THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATIVE, USA
An Online Journal of Political Commentary & Analysis
Volume XIV, Issue # 129, June 19, 2012
Dr. Almon Leroy Way, Jr., Editor
Government Committed to & Acting in Accord with Conservative Principles
Ensures a Nation's Strength, Progress, & Prosperity
NO CONFIDENCE IN MALIKI?
By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
IRAQI POLITICS: MEDIA REPORTS OF A SUPPOSEDLY ERODING SUPPORT BASE FOR IRAQ'S PREMIER NOURI AL-MALIKI -- CURRENT TALK OF A
NO-CONFIDENCE VOTE AGAINST THE PREMIER -- AL-MALIKI FACING A COALITION OF FOUR MAJOR POLITICAL BLOCS IN A CONFRONTATION THAT COULD
BRING DOWN HIS GOVERNMENT & PRODUCE A NEW INTERIM PREMIER -- WHAT THE MEDIA REPORTS OVERLOOK: INTERNAL DIVISIONS AMONG THE
FACTIONS OF AL-MALIKI'S OPPONENTS -- CONCESSIONS MADE BY PRIME MINISTER AL-MALIKI -- THE UNLIKELYHOOD THAT A PROPOSED VOTE OF
NO-CONFIDENCE AGAINST THE PM COULD OBTAIN THE ABSOLUTE MAJORITY IN PARLIAMENT REQUIRED TO PASS THE MOTION
FULL STORY:
A flurry of media reports has pointed to a supposedly eroding support base for Iraq's Premier Nouri al-Maliki.
For example, an Associated Press piece last week entitled "Al-Maliki Quickly Losing Trust in Iraq," characterized the "root" of the current "stand-off" in Iraqi
politics as the "unresolved power struggle between Iraq's three main groups: the majority Shiites and minority Sunnis and Kurds."
The AP report added that "Al-Maliki, a Shiite, is under fire for breaking promises to share power with his partners in a unity government that includes the
Sunni-dominated Iraqiya bloc, Kurdish parties, and loyalists of radical Shiite cleric Muqtada Al-Sadr."
What the AP report and other news organizations have in mind is the current talk of a no-confidence vote against the Premier. The MPs who are raising this
prospect include members of Iraqiya -- led by Maliki's rival Ayad Allawi and featuring the Speaker of the Parliament Osama al-Nujaifi -- Massoud Barzani and
Muqtada Al-Sadr, both of whom are allies in Maliki's coalition.
On this basis, al-Arabiya writer Musa Keilani declared that Maliki "is facing an alliance of four major political blocs in a confrontation that could bring down
his government and produce a new interim prime minister."
However, these reports are generally based on sensationalist narratives, and, in the case of the AP, there is too much focus on the sectarian paradigm. None
of this is to deny that the four aforementioned figures in Iraqi politics have publicly criticized the Prime Minister and are toying with the idea of a no-confidence vote,
but the evidence suggests that Maliki is likely to emerge from this crisis unscathed.
To begin with, the media reports overlook internal divisions within the factions of Maliki's opponents. In particular, Iraqiya can only be called a political bloc in the
loosest sense of the word. It is a coalition that is torn by infighting, with constant reports of defections and splits, something that was partly the reason behind the
bloc's eventual decision at the end of January to end its boycott of the Parliament.
In addition, certain key members of Iraqiya such as the Deputy Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlaq, who in December issued overblown statements comparing Maliki to
Saddam, have effectively reconciled with Maliki.
This is not to say that the concerns over Maliki's behavior raised by members of the opposition are not justified. One can point to many signs of monopolization of
power in the Premier's hands. For example, he is still maintaining his hold on the positions of Defense and Interior Ministers that should have been granted to
Allawi's bloc as per the Arbil agreement forged by Barzani. Further, as Judith S. Yaphe points out, "As the U.S. military, in particular the U.S. Special Forces,
transferred responsibility to their Iraqi counterparts, Maliki created several special brigades within the army as counter-terrorism brigades and moved them out of the
Defense Ministry to report directly to him." None of this, however, makes Maliki the equivalent of Saddam.
Amid the talk of a no-confidence vote, Al-Sumaria News reported that several MPs from Iraqiya came out in support of the Premier, including Ibrahim
al-Muhairi -- an Arab MP from Kirkuk -- and Yassin al-Obeidi, also from Kirkuk. Meanwhile, the Iraqiya Hurra bloc, which in April split from the White Iraqi National
Movement (a bloc that defected from Iraqiya last year), has urged lawmakers from Ninawa, Salah ad-Din, and Diyala, among other places, to reject a no-confidence
vote against the Premier.
This Sunni Arab and Iraqiya support for Maliki -- undermining the AP's obsession with sectarianism -- exists for two reasons. First, these backers appreciate
Maliki's stance on dealing with the Kurds, towards whom Maliki has adopted a delicate and careful carrot-and-stick approach.
While the Premier has made a number of concessions (e.g. allowing the Peshmerga to annex the disputed Khanaqin district in Diyala province last year), he is also
perceived to have taken tough stances on issues like Kirkuk and what is considered to be illegal exportation of oil by the Kurdistan Regional Government, such that
he is seen by many Shi'a and Sunni Arabs as someone who will preserve Iraq's territorial integrity. This was the rationale given by the Iraqiya MPs who signed a
statement in support of maintaining Maliki's position as Premier.
Second, there is growing frustration among Iraqiya members with Allawi, who spends much of his time abroad and is detached not only from the situation on the
ground, but also from ordinary members and supporters of his own bloc.
As for Muqtada al-Sadr, it is certainly true that he has made numerous fiery statements against the Premier, declaring in Najaf that the move to withdraw confidence
from Maliki's government is an act of "divine will."
