In spite of the War Powers Act, the presidential initiative in U.S. military actions abroad continued largely unabated during the four years of the Presidency of George H. W. Bush (1989-1993) as well as during the eight years of the Reagan Presidency (1981-1989), the four years of the Presidency of James E. Carter (1977-1981), and the nearly two and a half years of the Ford Presidency (1974-1977).

Republican President Bush managed to keep the initiative in war-making, despite the fact that, throughout his four-year Presidency, the Democrats had a clear majority in the Senate and an overwhelming majority in the House of Representatives.

During the first year of the Bush Presidency, the critical point was reached in the ongoing difficulty between the U.S. government and the corrupt Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega, as regards the latter's involvement in smuggling cocaine into the U.S.A. and his actions threatening the safety of the Panama Canal and of U.S. citizens living and working in the Canal Area, i.e., in what had been the Canal Zone prior to its abolition in October, 1979. Realizing that the problem could not be resolved through diplomatic negotiation or successfully dealt with by other political means (e.g., U.S. encouragement and support of a movement within Panama to overthrow the Noriega regime and replace it with a government more amenable to recognizing and respecting American national interests), President Bush, on December 20, 1989, dispatched U.S. military forces to Panama in order to depose Noriega, capture him, and bring him to the U.S.A. to stand trial in a federal district court on drug trafficking charges. Bush took this action, in the absence of a congressional declaration of war and largely without complying with the consultation requirements of the War Powers Act. While many members of Congress were critical of President Bush's ordering the Panama invasion without prior congressional authorization, the Democratic majorities in the Senate and House of Representatives took no action against the President, probably because the military operation was carried out quickly, smoothly and successfully, its main objectives being accomplished with minimal loss of American lives.

In defending his action in ordering the Panama invasion without prior congressional approval, President Bush maintained that it was his constitutional duty as President and Commander-in-Chief to handle matters pertaining to U.S. national security and military operations--and to handle those matters in such manner as he deemed necessary and appropriate, unimpeded by the provisions of the War Powers Act. Bush called attention to the fact that, throughout American history, presidents have found it necessary to send U.S. troops into foreign hostilities without first obtaining the approval of Congress. He insisted that, when the U.S.A. faces a serious threat to its national security, the President has the constitutional authority and responsibility to take swift and decisive action, even in the absence of clear statutory support.

In August, 1990, after Saddam Hussein's military forces had invaded and occupied Kuwait and there immediately followed the beginning of a large Iraqi military buildup close to the Saudi border, President Bush perceived the rapidly developing situation as a serious threat not only to the security and independence of Saudi Arabia but also to vital U.S. national interests in the Persian Gulf region. The Iraqi government and military establishment, controlled and directed by a ruthless dictator, was ready and willing to commit acts against neighboring states, was developing instruments of chemical and biological warfare, and was now in the process of forcibly seizing control of half of the world's supply of petroleum. Bush viewed this situation as one the U.S.A. could not and would not take lying down.

Hussein was, in effect, telling America to "Drink Seawater" (the Arab's way of saying, "Go to Hell"), operating on the assumption that the U.S.A. lacked the will to employ military force in defense of its national interests. President Bush, however, firmly believed that military force was an appropriate and justifiable instrument of American foreign policy, a tool which the nation should use neither carelessly and recklessly nor timidly and hesitantly. Acting in accordance with this belief, the President, on August 6, initiated "Operation Desert Shield," sending U.S. military forces to Saudi Arabia to help defend that country against a possible and, in Bush's view, highly probable Iraqi attack.

President Bush, without seeking and obtaining prior congressional authorization, initially dispatched 230,000 U.S. troops to Saudi Arabia. The President, in reporting to Congress and the nation, defended his action as a legitimate response to the Saudi government's request for American assistance in bolstering Saudi defenses and deterring an Iraqi attack. In late October, when it became clear that the Iraqi regime was continuing its military buildup in Kuwait, Bush, again without the prior consent of Congress, sent an additional 200,000 U.S. troops to Saudi Arabia, deployed there in preparation for a possible military offensive against Irag. The President reported to Congress his decision to nearly double the number of American military personnel deployed in Saudi Arabia, but did so only hours before implementation of his decision began. In this manner, he caught by surprise his Democratic critics in Congress, denying them sufficient time and opportunity to mobilize an effectual opposition to his military initiative.

