THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATIVE, USA
An Online Journal of Political Commentary & Analysis
Volume XIII, Issue # 229, September 14, 2011
Dr. Almon Leroy Way, Jr., Editor
Government Committed to & Acting in Accord with Conservative Principles
Ensures a Nation's Strength, Progress, & Prosperity
PANETTA VERSUS U.S. MILITARY ON IRAQ:
DEBATING THE WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN TROOPS
By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
THE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN IRAQ: SHOULD U.S. TROOPS BE KEPT IN IRAQ BEYOND THE ORIGINAL WITHDRAWAL
DEADLINE OF DECEMBER 31, 2011? THE VIEW OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE LEON PANETTA -- THE VIEW OF SENIOR U.S.
MILITARY FIGURES -- THE LATTER VIEW BASED ON FOUR LINES OF ARGUMENT THAT ULTIMATELY DO NOT STAND UP TO
SCRUTINY
FULL STORY:
As the original withdrawal deadline of December 31, 2011 under the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) edges ever closer
for U.S. troops in Iraq, reports have emerged that Defense Secretary Leon Panetta has come out in support of a plan that
would keep 3,000 to 4,000 American troops in the country beyond this year. Their sole purpose will be to provide training
for the Iraqi security forces.
On the other hand, senior military figures such as General Lloyd J. Austin III -- the senior American commander in Iraq --
would prefer to see a much larger and open-ended presence of around 14,000 to 18,000 U.S. troops. Such a view is based
on four lines of argument that ultimately do not stand up to scrutiny.
Generally, when U.S. military and think tanks argue for a significant indefinite presence of American forces, they highlight
concerns over Iranian influence, ethnic and sectarian tensions in Iraq's north, problems in forming an Iraqi government,
and conducting counterterrorism operations against groups like al-Qa'ida. However, even where these anxieties are valid,
it does not follow that a large U.S. military presence is the solution.
Iranian Influence: The presence of U.S. troops is supposedly the only thing that can prevent Iran from turning
Iraq into a subservient satellite state. Nevertheless, there are several problems with this claim. Although Nouri al-Maliki's
government maintains friendly economic and diplomatic ties with Tehran, political parties in Iraq that are perceived as
having pro-Iranian agendas do not win significant support even among the Shi'a population.
For example, the Supreme Islamic Council, which is probably Iran's staunchest ally in Iraq and changed its name from
"Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq" amid suspicions of being an Iranian agent, only won 20 seats out of 325
in Iraq's parliamentary elections in March, 2010.
One of the main reasons for this outcome is that the Shi'a clergy in Iraq generally reject the principle of velayat-e-faqih, or
"guardianship of the clerics," that forms the basis of Iran's system of government. The concern for the Iraqi Shi'a religious
authorities and the mainstream Shi'a parties (e.g. the Dawa party) is to maintain Shi'a dominance in internal Iraqi politics,
not to subordinate the nation to Iranian interests.
In any case, maintaining a large American military presence is only going to lead to continued Iranian support for the Shi'a
militant "Special Groups" (e.g. The Hezbollah Brigades) that receive financial aid and arms supplies from Tehran via
smuggling through Maysan province in the southeast. Owing to restrictions on movement, U.S. troops have become easy
targets for the Special Groups, which, in general, do not attack the Iraqi security forces, for good reason.
After all, when al-Maliki aimed to consolidate his power base in the period 2007-2008, he successfully used the Iraqi army
against the most powerful Shi'a militia at the time -- Muqtada al-Sadr's "Mahdi Army" -- in "Operation Charge of the
Knights" in the spring of 2008. The Mahdi Army was subsequently forced to disband. The Shi'a militants cannot afford to
cross swords with the central government again.
Ethnic & Sectarian Tensions in the North: This problem is indeed a real one, and, amid the debate on whether U.S.
troops should stay beyond the original SOFA deadline, Massoud Barzani -- President of the Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG) -- has urged Baghdad to sign an agreement with the United States to keep forces beyond 2011. The
reasoning is that American forces have helped to maintain peace between Arabs and Kurds in cities such as oil-rich Kirkuk,
which Jalal Talabani's party recently declared to be Kurdish and not subject to negotiation, even though the Iraqi
Constitution stipulates that a referendum should have been held on Kirkuk's status in 2007.
Nonetheless, the tensions are much more complicated, and go back to issues that are too deeply rooted to be resolved
through mediation by a U.S. military presence. Kirkuk is also home to a substantial number of Assyrian Christians and
Yezidis, both of whom have seen their political representatives (the Assyrian Democratic Movement and Yezidi Progress
Movement, respectively) marginalized by the KRG.
