THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATIVE, USA
An Online Journal of Political Commentary & Analysis
Volume X, Issue # 179, July 21, 2008
Dr. Almon Leroy Way, Jr., Editor
Government Committed to & Acting in Accord with Conservative Principles
Ensures a Nation's Strength, Progress, & Prosperity
MY PENTAGON YEARS: BRIEFING BY DOUGLAS J. FEITH
A SUMMARY ACCOUNT OF THE BRIEFING
By Mimi Stillman
U.S. FOREIGN & MILITARY POLICY FORMULATION DURING THE INITIAL STAGES OF THE FOURTH WORLD WAR:
SOME OF THE THOUGHTS DEVELOPED BY U.S. POLICYMAKERS IN THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF THE SEPTEMBER 11,
2001, ISLAMIST TERROR ATTACK ON THE U.S.A. -- DEVELOPMENT OF A DEFENSIVE & OFFENSIVE STRATEGY FOR THE WAR
ON ISLAMIST TERRORISM -- LAYING THE FOUNDATION FOR AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY IN THE WAR AGAINST
THE WORLDWIDE ISLAMIST TERROR NETWORK & THE STATES SUPPORTING THE NETWORK -- THE AL-QA'IDA-IRAQ
CONNECTION & THE CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE & THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
-- HOW THE CIA & THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLITICIZED INTELLIGENCE, LEAKED INFORMATION, SHAPED THE
AMERICAN PUBLIC'S CONCEPTION OF THE IRAQ WAR, & UNDERMINED POPULAR SUPPORT FOR THE WAR -- A VERY COSTLY
ERROR IN IRAQ -- THE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM IN IRAQ
FULL STORY:
The Middle East Forum presented Douglas J. Feith in a discussion of his new book, War and Decision: Inside the
Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism (HarperCollins, 2008), a chronicle of his experiences as Undersecretary of
Defense for Policy in the Bush administration between 2001 and 2005. In this position, he formulated policy through
critical stages of the wars in Iraq and against radical Islam.
Feith began by articulating some of the thoughts developed by policymakers in the immediate aftermath of the 9-11
attack. "In my book, I'm looking at the development of a strategy for the war on terrorism, and if one is going to
understand that it is useful to go back and capture the frame of mind that we had as a country, and specifically that the
policy makers had within the administration right after the attack."
Feith pointed out that President Bush's description of the situation right after 9-11 as a "war" was a significant break
with previous U.S. policy. The standard response, for decades, was to have the FBI arrest the perpetrators, prosecute,
and punish them. In his book, Feith chronicles how the administration crafted a strategy to fight a war against an
amorphous enemy that was not only hard to locate, but hard to define. His thesis is that the Bush administration
"developed a proper apprehension of the threat and a good strategy," and that "the administration has done a better
job of conceiving the strategy and executing it than talking about it." Indeed, the administration's failure was in
explaining and justifying this strategy to America and the world, which is one of several major criticisms of the
administration Feith makes in his book.
He described Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's approach to problematic issues, which was to ask what major
strategic thoughts should guide deliberations on the issue. Feith outlined the five major strategic thoughts that were
developed right after 9-11. These thoughts, he pointed out, laid the foundation for American national security policy
for the war on terrorism.
The U.S. government had to do something. The immediate instinct of some officials, particularly in the State Department
and the Central Intelligence Agency, was to do what had been done in the past: find the people responsible and punish
them. President Bush, Vice President Cheney, and Rumsfeld argued that the government's obligation to the American
people was not simply retaliation but prevention of the next attack; essentially, a defense strategy.
The enemy in the war is a network, and while the next attack could come from Al-Qa'ida, it could also come from other
parts of the global jihadist network. The network includes not only the terrorist groups but their state supporters. The
different elements of the network, groups and states, maintain various types of connections: financial, ideological,
logistical, operational. Thus, severing these connections became part of American strategy.
9-11 was a departure from most previous instances of terrorism, in that "they were not using terrorism as political theater,"
to garner attention and sympathy for their cause, but to wreak mass destruction. Preventing terrorists from getting
weapons of mass destruction became a key part of U.S. strategy. Feith noted how the "leading state supporters are also
the leading countries of WMD proliferation concern, and that coincidence was a fact of strategic importance."
The purpose of our national security policy is not simply to protect people and territory, but to secure our constitutional
system, our civil liberties, and the open nature of our society. Feith discussed how the President, in his first major speech
to Congress after 9-11, stated that the stakes in the war on terrorism could not be greater because terrorism threatens our
way of life.
