THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATIVE, USA
An Online Journal of Political Commentary & Analysis
Volume VII, Issue # 28, February 2, 2005
Dr. Almon Leroy Way, Jr., Editor
Government Committed to & Acting in Accord with Conservative Principles
Ensures a Nation's Strength, Progress, & Prosperity
BUSH MARCHES INTO A SECOND TERM,
HIS AGENDA SET BY MIDEAST FOES
By Michael Rubin
THE SECOND TERM OF PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH: A TERM DURING WHICH THE PRESIDENT WILL CONTINUE TO
PROMOTE FREEDOM, LIBERTY & CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THE RANK-&-FILE BUREAUCRATS IN
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY & THE U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT & EVEN MANY IN THE U.S. DEFENSE DEPARTMENT WILL
PERSIST IN THEIR HOSTILITY TO THE PRESIDENT'S MIDDLE EAST POLICIES, & THE ACTIONS OF ADVERSARIES, RATHER THAN
U.S. GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES, WILL REMAIN THE DOMINANT FACTOR IN SHAPING U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST
FULL STORY:
On January 20, 2005, George W. Bush took the Oath of Office and began his second term as President of the United States of America.
With 150,000 troops still in Iraq, Iran developing nuclear weapons and new leadership in the Palestinian Authority, the Middle East
will continue to dominate White House attention.
To what extent will President Bush's second term be different from his first? For better or worse, not much.
Pundits who keep a scorecard of second-term appointments forget three factors: First, this president remains firm in his views. When
he speaks about freedom, liberty and democracy, he is sincere. Second, the rank-and-file of not only the CIA, but also of the State
Department and even many in the Pentagon, are hostile to the President's Middle East policies.
During Bush's first term, the National Security Council failed to impose discipline either upon policy process or upon policy
execution. There is no indication that the second term will be any different. Hostile bureaucrats and lack of discipline lead to both
stonewalling — such as with Bush's democracy initiatives — and policy vacuums. Third and most importantly, the actions of
adversaries, rather than the initiatives of Washington, remain the dominant factor in shaping policy.
Iraq is a case in point. Months before the June 28, 2004, dissolution of the Coalition Provisional Authority, Ambassador L. Paul
Bremer's dictates had ceased to be relevant to most Iraqis. By day, Iraqi politicians might go through the motions of consultation
with American diplomats, but, at night, in smoky Baghdad parlors far from the Green Zone, the Iraqis would cement deals and stake
out positions. It was the Iraqi leaders who led the drive for sovereignty, dragging a petulant Bremer behind. While the Americans
— myself included — pushed for administrative federalism based upon Iraq's 18 governates, Kurdistan Democratic Party leader
Masud Barzani steadfastly filibustered and threatened until Washington relented.
With the Iraqis having elected their own government, policy initiatives subject to fierce debate in Washington will fall by the
wayside after Iraqis during the post-election periodt. Diplomats and intelligence officials still trumpet reconciliation for Baathists.
General David Petraeus embraced the reintegration of Baathists into key political and security positions. There are more than 900
senior Baathists in the Interior Ministry alone. Re-Baathification might have pleased Jordan and Saudi Arabia, but Iraqis are furious.
They correlate Washington's reconciliation policy with the growth of the insurgency. The U.S. State Department might force a
Sunni strategy but, with the close of Iraq's elections, Iraq will simply toss aside the proposal for such a strategy.
Regardless of the State Department trial balloons, there will be no quick withdrawal from Iraq. Iraq's neighbors all wanted the United
States to succeed militarily and fail politically. Their reasons vary: All but Iran fear consolidation of Shiite power. Turkey, Iran and
Saudi Arabia worry about a federalist precedent. Iran dreads both democracy and Shiite voices it cannot control emanating from
holy cities it does not possess. Both Tehran and Damascus see American withdrawal as an existential threat. Should there be any
significant American pullout, Bush would be freer to deploy them against Iran and Syria. Iraq's neighbors will, accordingly, lend
passive, if not active, support to the insurgents to maintain a low-level conflict in Iraq. American forces may redeploy outside the
cities, but they will be needed in Iraq for a long time to come.