Concerning the Yezidis, the problem is that the Yezidis do not identify as Kurds but are not recognized by the KRG
Constitution as a separate ethnic group, while Assyrians have legitimate grievances that pre-date the U.S. invasion in 2003,
such as the fact that, in October, 2002, the KRG passed a resolution legalizing the confiscation of Assyrian land by
Peshmerga militiamen.
Thus, as analyst Joel Wing of Musings on Iraq points out, the joint patrols created by the United States have only
helped to maintain the tense status quo, not to alleviate the animosities between the various ethno-religious groups. Most
of these patrols have already been pulled out, with no noticeable change in the situation.
Breaking the Deadlock between Iraqi Politicians: It is argued that an extended U.S. presence can exert sufficient
pressure on Iraq's politicians to move beyond the stalemate in power-sharing and work towards forming a functioning
administration. Yet, this argument imputes too much power to the Americans in assuming that they are the decisive
game-changers. On the contrary, there is little evidence to support such a view.
After the elections in March, 2010, the root cause of the deadlock was the fact that al-Maliki remained intent on retaining
his position as Prime Minister, while Ayad Allawi's "al-Iraqiya" bloc, having won the largest single number of seats in the
parliament (91 seats as opposed to 89 for al-Maliki's "State of Law" bloc), continued to insist on its right to form a
government, even as al-Maliki forged a new coalition with the Sadrists. Some headway was made in December, 2010, when
Massoud Barzani convened the quarrelling factions in Arbil and forged a compromise that allowed al-Maliki to remain
Prime Minister for a second term, with a "Supreme Council for Strategic Policies" created to placate Allawi.
The United States had no influence in the creation of this compromise. To this day, the government has not been fully
formed, despite the American presence, for al-Maliki has gone back on many of the terms of the compromise, aiming now
to control the Defense Ministry, which was supposed to be awarded to Allawi's bloc.
Hence, only the final point remains regarding counterterrorism operations against al-Qa'ida and similar militant groups in
Iraq. Here, there is valid concern, as the springtime assault by Sunni insurgents on the provincial government buildings in
Tikrit still required a joint U.S.-Iraqi team to end the hostage crisis. Yet, this issue can be resolved by keeping a small,
residual U.S. force, as Panetta proposes, to provide further training for the Iraqi army, which continues to make progress
in morale and performance.
In short, the U.S. military must appreciate that most of Iraq's problems are challenges for Iraqis to overcome. A sustained,
large American presence has already aroused too much opposition from the Iraqi public and politicians to be a viable
option. In contrast, the much reduced military role favored by the White House and Panetta is far more tenable. If the aim
is to have good U.S.-Iraqi relations, the best approach is through the U.S. Embassy not keeping a large number of troops
in the country indefinitely.
LINKS TO RELATED TOPICS:
The Middle East & the Problem of Iraq
Page Two
Page One
The Problem of Rogue States:
Iraq as a Case History
American Foreign Policy -- The Middle East
Middle East -- Arabs, Arab States,
& Their Middle Eastern Neighbors
Islamism & Jihadism -- The Threat of Radical Islam
Page Three
Page Two
Page One
International Politics & World Disorder:
War, Peace, & Geopolitics in the Real World:
Foreign Affairs & U.S. National Security
Page Two
Page One
Islamist Terrorist Attacks on the U.S.A.
Osama bin Laden & the Islamist Declaration of War
Against the U.S.A. & Western Civilization
Islamist International Terrorism &
U.S. Intelligence Agencies
Counterterrorism & U.S. National Security
U.S. National Security Strategy
Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi is a student at Brasenose College, Oxford University, United Kingdom, and an intern at the
Middle East Forum.
The foregoing article by Al-Tamimi was originally published in The American Spectator, September 13, 2011, and
can be found on the Internet website maintained by the Middle East Forum, a foreign policy think tank which seeks to
define and promote American interests in the Middle East, defining U.S. interests to include fighting radical Islam,
working for Palestinian Arab acceptance of the State of Israel, improving the management of U.S. efforts to promote
constitutional democracy in the Middle East, reducing America's energy dependence on the Middle East, more robustly
asserting U.S. interests vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia, and countering the Iranian threat.
(URL: http://www.meforum.org/3040/panetta-vs-us- military-on-iraq)
Republished with Permission of the Middle East Forum
Reprinted from the Middle East Forum News
mefnews@meforum.org (MEF NEWS)
September 14, 2011
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