However, as is the case with Iraqiya, members of the Sadrist movement have come out in support of Maliki. This includes Grand Ayatollah Kazem al-Haeri, who,
viewed as a spiritual leader by many Sadrists, issued a fatwa against voting for secular candidates and implicitly forbidding withdrawal of support for Maliki.
Interestingly, Sadr rejected this fatwa, and, according to sources in Najaf and sheikhs in the Sadrist movement interviewed by al-Hayat, he would only accept
such a fatwa from Grand Ayatollah Sistani or Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Ishaq al-Fayad (who, like Sistani, opposes Khomeini's doctrine of velayat-e-faqih), since
he views both clergymen as voices for Iraq, not foreign powers.
This point tells against Nimrod Raphaeli's view that Sadr is simply "Iran's mouthpiece in Iraq." The cleric's ties to Iran notwithstanding, it is more accurate to describe
Sadr as a wildcard, whose primary concern is contesting for a position of leadership of the Shi'a political factions in Iraq. What stance Sadr will eventually take is
difficult to tell, as reports have already emerged of an upcoming meeting between Maliki and Sadr, as regards the political process.
Yet, more generally, the Sadrists are likely to end up backing Maliki, for not only are they too distant from Iraqiya to cement any sort of alliance to establish a
government, but the Premier has also granted positions to Sadrists in the Ministries of Housing and Planning, which has allowed the movement to expand its support
network.
As for the Kurds, it is clear that Barzani's stance against Maliki is not the consensus among the Kurdish parties. Talabani -- the President of Iraq and the leader of the
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) -- is firmly opposed to any withdrawal of support from Maliki, as Kurdish MP Mahmoud Othman recently confirmed.
This is partly rooted in the fact that Maliki has granted significant concessions to the Kurds, as noted above. On the other hand, it is also fair to say that many of the
outstanding issues between Baghdad and Arbil have yet to be dealt with, above all the question of Kirkuk's status, which Maliki's side has not yet shown any real
intention of resolving. This makes for a valid concern for those on the Kurdish side who are frustrated with Maliki.
In any case, the lack of unity among any opposition to Maliki means that there is unlikely to be an absolute majority no-confidence vote in the Council of
Representatives (the Iraqi parliament, with 163 votes required) now or even until the next elections in 2014.
Talabani is a key figure to keep in mind regarding any unseating of the Premier. Since he has now made it clear that he will not submit a request to the Council of
Representatives to withdraw confidence from the Prime Minister, it follows, as Reidar Visser has also noted, that the only option remaining for those who wish to get
rid of Maliki is to request for the Prime Minister to be summoned for an inquiry (see Article 61, Section 8 B2, of the Iraqi Constitution).
Only one-fifth of the Council of Representatives is required to submit a request, but the actual inquiry is a murkier area. Visser further draws attention to the fact that
the Iraqi Supreme Court recently ruled that an inquiry involving a government minister must pertain to a "specific criminal charge or constitutional infraction."
General charges along the lines of corruption, which is endemic in Iraq anyway, will probably get nowhere. The question of federalism -- raised last year after some
provincial councils in predominantly Sunni areas declared autonomy -- is also problematic: both sides -- the central government and the provincial councils -- had
little understanding of observing the Constitution.
In sum, Maliki's position as Premier will remain safe. The disputes discussed here are likely to persist for at least many months to come. In truth, therefore, the
attempts to initiate a no-confidence vote against Maliki are little more than a waste of time.
Instead of offering constructive criticism and trying to reach an accord with the Premier, numerous members of the opposition -- in particular Ayad Allawi and other
senior figures in Iraqiya -- have developed an obsession with attacking Maliki, which distracts from more serious problems such as corruption, over-dependence on
oil revenues, excessive bureaucracy, reasoned criticism of monopolization of power by the central government, and poor public services.
One would hardly be unjustified in concluding that Maliki has been better suited than Allawi for the role of Prime Minister all along.
LINKS TO RELATED TOPICS:
The Middle East & the Problem of Iraq
Page Two
Page One
The Problem of Rogue States:
Iraq as a Case History
American Foreign Policy -- The Middle East
Middle East -- Arabs, Arab States,
& Their Middle Eastern Neighbors
Islamism & Jihadism -- The Threat of Radical Islam
Page Three
Page Two
Page One
International Politics & World Disorder:
War, Peace, & Geopolitics in the Real World:
Foreign Affairs & U.S. National Security
Page Two
Page One
Islamist Terrorist Attacks on the U.S.A.
Osama bin Laden & the Islamist Declaration of War
Against the U.S.A. & Western Civilization
Islamist International Terrorism &
U.S. Intelligence Agencies
Counterterrorism & U.S. National Security
U.S. National Security Strategy
Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi is a student at Brasenose College, Oxford University, and an adjunct fellow at the Middle East Forum.
The foregoing article by Al-Tamimi was originally published in The American Spectator, June 19, 2012, and
can be found on the Internet website maintained by the Middle East Forum, a foreign policy think tank which seeks to
define and promote American interests in the Middle East, defining U.S. interests to include fighting radical Islam,
working for Palestinian Arab acceptance of the State of Israel, improving the management of U.S. efforts to promote
constitutional democracy in the Middle East, reducing America's energy dependence on the Middle East, more robustly
asserting U.S. interests vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia, and countering the Iranian threat.
(URL: http://www.meforum.org/3266/maliki-no-confidence)
Republished with Permission of the Middle East Forum
Reprinted from the Middle East Forum News
mefnews@meforum.org (MEF NEWS)
June 19, 2012
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Dr. Almon Leroy Way, Jr., Editor
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