POLITICAL EDUCATION, CONSERVATIVE ANALYSIS
POLITICS, SOCIETY, & THE SOVEREIGN STATE
Website of Dr. Almon Leroy Way, Jr.
PART I: CONTEXT, FINDINGS, & CONCLUSIONS
December 10, 2002
Finding 2: During the Spring and Summer of 2001, the Intelligence Community experi- enced a significant increase in information indicating that bin Ladin and al-Qa’ida in- tended to strike against U.S. interests in the very near future.
Finding 3: Beginning in 1998 and continuing into the Summer of 2001, the Intelligence Community received a modest, but relatively steady, stream of intelligence reporting that indicated the possibility of terrorist attacks within the United States. Nonetheless, testimony and interviews confirm that it was the general view of the Intelligence Commu- nity, in the spring and summer of 2001, that the threatened bin Ladin attacks would most likely occur against U.S. interests overseas, despite indications of plans and intentions to attack in the domestic United States
Finding 4: From at least 1994, and continuing into the summer of 2001, theIntelligence Community received information indicating that terrorists were contemplating, among other means of attack, the use of aircraft as weapons. This information did not stimulate any specific Intelligence Community assessment of, or collective U.S. government reaction to, this form of threat.
Finding 5: Although relevant information that is signifi- cant in retrospect regarding the attacks was available to the Intelligence Community prior to September 11, 2001, the Intelligence Community too often failed to focus on that information and consider and appreciate its collective significance in terms of a probable terrorist attack. Neither did the Intelligence Community demonstrate sufficient initiative in coming to grips with the new transnational threats. Some significant pieces of information in the vast stream of data being collected were overlooked, some were not recognized as potentially signifi- cant at the time and therefore not disseminated, and some required additional action on the part of foreign governments before a direct connection to the hijackers could have been established.For all those reasons, the Intelligence Community failed to fully capitalize on available, and potentially important, information. The sub-findings below identify each category of this information.
Finding 5a: During 1999, the National Security Agency obtained a number of communi- cations–none of which included specific detail regarding the time, place or nature of the September 11 attacks--connecting individuals to terrorism who were identified, after September 11, 2001, as participants in the attacks that occurred on that day.
Finding 5b: The Intelligence Community acquired additional, and highly significant, information regarding Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi in early 2000. Critical parts of the information concerning al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi lay dormant within the Intelligence Community for as long as eighteen months, at the very time when plans for the September 11 attacks were proceeding. The CIA missed repeated opportunities to act based on information in its possession that these two bin Ladin-associated terrorists were traveling to the United States, and to add their names to watchlists.
Finding 5c: In January, 2000, after the meeting of al-Qa’ida operatives in Malaysia, Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi entered the United States. Thereafter, the In- telligence Community obtained information indicating that an individual named “Khaled” at an unknown location had contacted a suspected terroristfacility in the Middle East. The Intelligence Community reported some of this information but did not report all of it. Some of it was not reported because it was deemed not terrorist-related. It was not until after September 11, 2001, that the Intelligence Community determined that these con- tacts had been made by future hijacker Khalid al-Mihdhar while he was living within the domestic United States.
Finding 5d: [Redacted for national security reasons.]
Finding 5e: On July 10, 2001, a Phoenix FBI field office agent sent an “Electronic Com- munication” to 4 individuals in the Radical
Fundamentalist Unit (RFU) and two people in the Osama bin Ladin Unit (OBLU, or UBLU) at FBI headquarters, and to two agents on International Terrorism squads in the New York Field Office. In the communication, the agent expressed his concerns, based on his first-hand knowledge, that there was a coordinated effort underway by bin Ladin to send students to the United States for civil aviation-related training He noted that there was an “inordinate number of individuals of investigative interest” participating in this type of training in Arizona and expressed his suspicion that this was an effort to establish a cadre of individuals in civil aviation who would conduct future terrorist activity. The Phoenix EC requested that FBI Headquar- ters consider implementing four recommendations:
However, the FBI headquarters personnel did not take the action requested by the Phoenix agent prior to September 11, 2001. The
communication generated little or no interest at either FBI Headquarters or the FBI’s New York field office.
