THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATIVE, USA
An Online Journal of Political Commentary & Analysis
Volume VII, Issue # 9, January 14, 2005
Dr. Almon Leroy Way, Jr., Editor
Government Committed to & Acting in Accord with Conservative Principles
Ensures a Nation's Strength, Progress, & Prosperity
AL-KUT, IRAQ -- AN AFTER-BATTLE REPORT:
THE FULL STORY
By David Stokes
PROBLEMS WITH THE WAR IN IRAQ: DYSFUNCTION BETWEEN REGIONAL OFFICERS OF THE COALITION PROVISIONAL
AUTHORITY & THE CPA HEADQUARTERS IN BAGHDAD, TENSION BETWEEN DIPLOMATS & SECURITY OFFICERS, & DIPLOMATS'
"TONING DOWN" REPORTS OF ISLAMIST ACTIVITY OUT OF EITHER NAIVETE OR A DESIRE TO BE "POLITICALLY CORRECT" WITH
REGARD TO MILITANT ISLAM -- IMPEDING IMPLEMENTATION OF EFFECTIVE DEFENSIVE MEASURES AGAINST THE INSURGENTS &
TERRORISTS & UNNECESSARILY ENDANGERING THE LIVES OF U.S. & ALLIED MILITARY PERSONNEL
EDITOR'S NOTE: In April, 2004, followers of the radical Iraqi Shi‘ite cleric, Muqtada al-Sadr, launched a well-coordinated uprising
across southern Iraq. While Western media focused on events in Sadr City, Najaf and Karbala, violence occurred elsewhere as well.
A Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) source forwarded the following after-action report regarding violence in the town of Al-Kut,
the capital of the Wassit governorate and home to the Ukrainian contingent.
The unclassified report, written by a Coalition security contractor, highlights dysfunction between regional Coalition offices and the
Coalition Provisional Authority headquarters in Baghdad, as well as tension between diplomats and security officers. The summary
faulted a British diplomat who had "toned down" reports of Islamist activity so as not to alarm superiors in Baghdad. From my own
personal observations while stationed in Baghdad, many U.S. diplomats committed the same offence out of either naiveté or a desire
to be politically correct with regard to militant Islam. The report gave a minute-by-minute update of the battle.
The summary is provided here. The editors obtained the document through officials not in the U.S. government. — Michael Rubin
TAKING STOCK
Incident: Possible attack against the CPA Compound
Date: April 5, 2004
Reported by: David Stokes, #293545, Site Supervisor, CPA, Al Kut, Iraq
Written by: David Stokes, #293545, Site Supervisor, CPA, Al Kut, Iraq
Report Date: April 7, 2004
ANALYSIS
This supplement report is designed to expound upon and bring to light several instances that occurred on or prior to April 6, 2004,
that led to or enhanced the threat which we faced at the CPA Compound in Al Kut, Iraq. I have broken this down by entity to cover
those factors which I believe to be important and relevant to the attack and the result thereof.
KBR:
KBR [Kellogg, Brown and Root, a subsidiary of Halliburton] had a role to play in some of the problems that arose during the attack
that occurred on April 5/6/7 at the CPA Compound in Al Kut, Iraq. Primarily, the biggest issue is that of procurement and logistics.
While not blaming any one individual, the fault lied more in the "beast of bureaucracy." Several specific examples come to mind.
Sandbags: On December 9, 2003, I requisitioned 3000 sandbags for use in hardening sites within the compound and installing
fighting/defensive positions around the perimeter. The sandbags were not delivered until March 7, 2004.
Scud-bunkers: On December 9, 2003, I ordered 8 scud-bunkers... I received three (3) of the 8 on March 10, 2004. As a result of
this incomplete order, several locations had no cover, and that was crucial when mortar rounds began falling into our compound
during the assault.
COMMUNICATIONS:
One of the biggest disasters during this ordeal was the lack of an integrated communications network for
the entire site. While each entity had its own commo gear, there was no tie-in with other entities. As a result, the POC
[point-of-contact] for each entity ended up carrying 3 or 4 different radios, a situation which was cumbersome to deal with in the heat
of battle. …
UKRANIAN ARMY:
The Ukrainian Army played a significant role in the outcome of the events over the period of the assault. Let it be noted up front that
the soldiers who were stationed at the CPA compound fought valiantly and tirelessly during the assault. They manned defensive
positions all along the compound and fought throughout the day and night.
