THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATIVE, USA
An Online Journal of Political Commentary & Analysis
Volume VII, Issue # 7, January 12, 2005
Dr. Almon Leroy Way, Jr., Editor
Government Committed to & Acting in Accord with Conservative Principles
Ensures a Nation's Strength, Progress, & Prosperity
IRAQ, THE COMING ELECTION, &
THE INTERNAL SECURITY PROBLEM:
TIME TO LISTEN TO THE IRAQIS
By Michael Rubin
THE COMING IRAQI ELECTION TO CHOOSE POLITICAL LEADERS WITH SUFFICIENT LEGITIMACY & MORAL AUTHORITY TO ENSURE
IRAQ THE DEGREE OF POLITICAL STABILITY & INTERNAL SECURITY ESSENTIAL TO ESTABLISHMENT & SUCCESSFUL OPERATION
OF A CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT -- POLITICAL INSTABILITY & INTERNAL INSECURITY
EXACERBATED BY THE INABILITY OR UNWILLINGNESS OF AMERICAN & BRITISH PROFESSIONAL DIPLOMATS & INTELLIGENCE
OPERATIVES TO COMPLETELY REJECT & DISCARD THE OLD POLITICAL ORDER OF SADDAM HUSSEIN & THE BAATHISTS
FULL STORY:
Baghdad, Iraq — Half past ten in the morning on Monday, January 3, an Iraqi National Guard unit, escorted by a dozen uniformed U.S.
military, pulled up to Abdul Karim Muhammadawi's headquarters in the Hay al-Jamiah section of Baghdad. Muhammadawi, known to
the Iraqis as Abu Hatem, is renowned among Iraqi Shia as "the Robin Hood of the marshes." Hailing from al-Amarah, during Saddam
Hussein's rule, he led a persistent Shia resistance which harried local Baathist commanders and protected the political opposition. A
member of the now-defunct Governing Council, he has since joined the Iraqi National Alliance (al-Ittilaf al-Watani al-Iraqi), the
socalled united Shia list endorsed by Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani.
As the heavily armed Iraqi national guardsmen rushed toward Muhammadawi's house, his guard stopped the national-guard captain
commanding the small unit. "Don't you know Abu Hatem?" he asked. "Of course I know him," the captain responded, "He gave me a
hell of a time when I was an officer in the 4th Corps." The 4th Corps was the Iraqi unit sent by Saddam Hussein to liquidate the Shia
resistance in the southern marshlands. The Iraqi national guardsmen, who had no warrant, proceeded to ransack and vandalize Abu
Hatem's house before leaving. The violence wrought by former Baathists in American-provided uniforms was gratuitous.
Not all Iraqi national guardsmen are corrupt. Many fought in Fallujah and are committed to eradicating the Baathists and terrorists
who target them and their families. But some former regime elements spoil the reputation of the entire corps. The presence of
Americans in the Muhammadawi raid served only to drive a further wedge between Washington and the people who at first
welcomed their American liberators before occupation policy went awry.
Both Americans and Iraqis agree that lack of security is now Iraq's major problem, but they disagree about how to resolve the
situation. Many Iraqis complain about incomplete de-Baathification. In April 2004, in an effort to appease the nascent insurgency,
the Coalition Provisional Authority reversed de-Baathification. In Fallujah, they empowered a special brigade largely composed of
former Baathists; monthly car bombings throughout the country increased almost 800 percent upon the lifting of the siege and the
creation of the Fallujah Brigades.
Upon the advice of United Nations Special Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi, Coalition Provisional Authority administrator L. Paul Bremer
appointed Falah Hasan Naqib as Interior Minister in the interim Iraqi government. Falah was the son of the chief of staff of the
Iraqi army under Saddam and, according to several different Iraqis, a major Central Intelligence Agency asset. Less than a month
before elections, Naqib refuses to issue weapons permits to Shia politicians and their guards. Traveling without weapons is a
dangerous prospect, especially for those targeted for assassination.