The U.S.A. cannot rely on a defensive strategy, because it would have to curtail civil liberties in the process of trying to
protect every possible target at home. Feith explained how this thinking led to an offensive strategy of hitting the
terrorists abroad.
Feith talked about how his book contradicts much of the accepted narrative about the administration's decision to go to
war in Iraq, such as the notion that President Bush came into office determined to go to war no matter what, and the
allegation that the U.S. didn't plan for post-Saddam Iraq.
He discussed his methodology in War and Decision, of using extensive citations, quotations from previously
classified documents, and his own notes from meetings of the National Security Council, using only exact quotations of
people's remarks. He included 140 pages of references and made documents available at www.WarAndDecision.com
to support his challenge to the conventional, but, according to Feith, deeply flawed account of the creation of American
strategy. His goal was to create an account that is "civil, useful, and accurate," meticulously relying on the
contemporaneous written record.
The politicization of intelligence is an important theme in Feith's book. The controversy between the Defense Department
and the CIA over the Al-Qa'ida-Iraq connection was not a clash in which the former argued for a relationship and the latter
against. Rather, "it was an argument about methodology and professionalism." The problem was that the State Department
and the CIA leaked information to the press, a tactic to which the Defense Department did not resort. However, Feith notes,
"we didn't talk to the press very much, which was foolish," and so the State Department-CIA team shaped the public's
conception.
Another of his major topics, said Feith, is the postwar plan for political transition in post-Saddam Iraq, a plan which he
presents for "the first time anywhere." The Defense Department aimed for a short American stay in Iraq, to put Iraqis in
control of government. This plan, approved by the President, was built on American experience in Afghanistan, where there
was no occupation government and no insurgency as in Iraq. Feith analyzes how the plan was undone. He calls the
14-month occupation government of Iraq by the United States a "very costly error," which left a large-scale insurgency in
its wake.
When questioned about the future of Iraq, Feith referred to recent positive signs in the war, such as the Sunni tribal leaders'
180-degree switch from supporting Al-Qa'ida to allying with the U.S.A., the ceasefire declared by Shiite leader Muqtada
al-Sadr, the substantial improvement in the operations capabilities of the Iraqi army and police, and political developments,
including power and revenue sharing, as well as some legislative progress.
He criticized the administration's redefinition of the U.S. goal in Iraq, beginning in 2003, from reducing threats to promoting
democracy, as a major error which set the standard of success unreasonably high and almost led Congress to pull out of the
war in the Summer of 2007. The solution in Iraq, according to Feith, is to "contain the magnitude of the problems, and
increase the capacity of the Iraqis to manage their own problems."
LINKS TO RELATED TOPICS:
The Middle East & the Problem of Iraq
Page Two
Page One
The Problem of Rogue States:
Iraq as a Case History
National Strategy for Victory in Iraq
American Foreign Policy -- The Middle East
Middle East -- Arabs, Arab States,
& Their Middle Eastern Neighbors
Islamism & Jihadism -- The Threat of Radical Islam
Page Three
Page Two
Page One
International Politics & World Disorder:
War & Peace in the Real World
Page Two
Page One
Islamist Terrorist Attacks on the U.S.A.
Osama bin Laden & the Islamist Declaration of War
Against the U.S.A. & Western Civilization
Islamist International Terrorism &
U.S. Intelligence Agencies
Counterterrorism & U.S. National Security
U.S. National Security Strategy
Douglas J. Feith was Undersecretary of Defense for Policy in the Bush administration from 2001 to 2005, and is a Professor
of National Security Policy at Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. He previously served in several capacities in the
Reagan administration. His articles on foreign and defense affairs have appeared in the Middle East Quarterly, as
well as in The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, The Washington Post, and Commentary.
He was educated at Georgetown University Law Center (J.D., magna cum laude, 1978) and Harvard University (A.B., magna
cum laude, 1975).
The foregoing summary account by Mimi Stillman was originally published as a MEF Wire (May 8, 2008) and can be
found on the Internet website maintained by the Middle East Forum, a foreign policy think tank which seeks to define and
promote American interests in the Middle East, defining U.S. interests to include fighting radical Islam, working for
Palestinian Arab acceptance of the State of Israel, improving the management of U.S. efforts to promote constitutional
democracy in the Middle East, reducing America's energy dependence on the Middle East, more robustly asserting U.S.
interests vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia, and countering the Iranian threat.
(Article URL: http://www.meforum.org/article/1934)
Republished with Permission of the Middle East Forum
Reprinted from the Middle East Forum News
mefnews@meforum.org (MEF NEWS)
July 21, 2008
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THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATIVE, USA
An Online Journal of Political Commentary & Analysis
Dr. Almon Leroy Way, Jr., Editor
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