Congressional Democrats wishing to obstruct implementation of the President's Persian Gulf policy realized that the only avenue left to them was rejection of proposed military appropriations. The would-be obstructionists also realized that withholding funds for American troops already in harm's way was a strategem fraught with tremendous political risks--one which could very well backfire on those who employed it, resulting in their being severely burned by a voters' backlash in the coming November congressional elections. Hence, suggestions that this maneuver be used against President Bush and his military policy did not receive appreciable support. In fact, the 1990 military initiative taken by Bush under the label "Operation Desert Shield" received the full support of Congress, despite some moaning and groaning over the largescale deployment of U.S. combat troops in Saudi Arabia and the devious manner in which the President outmaneuvered his congressional critics.

Determined to reverse the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait, President Bush rallied the support of the United Nations, getting the U.N. Security Council, on November 29, 1990, to pass U.N. Resolution 678--the resolution which authorized U.N. members to use "all necessary means" to drive the Iraqi invaders from Kuwait, if Iraq failed to withdraw them by January 15, 1991. In gaining explicit United Nations authorization to employ military force to expel the Iraqi troops from Kuwait, if they did not leave by the specified deadline, Bush again outmaneuvered his critics in Congress, putting pressure on them to abandon their opposition and begin supporting the President's initiatives in the Persian Gulf region. James Baker, then U.S. Secretary of State, explained the advantage which, according to his perception, passage of the U.N. resolution gave to the Bush Presidency vis-a-vis the House and Senate Democratic majorities:

      "It was quite clear that ... [U.N. Resolution 678]
      would give us such a boost, in terms of internation-
      al public opinion but also domestic public opinion
      and public opinion with Congress.  It would put us,
      frankly, in the position of being able to say to a
      congressman who would not vote for us, 'You mean
      you are not willing to support the president, but
      the prime minister of Ethiopia will support the
      president?'"  [Quoted in Michael Duffy and Dan
      Goodgame, MARCHING IN PLACE--THE STATUS QUO PRESI-
      DENCY OF GEORGE BUSH (New York:  Simon & Schuster,
      1992), pp. 157-158.]

On January 12, 1991, President Bush called on Congress to adopt the Persian Gulf Resolution and thereby go on record as giving its full support to the President's use of "all necessary means" to carry out U.N. Resolution 678. The House of Representatives, after a lengthy debate, passed the requested joint resolution by an overwhelming majority vote (250-183). The Senate passed it by a much slimmer majority (52-47). The President signed the measure into law on January 14.

With the Security Council's adoption of U.N. Resolution 678 and congressional passage of the Persian Gulf Resolution, President Bush had all the authority and support he needed to wage war against Saddam Hussein. On January 16, after the Iraqi government failed to withdraw its military forces from Kuwait by the deadline, Bush ordered "Operation Desert Storm," effectuating a devastating aerial assault against military installations and concen- trations in Iraq and Kuwait. On the President's orders, a ground offensive began on February 24. After four days of ground warfare, the Iraqi forces were defeated and Kuwait was liberated. Shortly thereafter, Bush unilaterally ordered an informal ceasefire and the Iraqi government agreed to observe and comply with all U.N. Resolutions. On April 6, a formal ceasefire was accepted and signed by representatives of the contending parties in the Persian Gulf War, and the conflict was thereby brought to an official end. Having destroyed and/or captured the greater part of Hussein's military machine and having compelled him to back down, as regards his pursuit of the Iraqi claim to Kuwait, the U.S.A. and the U.S.-led allied coalition emerged from the war victorious.

While President Bush consulted with and reported to Congress during the course of the Persian Gulf War, he disagreed with the contention that Congress has the constitutional authority to take part in decision-making regarding initiation of U.S. military action abroad. Although he sought and obtained congressional passage of the Persian Gulf Resolution, there are indications that Bush believed that, as President and Commander-in-Chief, he had ample constitutional authority to act unilaterally in initiating military operations against Irag. It has been reported that, in the presence of journalists, Bush expressed the opinion that he possessed the power to undertake military action, regardless of the presence or absence of a congressional joint resolution authorizing the military undertaking. According to the reports, Bush pushed for adoption of the Persian Gulf Resolution to secure the political support of Congress, not to obtain legal authority he would lack in the absence of a congressional joint resolution.