Finding 5f: In August, 2001, the FBI’s Minneapolis field office, in conjunction with the INS, detained Zacarias Moussaoui, a French national who had enrolled in flight training in Minnesota, because FBI agents there suspected that Moussaoui was involved in a hi- jacking plot. FBI Headquarters attorneys determined that there was not probable cause to obtain a court order to search Moussaoui’s belongings under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). However, personnel at FBI Headquarters, including the Radical Fundamentalist Unit and the National Security Law Unit, as well as agents in the Minne- apolis field office, misunderstood the legal standard for obtaining an order under FISA. Therefore, FBI Minneapolis field office personnel wasted valuable investigative re- sources trying to connect the Chechen rebels to al-Qa’ida. Finally, no one at the FBI apparently connected the Moussaoui investigation with the heightened threat environ- ment in the Summer of 2001, the Phoenix communication, or the entry of al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi into the United States
Finding 5g: The Joint Inquiry confirmed that at least some of the hijackers were not as isolated during their time in the United States as
has been previously suggested. Rather, they maintained a number of contacts both in the United States and abroad during this time period. Some of those contacts were with individuals who were known to the FBI, through either past or, at the time, ongoing FBI inquiries and investigations. Although it is not known to what extent any of these contacts in the United States were aware of the plot, it is now clear that they did provide at least some of the hijackers with substantial assistance while they were living in this country.
Finding 5h: Since 1995, the CIA had been aware of a radical Islamic presence in Germa- ny, including individuals with connections to Osama bin Ladin. Prior to September 11, 2001, the CIA had unsuccessfully sought additional information on individuals who have now been identified as associates of some of the hijackers.
Finding 5i: Prior to September 11, the Intelligence Community had information linking Khalid Shaykh Mohammed (KSM), now recognized by the Intelligence Community as the mastermind of the attacks, to bin Ladin, to terrorist plans to use aircraft as weapons, and to terrorist activity in the United States. The Intelligence Community, however, relegated Khalid Shaykh Mohammed (KSM) to rendition target status following his 1996 indictment in connection with the Bojinka Plot and, as a result, focused primarily on his location, rather than his activities and place in the
al-Qa’ida hierarchy. The Intelli- gence Community also did not recognize the significance of reporting in June, 2001, con- cerning KSM’s active role in sending terrorists to the United States, or the facilitation of their activities upon arriving in the United States. Intelligence collection efforts were not targeted on information about KSM that might have helped better understand al- Qa’ida’s plans and intentions, and KSM’s role in the September 11 attacks was a surprise to the Intelligence Community.
Finding 5j: In the period from September 8 to September 10, 2001, the National Security Agency (NSA) intercepted, but did not translate or disseminate until after September 11, some communications that indicated possible impending terrorist activity.
In short, for a variety of reasons, the Intelligence Community failed to capitalize on both the individual and collective significance of available information that appears relevant to the events of September 11. As a result, the Intelligence Community missed oppor- tunities to disrupt the September 11 plot by denying entry to or detaining would-be hi- jackers; to at least try to unravel the plot through surveillance and other investigative work within the United States; and, finally, to generate a heightened state of alert and thus harden the homeland against attack.
No one will ever know what might have happened had more connections been drawn between these disparate pieces of information. We will never definitively know to what extent the Intelligence Community would have been able and willing to exploit fully all the opportunities that may
have emerged. The important point is that the Intelligence Community, for a variety of reasons, did not bring together and fully appreciate a
range of information that could have greatly enhanced its chances of uncovering and prevent- ing Osama bin Ladin’s plan to attack the United States on September 11, 2001.
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INTEREST IN THE UNITED STATES
B. SYSTEMIC FINDINGS
Our review of the events surrounding September 11 has revealed a number of systemic weaknesses that hindered the Intelligence Community’s
coun- terterrorism efforts before September 11. If not addressed, these weaknesses will continue to undercut U.S. counterterrorist efforts In order to minimize the possibility of attacks like September 11 in the future, effective solutions to those problems need to be developed and fully imple- mented as soon as possible.