With regard to Iran, the second Bush administration will replicate the mistakes of the first. The State Department will carry the day
with a renewed effort to engage, and the Islamic Republic will be just as willing to accede. Still more last chances allow Iran to run
down the clock toward nuclear capability, something which the clerical leadership considers key to maintaining power.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is disinclined to assist the Iranian people in their quest for freedom. Her opposition to both
Ukrainian independence and the Red Army's withdrawal from Eastern Europe is legendary. Scratch Rice, and Brent Scowcroft, the
former National Security Adviser who has served as Rice's mentor, oozes out. Given a choice, Rice favors stability over liberty.
Regardless, engagement will fail for the simple reason that the problems are more ideological than political. The Islamic Republic
predicates its existence on hatred of America and denial of Israel's right to exist. Iran's continuing support for Al-Qa'ida,
continued Revolutionary Guard consolidation of power, and hardliners set to triumph in Iran's June, 2005, presidential elections
all increase the likelihood that Iranian-backed terrorists will conduct an operation that would leave Bush little choice but to
respond. Recent American requests to station U-2 reconnaissance aircraft in Turkey should be a warning to Tehran.
Pundits have more hope with the Arab-Israeli conflict. The State Department is already leading the charge to restart
Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. Ultimately, they will fail.
While the Israeli government may want peace, the Palestinian leadership values the process more. If aid again fills Palestinian
coffers and Palestinian officials are again welcomed in the White House, why make peace? There is neither indication that states like
Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Iran will cease supporting Palestinian terrorism, nor signs that the new Palestinian leadership has the will to
abandon terrorism, especially since any final status agreement would mean accepting the reality that there would be no right of
Palestinian return to Israel.
Some scenarios, however, would be better than others. Perhaps, the worst option for the United States would be Prime Minister
Sharon's withdrawal from Gaza. Televised images of Hezbollah or Hamas flags flying over former Jewish settlements would
reinvigorate the insurgency in Iraq and justify terrorism for decades more.
Bush may be a visionary. Overcoming both bureaucratic resistance and defeatist foreign policy elites, he freed both Afghanistan
and Iraq of odious regimes. He retains moral clarity and remains committed to introducing democracy to the region. But the path
will remain rough and the process bumpy.
Most professional diplomats treat Bush with disdain; in Baghdad, they did not hesitate to make their personal views known to
foreign counterparts. Large-scale initiatives like the Middle East Partnership Initiative will likely fall flat, not because the program
lacks importance, but rather because there is insufficient desire among professional diplomats to see it succeed.
When the White House inserts political appointees into Foggy Bottom, career Foreign Service officers up to the assistant secretary
level simply channel information and decisions away from them. Bush's policies threaten not only the status quo on which
professional diplomats' careers have been built, but also the relationships with Arab elites upon which many cash in after retirement.
Dissidents like Fathi El-Jahmy remain in jail in Libya. Assistant Secretary of State William Burns has refused to predicate future
negotiations with Libyan strongman Muammar Gadhafi upon this dissident's release.
The rollercoaster ride will continue. Bush's second term might not bring Arab constitutional democracy, but it will not revert to
pre-September 11 realism either. Bush's second-term team may welcome engagement and the peace process, but the Bush
administration cannot escape the reality of the adversaries it faces, nor can it expect to make concessions to terrorism and blackmail
without engendering more. It will be a rough ride. There will be many obstacles — many thrown up by Bush's own team — but
there will be no turning back.
LINKS TO RELATED TOPICS:
American Government & the U.S. Presidency
The Middle East & the Problem of Iraq
Page Two
Page One
The Problem of Rogue States:
Iraq as a Case History
The Middle East & the Arabs
The Israeli-Arab Conflict
The Middle East & the Problem of Iran
Islamism & Jihadism -- The Threat of Radical Islam
Page Three
Page Two
Page One
War & Peace in the Real World
Page Two
Page One
Islamist Terrorist Attacks on the U.S.A.
Osama bin Laden & the Islamist Declaration of War
Against the U.S.A. & Western Civilization
Islamist International Terrorism &
U.S. Intelligence Agencies
U.S. National Security Strategy
Michael Rubin, a former political adviser to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, is a resident scholar at the American
Enterprise Institute and Editor of the Middle East Quarterly.
The foregoing article by Michael Rubin was originally published in The Forward. January 28, 2005, and can be found on the
Internet website maintained by the Middle East Forum.
Republished with Permission of the Middle East Forum
Reprinted from the Middle East Forum News
mefnews@meforum.org (MEF NEWS)
February 1, 2005
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