During the remainder of his Presidency, Bush continued to adhere to and act in accord with the belief that the President has full authority to initiate U.S. military action abroad, and to do so without congressional interference. In December, 1992, near the end of his term of office, President Bush, without consulting with or seeking authorization from Congress, sent U.S. troops to Somalia, with orders to operate as part of the United Task Force (UNITAF)--a U.N.-sanctioned, U.S.-led multinational coalition of U.N. member-states. Deployed to Mogadishu on December 9, the United Task Force was given specific authority under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter to employ armed force, if necessary to accomplish UNITAF's mission--to (1) disarm political factions that were violating the ceasefire and (2) establish and maintain orderly conditions under which food and other humanitarian supplies could be safely delivered to the starving segments of the Somali population. The United Task Force was conceived as a U.N.-authorized military force similar to the U.S.-led coalition forces in the Korean War (1950-1953) and in Operation Desert Shield (1990) and the Persian Gulf War (1991).

The American component, the U.S. troops volunteered by President Bush and given the name "Operation Restore Hope," constituted the overwhelming majority of the military personnel comprising UNITAF. The other U.N. member-states participating in the operation made only token contributions of military personnel. The socalled "United Nations" military operation was, for all practical purposes, a U.S.A. operation. The "U.N. peace-keepers" were primarily a U.S. military force operating behind the facade of a U.N. multi-national force

4. President Clinton and the War Powers Act

a. Intervention into the Civil War in Somalia

During the first year of the Presidency of William J. Clinton, the Somalia operation dragged on and America's participation in the operation continued. In order to divert the attention of Congress and the American public away from Somalia and the involvement of U.S. troops in the hostilities (and thereby reduce the domestic political risks to the Clinton Presidency and the Democratic Party), President Clinton decided on a substantial reduction of the U.S. military presence in Somalia, envisioning transformation of the U.N.-authorized military force deployed there into a force with the appearance of a more "international" and "Third World" composition. By May 4, 1993, the American component no longer comprised the bulk of the U.N. force. Most of the nearly 30,000 well-trained and well-organized U.S. troops, along with most of their helicopters, tanks and armored personnel carriers, had been withdrawn from Somalia and this formidable American component had been replaced by a considerably less than formidable contingent of Pakistani troops, who numbered no more than 4,000, were poorly trained and poorly organized, and had no tanks. The only U.S. military personnel and equipment remaining available for U.N. peacekeeping purposes in Somalia was a small "Quick Reaction Force," deployed in Mogadishu, under U.S. (rather than U.N.) command and control, and intended to function as a reserve, or back-up, force, going into action on those occasions when the U.N. peacekeepers met a degree of armed resistance they could not handle on their own and, therefore, were in genuine need of U.S. military assistance.

In the meantime, after consultations between the Clinton Presidency and U.N. Secretary- General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (but not between President Clinton and the U.S. Congress), an important policy decision had been made and was in the process of being carried out. This was the decision to transform the Somalia operation from a limited intervention with a humanitarian objective (distributing food to the starving Somalis) into an overly ambitious and totally unrealistic plan for "nation-building"--a plan for forcibly imposing national unity on the Somali population, against the wishes of the warring clans and political factions in Somalia. National unity was to be imposed on a people determined to remain divided into warring clans and political factions bent on annihilating one another.

The enlarged mission for the U.N. peacekeepers in Somalia, coupled with the premature withdrawal of the formidable contingent of experienced U.S. troops and its replacement with a not-so-formidable Pakistani contingent ill-prepared for the function it was expected to perform, had disastrous consequences. General Mohammed Farah Aidid, leader of the United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance (USC/SNA) and one of the two principal warlords in Somalia, very quickly realized that the U.N. military force had been critically weakened. General Aidid immediately challenged the authority of the U.N. peacekeepers by sending his armed militia into the streets of Mogadishu to commit acts of violence against U.N. peacekeeping personnel and humanitarian aid workers. In resorting to these guerrilla-warfare tactics, Aidid deliberately set out to disrupt the delivery of humanitarian aid supplies and to thwart the attempt to bring peace, stability, and unity to Somalia.

On June 5, 1993, in a series of attacks by General Aidid's militia on U.N. peacekeepers in south Magadishu, 25 Pakistani soldiers were killed, 10 went missing in action, and 54 were wounded. The bodies of some of the Pakistani dead were dismembered and skinned. Many of the attacking Somali militiamen sought to deter return gunfire by using unarmed women and children as shields.