Finding 1: Prior to September 11, the Intelligence Community was neither well organized nor equipped, and did not adequately adapt, to meet the challenge posed by global terrorists focused on targets within the domestic United States. Serious gaps existed between the intelligence collection coverage provided by U.S. foreign intelligence and U.S. domestic intelligence capabilities. The U.S. foreign intelligence agencies paid inadequate attention to the potential for a domestic attack. The CIA’s failure to watchlist suspected terrorists aggressively reflected a lack of emphasis on a process designed to protect the homeland from the terrorist threat. As a result, CIA employees failed to watchlist al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi. At home, the counterterrorism effort suffered from the lack of an effective domestic intelligence capability. The FBI was unable to identify and monitor effectively the extent of activity by al-Qa’ida and other international terrorist groups operating in the United States. Taken together, these problems greatly exacerbated the nation’s vulnerability to an increasingly dangerous and immediate international terrorist threat inside the United States.
Finding 2: Prior to September 11, 2001, neither the U.S. government as a whole nor the Intelligence Community had a comprehensive counterterrorist strategy for combating the threat posed by Osama bin Ladin. Furthermore, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was either unwilling or unable to marshal the full range of Intelligence Community resources necessary to combat the growing threat to the United States.
Finding 3: Between the end of the Cold War and September 11, 2001, overall Intelli- gence Community funding fell or remained even in constant dollars, while funding for the Intelligence Community’s counterterrorism efforts increased considerably. Despite those increases, the accumulation of intelligence priorities, a burdensome requirements process, the overall decline in Intelligence Intelligence Community funding, and reliance on supplemental appropriations made it difficult to allocate Intelligence Community resources effectively against an evolving terrorist threat. Inefficiencies in the resource and requirements process were compounded by problems in Intelligence Community budgeting practices and procedures.
Finding 4: While technology remains one of this nation’s greatest advantages, it has not been fully and most effectively applied in support of U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Persistent problems in this area included a lack of collaboration between Intelligence Community agencies, a reluctance to develop and implement new technical capabilities aggressively, the FBI’s reliance on outdated and insufficient technical systems, and the absence of a central counterterrorism database.
Finding 5: Prior to September 11, the Intelligence Community’s understanding of al-Qa’ida was hampered by insufficient analytic focus and quality, particularly in terms of strategic analysis. Analysis and analysts were not always used effectively because of the perception in some quarters of the Intelligence Community that they were less important to agency counterterrorism missions than were operations personnel. The quality of counterterrorism analysis was inconsistent, and many analysts were inexperienced, unqualified, under-trained, and without access to critical information. As a result, there was a dearth of creative, aggressive analysis targeting bin Ladin and a persistent ina- bility to comprehend the collective significance of individual pieces of intelligence. These analytic deficiencies seriously undercut the ability of U.S. policymakers to understand the full nature of the threat, and to make fully informed decisions.
Finding 6: Prior to September 11, the Intelligence Community was not prepared to han- dle the challenge it faced in translating the volumes of foreign language counterterror- ism intelligence it collected. Agencies within the Intelligence Community experienced backlogs in material awaiting translation, a shortage of language specialists and lan- guage-qualified field officers, and a readiness level of only 30% in the most critical terrorism-related languages.
Finding 7: Prior to September 11, the Intelligence Community’s ability to produce sig- nificant and timely signals intelligence on counterterrorism was limited by NSA’s failure to address modem communications technology aggressively, continuing conflict between Intelligence Community agencies, NSA’s cautious approach to any collection of intelli- gence relating to activities in the United States, and insufficient collaboration between NSA and the FBI regarding the potential for terrorist attacks within the United States.
Finding 8: The continuing erosion of NSA’s program management expertise and experi- ence has hindered its contribution to the fight against terrorism. NSA continues to have mixed results in providing timely technical solutions to modern intelligence collection, analysis, and information sharing problems.