Iraq's Shia feel slighted in other ways. While Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, himself a former Baathist, trumpets his Intelligence
Service as the key to security in the new Iraq, the sad fact is that only three percent of the personnel in the new Intelligence
Service is Shia. By comparison, during Saddam's rule, Shia composed five percent of the Intelligence Ministry. General
Muhammad Abdullah al-Shahwani, an ex-Baathist himself and a former CIA asset, has instructed that he personally must
approve the hiring of any Shia. Not only does such a policy antagonize the chief victims of Saddam's tyranny, but it also makes
for bad intelligence.
Political snubs also continue. John Negroponte, the United States Ambassador to Iraq, has refused to meet with Ahmad Chalabi.
Chalabi may not have survived the interagency battles in Washington, but he has excelled in the Iraqi political arena and has
emerged as a leading figure on Sistani's list of Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish candidates. Professional American diplomats and
intelligence analysts may approve the snub, but Iraqis say it strikes them as petulant and unprofessional.
Senior American diplomats and National Security Council staff may describe Allawi as Iraq's Hamid Karzai, but he has proven
himself anything but. Allawi promised security, but delivered corruption. He ingratiated himself to Bremer, former CIA chief
George Tenet, and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice by telling them what they wanted to hear, rather than telling
them what they needed to hear.
Every day, Iraqis feel the insecurity: While restaurants are open and commerce continues, Iraqis are tense. Iraqi police stop cars;
sometimes to check for insurgents and other times to assist them. Craters pock major Baghdad roads, the result of car bombings
and improvised explosive devices. American convoys threaten to shoot at any vehicle which comes within 100 yards, snarling
traffic as they drive through Baghdad at 30 miles per hour.
Working in Dushanbe at the close of the Tajikistan civil war, I learned to ignore gunfire, but take precautions when I heard return
fire. In the once posh Mansur district of Baghdad, not only can residents hear nightly gun battles, but also mortar fire and
occasional explosions as well. An Iraqi who recently escaped Mosul described seeing a boy no more than 15-years-old waving a
severed head in the main street as a warning that the Baathists were back.
Private security contractors contribute to the atmosphere of lawlessness. They have become infamous for threatening and firing
upon locals on the road. One private security contractor recently shot three rounds at a middle-aged Shia professional whom I had
met a year ago at the Khadimiya shrine, one of Shia Islam's holiest. He is now a director-general in one of Iraq's ministries. He does
not know why they fired, but considers himself lucky that the rounds which shattered his windshield missed him. The security
contractors did not stop, nor does he have anyone to whom to complain.
Anonymous American and British diplomats increasingly suggest that elections cannot be held in the deteriorating security
situation in Iraq, but it is the worsening atmosphere that is driving the Iraqi desire to vote. Iraqis look forward to the January 30
poll, the first free elections Iraq has seen in 50 years. Not only those in the Shia south, but also many Baghdadis talk about voting
169, the position of the Iraqi National Alliance on the ballot. Many others say they plan to vote for President Ghazi al-Yawar's list.
Most Kurds will support Masud Barzani and Jalal Talabani's Kurdish list. Few, if any, Iraqis say they will support Allawi.
Allawi has failed the Iraqis. Re-Baathification may win King Abdullah of Jordan's approval and Syrian President Bashar al-Asad's
consent, but the policy will not improve Iraq's security. Insurgents and terrorists may kill Iraqis lining up to vote. They may
assassinate winning candidates.
Only through voting, howver, can Iraqis choose their own government, one that will have the political legitimacy and moral
authority to undertake remedies forbidden by professional diplomats and intelligence operatives who have had trouble letting go
of the old political order of Saddam Hussein and the Baathists. It is time to listen to the Iraqis.
LINKS TO RELATED TOPICS:
The Middle East & the Problem of Iraq
Page Two
Page One
The Problem of Rogue States:
Iraq as a Case History
Michael Rubin, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, is editor of The Middle East Quarterly. He is
currently in Baghdad, outside the international zone.
The foregoing article by Michael Rubin was originally published in National Review Online, January 7, 2005, and can be found
on the Internet website maintained by the Middle East Forum.
Republished with Permission of the Middle East Forum
Reprinted from the Middle East Forum News
mefnews@meforum.org (MEF NEWS)
January 8, 2995
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