In response to the events occurring on June 5, U.N. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, under U.N. Resolution 814, obtained authorization to "take all necessary measures against those responsible for the armed attacks and for publicly inciting them, including their arrest and detention for prosecution, trial, and punishment." Boutros-Ghali, with the approval and support of President Clinton, gave the U.N. military force in Somalia the added task of hunting down and apprehending Aidid and others responsible for the June 5 militia attacks on U.N. military personnel.

Parallel to its efforts to locate and capture Aidid and his top lieutenants, the U.N. peacekeeping force continued its coercive disarmament operations, which had come to mean primarily an endeavor to forcibly disarm the USC/SNA. General Aidid's militia put up a strong and determined resistance to the U.N. peacekeepers' disarmament operations as well as their efforts to find and seize Aidid. Armed conflict between the U.N. troops and the USC/SNA militia continued. As U.N. troops, led by U.S. helicopters redeployed to Somalia, attacked the militia's weapons depots, the militia fought back, firing at U.N. peacekeepers and U.S. helicopters and slaughtering Somali civilians working in the employ of U.N. entities in Somalia. Throughout the remainder of 1993, the USC/SNA militia conducted mortar attacks on U.N. compounds nearly every night, less frequently launched all-out assaults on U.N. compounds, subjected U.N. military and civilian personnel to random sniper fire, used such anti-personnel devices as mines and command-detonated explosives, utilized rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) to hit and bring down helicopters, and equipped children with grenades and directed them to go to the gates of U.N. compounds, where they unknowingly blew themselves up and killed or severely wounded any U.N. personnel within close range.

U.N. efforts to disarm the USC/SNA and capture General Aidid met with one failure after another. For the U.N. peacekeeping force to accomplish the mission of subduing and disarming the USC/SNA, the U.S. Quick Reaction Force deployed in Mogadishu needed to be substantially reinforced and then assigned the central role in the disarmament operations. President Clinton, however, delayed taking the necessary actions. During the greater part of the Summer of 1993, Clinton, more concerned with preventing U.S. involvement in Somalia from drawing media and voter attention, declined to augment the Quick Reaction Force to the level recommended by his military and foreign-policy advisers. Success of the mission continued to depend upon the performance of ill-prepared and unreliable troops from Pakistan and other Third World nations.

As regards the task of locating and seizing General Aidid, the Quick Reaction Force was even less capable of accomplishing that mission. What was needed was the U.S. Army's Special Forces Operational Detachment D, the elite, super-secret "Delta Force"--a military unit specializing in covert operations, a commando unit well-trained and well-prepared to employ the tactics essential to accomplishment of the "snatch-and-grab" mission. Ever since the June 5 militia attacks on the U.N. peacekeepers, U.S. Marine General Jonathan Howe, the U.N. Secretary-General's Special Representative in Somalia (officially appointed by Boutros-Ghali but, in reality, handpicked by President Clinton) and charged with responsibility for managing the U.N. peacekeeping mission in that country, had been pushing for deployment of the Delta Force to Somalia, thinking that the unit could pull off an easy and bloodless arrest of Aidid. Supporting General Howe in his repeated requests for the Delta Force were: (1) Medeleine K. Albright, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations; (2) Warren M. Christopher, U.S. Secretary of State; and Robert Gosende, U.S. Envoy to Somalia. As the Somali conflict became increasingly messy, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) came to support Howe's call for use of the Delta Force. So did President Clinton's National Security Adviser (Anthony Lake) and the Deputy to the National Security Adviser (Samuel R. Berger).

On August 8, a remote-controlled land mine, detonated by a Somali spotter, killed four U.S. Army MPs and then, on August 22, the same type of device was used to wound seven American soldiers and destroy their vehicle. These August attacks constituted the last straw. Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin L. Powell, until then an opponent of using the Delta Force in the Somalia conflict, was suddenly converted into a supporter of the proposal. On August 22, General Powell recommended to the President that he dispatch the Delta Force commandos and other U.S. Army Special Forces to Somalia. Clinton readily agreed and, that evening, the following military units were on their way to Somalia: (1) Special Forces Operational Detachment D, from Fort Bragg, North Carolina; (2) a helicopter detachment of the 160th. Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Nightstalkers), from Fort Campbell, Kentucky; and (3) Company B and a Command and Control Element of the 3rd. Battalion, 75th. Ranger Regiment, from Fort Benning, Georgia. Once these units reached their destination, they were to operate in coordination with a CIA team which had arrived in Somalia more than a month earlier. Their mission, of course, was to arrest General Aidid and his top lieutenants, destroy the command structure of the USC/SNA militia, and put Aidid and his faction out of business. Aidid, once he had been captured, was to be taken to an offshore location, where he would be charged with murder and forced to stand trial on the charges in an international court comprised of African judges.