One problem, however, was that they were never prepared to fight a ground offensive. Towards the end of the night on April 6, the
Ukrainians began to run low on ammunition. Additionally, they had no Night Vision equipment nor did they have any heavy weapons
which could be set up in defensive positions.
The Ukrainian command structure also caused some problems and nearly cost us our lives. The Ukrainian command would not
authorize the deployment of ordinance from fast movers, even as a show of force, due to the possibility of collateral damage.
TRIPLE CANOPY:
Triple Canopy [1] was the contract provider for security at the CPA compound. They stood up operations on March 15, 2004, with a
force of 69 local Iraqis hired predominantly from the town of Al Kut. When the firing began, most of the guard force abandoned their
positions and fled the compound. When reinforcements arrived from outside of Al Kut, they too fled their posts and left us in a
weakened defensive posture.
CPA:
Many of the problems that we faced at our compound were directly related to the Governorate Coordinator's decisions. The GC,
Marc Etherington, hampered and denied implementation of several defensive measures which would have greatly enhanced our
defensive posture. One specific example was the treatment of our southern flank (the river). No less than three security entities
(Triple Canopy, KBR, and Global Security) recommended the implementation of T-walls along the length of the southern flank. The
GC specifically denied that implementation, as it would have obstructed the view of the river from the office building. … The GC
compromised our security for an aesthetic view. He said, on numerous occasions, that there was no threat from the river.
During the assault, we took numerous RPG rounds from across the river. Additionally, we took heavy machine gun fire from that
direction as well.
The GC intentionally "toned down" reports of insurgent activity to his superiors in Baghdad. While every entity on post was
reporting numbers in the hundreds of insurgents, the GC was typically calling this a small clash with 50 or less angry teenagers, to
borrow his words. The enemy that we faced numbered between 250 and 300 and was a determined fighting force. At one point, the
GC specifically asked me to "tone down" my reports as well, as it was causing him to answer inquiries from Baghdad.
The GC attempted to control and to manipulate the flow of information ... At one point, he advised that he wanted all reports going
out to be cleared through another member of the CPA staff ... I am confident that he also had knowledge or forewarning of these
events through his contacts with local leaders. If so, then he failed to disseminate that information and thereby allowed the enemy
to maintain the element of surprise.
During the firefight, a request was made for fire to be drawn from the enemy so that the gunship could pinpoint the enemy locations
and take them out. As everyone prepared to fire, the GC told everyone not to do so, as it would break the terms of the "cease-fire"
that had been arranged. There was no cease-fire in place, as we had already taken rounds and continued to do so. As a result of his
decision, personnel were subjected to additional fire that could have possibly been eliminated …
The final straw in this saga was his insistence that we not abandon the compound. He attempted to order the convoy halted while
he pleaded with the General to reverse his decision. I am sure that he was under orders to hold as long as possible, but I feel those
orders would have not been given had the facts about the situation been truthfully told. He then attempted to have one of his PSD
[Personal Security Detail] block the convoy with their vehicle. The PSD disregarded that order and eventually told the GC to get in
the vehicle or he would be left behind. His delay jeopardized our security. We were already aware of enemy mortar positions being
erected on rooftops near our perimeter, and we were expecting incoming fire at any moment.
END NOTE:
[1] Website at http://www.triplecanopy.com/sec_services/sec_svcs_iraq.php. —Eds.
LINKS TO RELATED TOPICS:
The Middle East & the Problem of Iraq
Page Two
Page One
The Problem of Rogue States:
Iraq as a Case History
The foregoing after-action report by David Stokes, a Coalition Provisional Authority security contracor, was originally published in the
Middle East Quarterly, Fall, 2004, and can be found on the Internet website maintained by the
Middle East Forum.
Republished with Permission of the Middle East Forum
Reprinted from the Middle East Forum News
mefnews@meforum.org (MEF NEWS)
January 10, 2005
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