Finding 9: The U.S. government does not presently bring together in one place all ter- rorism-related information from all sources. While the Counterterrorist Center (CTC) does manage overseas operations and has access to most Intelligence Community information, it does not collect terrorism-related information from all sources, domestic and foreign. Within the Intelligence Community, agencies did not adequately share relevant counterterrorism information, prior to September 11. This breakdown in communications was the result of a number of factors, including differences in the agencies’ missions, legal authorities and cultures.Information was not sufficiently shared, not only between different Intelligence Community agencies, but also within individual agencies, and between the intelligence and the law enforcement agencies.
Finding 10: Serious problems in information sharing also persisted, prior to September 11, between the Intelligence Community and relevant non-Intelligence Community agencies. This included other federal agencies as well as state and local authorities. This lack of communication and collaboration deprived those other entities, as well as the Intelligence Community, of access to potentially valuable information in the “war” against bin Ladin. The Inquiry’s focus on the Intelligence Community limited the extent to which it explored these issues, and this is an area that should be reviewed further.
Finding 11: Prior to September 11, 2001, the Intelligence Community did not effectively develop and use human sources to penetrate the al-Qa’ida inner circle. This lack of re- liable and knowledgeable human sources significantly limited the Intelligence Communi- ty’s ability to acquire intelligence that could be acted upon before the September 11 attacks. In part, at least, the lack of unilateral (i.e., U.S.-recruited) counterterrorism sources was a product of an excessive reliance on foreign liaison services.
Finding 12: During the Summer of 2001, when the Intelligence Community was bracing for an imminent al-Qa’ida attack, difficulties with FBI applications for Foreign Intelli- gence Surveillance Act (FISA) surveillance and the FISA process led to a diminished level of coverage of suspected al-Qa’ida operatives in the United States. The effect of these difficulties was compounded by the perception that spread among FBI personnel at Headquarters and the field offices that the FISA process was lengthy and fraught with peril.
Finding 13: [Redacted for national security reasons]
Finding 14: [Redacted for national security reasons]
Finding 15: The Intelligence Community depended heavily on foreign intelligence and law enforcement services for the collection of counterterrorism intelligence and the conduct of other counterterrorism activities. The results were mixed in terms of productive intelligence, reflecting vast differences in the ability and willingness of the various foreign services to target the bin Ladin and al-Qa’ida network. Intelligence Community agencies sometimes failed to coordinate their relationships with foreign services adequately, either within the Intelligence Community or with broader U.S. government liaison and foreign policy efforts. This reliance on foreign liaison services also resulted in a lack of focus on the development of unilateral human sources.
Finding 16: The activities of the September 11 hijackers in the United States appear to have been financed, in large part, from monies sent to them from abroad. Prior to September 11, there was no coordinated U.S. government-wide strategy, and reluctance in some parts of the U.S. government, to track terrorist funding and close down their financial support networks. As a result, the U.S. Government was unable to disrupt financial support for Osama bin Ladin’s terrorist activities effectively.
Finding 18: Between 1996 and September 2001, the counterterrorism strategy adopted by the U. S. government did not succeed in eliminating Afghanistan as a sanctuary and training ground for Osama bin Ladin’s terrorist network. A range of instruments was used to counter al-Qa’ida, with law enforcement often emerging as a leading tool because other means were deemed not to be feasible or failed to produce results. While generating numerous successful prosecutions, law enforcement efforts were not adequate by themselves to target or eliminate bin Ladin’s sanctuary. While the United States persisted in observing the rule of law and accepted norms of international behavior, Bin Ladin and al-Qa’ida recognized no rules and thrived in the safehaven provided by Afghanistan.
Finding 19: Prior to September 11, the Intelligence Community and the U.S.government labored to prevent attacks by Osama bin Ladin and his terrorist network against the United States, but largely without the benefit of an alert, mobilized and committed American public Despite intelligence information on the immediacy of the threat level in the Spring and Summer of 2001, the assumption prevailed in the U.S. government that attacks of the magnitude of September 11 could not happen here. As a result, there was insufficient effort to alert the American public to the reality and gravity of the threat