The U.S. Special Operations forces, sent by the President to Somalia to accomplish the foregoing mission, were to operate under U.S.command and control--not under U.N. command and control.

Within days of the clandestine deployment of Rangers, Nightstalkers, and Delta Force commandos to Somalia, there were clear indications that President Clinton had adopted and was about to implement a new and tougher policy, as regards General Aidid and the USC/SNA militia. On August 27, five days after the secret deployment of the Special Operations team, U.S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, speaking for the President, delivered a major public speech on American military and foreign policy, declaring that U.S. military forces would remain in Somalia until Aidid's militia had been disarmed, the acts of terrorism and violence had ended, and there had been created a new and trustworthy Somali police force possessing the will as well as the ability to maintain law and order throughout the country. Aspin's speech sounded very much like an announcement that the U.S. Government had plans for a longterm, massive American military presence in Somalia.

Almost immediately, the new Somalia policy of the Clinton Presidency was subjected to severe criticism in Congress. Most conspicuous was the criticism emanating from Democratic Senator Robert C. Byrd, who, at the time, was Chairman of the Senate Committee on Appropriations and, in that capacity, was one of the more important and influential leaders of the Democratic majority in the Senate. Senator Byrd promised that he would do everything within his power to prevent congressional funding of the enlarged U.S. mission in Somalia. He asserted that the mission should--

      "either be specifically endorsed by Congress
      or we should pack up and go home.  My vote
      is for the latter."  [Quoted in Patrick J.
      Sloyan, "Hunting Down Aidid:  Why Clinton
      Changed Mind," NEWSDAY (December 6, 1993),
      p. 2.]

Keep in mind that Congress and the general American public were, at the time, unaware that President Clinton had, on August 22, sent Special Operations units of the U.S. Army to Somalia, with the assigned task of locating and seizing General Aidid and spiriting him offshore to face murder charges.

Once the Special Operations team had arrived in Somalia and had gotten up and running, it made seven very risky attempts to find and apprehend Aidid, each of these attempts ending in failure. On August 30, when U.S. Army Rangers and Delta Force commandos used helicopters and helicopter ropes to swoop down on designated targets in south Mogadishu, this first attempt of the Special Operations team to "snatch and grab" Somalia's top warlord went badly. The key location targeted for assault, seizure, and arrest of its occupants turned out to be an empty building. Among the personnel arrested at another important location, there was one man who physically resembled Aidid, but subsequently was found to be an employee of the U.N. Relief Mission.

As regards the first six attempts, U.S. military commanders in Somalia contended that the failure of the efforts was due to poor intelligence--i.e., an insufficient supply of relevant information and an overabundance of misinformation. From the very beginning of the endeavor, General Howe had warned that, in the absence of adequate and reliable intelligence, the Special Operations team would not be able to accomplish its mission. Howe was well aware that there had been a substantial decrease in U.S. and U.N. military intelligence capability after most of the American combat troops had, on the orders of President Clinton, pulled out of Somalia in late March and early May, 1993.

On October 3, 1993, when the Special Operations team made its seventh and final attempt to accomplish its mission, the effort ended in disaster--disaster in international geopolitical terms as well as in domestic American political terms. The goal of the October 3 operation, launched by the Rangers in south Mogadishu, was to arrest a number of key aides of General Aidid--men who were suspected of direct involvement in or collusion with those directly involved in the armed attacks on U.N. personnel and installations during June, July, and August. While the Rangers managed to capture two of Aidid's key aides and 22 other suspects, two U.S. helicopters were shot down, 18 American soldiers killed, 75 others wounded, and one helicopter pilot captured. Dead Rangers were stripped of their uniforms and their bodies dragged through the streets of south Mogadishu. Scenes of these outrageous acts of barbarism were broadcast by television networks and stations throughout the world. The secrecy of the Special Operations team and its mission in Somalia had been shattered in a most shocking and revolting manner.