, evidence that frequent
border crossings took place. In one location, the investigators
observed well-worn footpaths and tire tracks on the Mexican side of the
river. At another location, a boat ramp on the U.S. side of the Rio
Grande was mirrored by a boat ramp on the Mexican side. Access to the
boat ramp on the Mexican side of the border had well-worn footpaths and
vehicle tracks.
An individual who worked in this area told our investigators that at
several times during the year, the water is so low that the river can
easily be crossed on foot. Our investigators were in this area for 1
hour and 30 minutes and observed no surveillance equipment, intrusion
alarm systems, or law enforcement presence. Our investigators were not
challenged regarding their activities. According to CBP officials, in
some locations on federally managed lands, social and cultural issues
lead the U.S. Border Patrol to defer to local police in providing
protection. This sensitivity to social and cultural issues appears to
be confirmed by the provisions of the memorandum of understanding
between DHS, Interior, and USDA.
Corrective Action Briefing
On February 23, 2007, we met with CBP officials to discuss the results
of our investigation. CBP officials clarified their approach to law
enforcement in unmanned and unmonitored areas at the northern and
southern U.S. borders, including an explanation of jurisdictional
issues on federally managed lands. CBP indicated that resource
restrictions prevent U.S. Border Patrol agents from investigating all
instances of suspicious activity. They added that the northern border
presents more of a challenge than the southern border and that many
antiquated ports of entry exist.
Conclusions
Our visits to the northern border show that CBP faces significant
challenges in effectively monitoring the border and preventing
undetected entry into the United States. Our work shows that a
determined cross-border violator would likely be able to bring
radioactive materials or other contraband undetected into the United
States by crossing the U.S.A.-Canada border at any of the locations we
investigated. CBP records indicate that it does successfully stop many
individuals from crossing the border illegally, but our own
observations and experiences (along with CBP's acknowledgment of
existing challenges) lead us to conclude that more human capital and
technological capabilities are needed to effectively protect the
northern border. Our observations on the southern border showed a
significant disparity between the large law enforcement presence on
state lands in one state and what seemed to be a lack of law
enforcement presence on federally managed lands.
APPENDICES
Appendix I -- Case Studies of Successful Customs and Border Protection
Responses to Suspicious Activities on Northern and Southern U.S.
Borders:
This appendix details four cases where Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) apprehended individuals who were engaged in suspicious activities
on the northern and southern borders. According to CBP, U.S. Border
Patrol agents followed proper protocols in responding to these
incidents. We are summarizing these case studies, which CBP provided to
us, in order to further illustrate challenges the U.S. Border Patrol faces.
Northern Border Incident One:
At about 3:20 a.m. on June 24, 2006, electronic surveillance equipment
observed a vehicle arrive at the port of entry gate from the direction
of Canada. The suspect got out of the vehicle and, after inspecting the
area around the gate, returned to the vehicle and drove around the gate
into the United States. U.S. Border Patrol agents were notified, along
with state law enforcement. The state officer identified and stopped
the vehicle while the U.S. Border Patrol agents were en route. U.S.
Border Patrol agents arrived and arrested the suspect. The suspect was
identified as a citizen of Albania and admitted to driving around the
port of entry gate. The suspect had applied for asylum in the United
States and been denied in 2001, at which point he had moved to Canada.
Attempts to return the suspect to Canada failed, as he had no legal
status in Canada. Suspect was held in jail pending removal proceedings.
Northern Border Incident Two:
At about 6:00 p.m. on January 25, 2007, the U.S. Border Patrol was
notified of suspicious activity on the U.S.A.-Canada border. U.S.
residents on the border had observed a vehicle dropping off several
individuals near their home. A U.S. Border Patrol agent proceeded to
the area where residents had observed the suspicious activity. Once
there, the agent followed footprints in the snow and discovered two
suspects hiding among a stand of pine trees. The suspects were
Columbian nationals, one male and one female. They indicated that a man
was going to pick them up on the Canadian side of the border, and that
a friend had driven them to the agreed-upon location on the U.S. side.
Cell phone numbers retrieved from the suspect's phone linked him to
phone numbers belonging to a known alien smuggler in the area. The
suspects said they intended to seek political asylum in Canada. They
were sent to a detention facility after their arrest.
Northern Border Incident Three:
On February 10, 2007, at about 2:00 a.m., U.S. Border Patrol
surveillance equipment detected six suspects entering the United States
from Canada. The suspects were walking south along railroad tracks.
After a short foot chase, U.S. Border Patrol agents apprehended all six
suspects -- two individuals who were believed to be smugglers and a
family of four. All the suspects were citizens of South Korea.
According to interviews with the suspects, after the family arrived in
Canada, they were approached by an individual who said he could take
them to the United States. He brought the family to a desolate area and
introduced them to a male and a female, who they were to follow across
the border. The individual then instructed the family to leave their
luggage in the car and said that he would pick all six of them up in
the United States. After apprehension, the wife and two children in the family were
released for humanitarian reasons.
Southern Border Incident One:
On May 3, 2007, at about 1:20 a.m., an alert citizen reported a
possible illegal alien near the U.S.-Mexico border. The responding U.S.
Border Patrol agent located the individual, who claimed to be a citizen
of Uruguay. He said that he had used a variety of transportation means,
including airplanes and buses, to travel from Uruguay to a Mexican city
just south of the U.S. border. The individual claimed to have crossed
the border by foot along with four other individuals. He then walked
for 4 days through the desert. When he became dehydrated, he sought
help at a nearby U.S. town. As a result, he was spotted by the alert
citizen who notified the U.S. Border Patrol. The individual was
scheduled to be removed from the country, but requested a hearing before
an immigration judge.
NOTES:
[1] 19 U.S.C. §§ 1433, 1459; 8 C.F.R. §235.1.
[2] See GAO, Border Security: Agencies Need to Better Coordinate Their
Strategies and Operations on Federal Lands, GAO-04-590 (Washington,
D.C.: June 16, 2004).
LINKS TO RELATED TOPICS:
United States Immigration, Assimilation, & National Security Policy:
Immigration into the U.S.A., Legal & Illegal Aliens,
& U.S. Border Control
Gregory D. Kutz is Managing Director of Forensic Audits and Special Investigations, United States Government
Accountability Office, Washington, D.C. John W. Cooney is GAO Assistant Director of Forensic Audits and Special
Investigations.
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