THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATIVE, USA
An Online Journal of Political Commentary & Analysis
Volume VIII, Issue # 140, July 28, 2006
Dr. Almon Leroy Way, Jr., Editor
Government Committed to & Acting in Accord with Conservative Principles
Ensures a Nation's Strength, Progress, & Prosperity
EMBRACING THE THREE-STATE SOLUTION IN IRAQ:
A BOOK REVIEW
By Dr. Michael Rubin
CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN IRAQ VIA DIVISION OF THE COUNTRY INTO THREE SEPARATE SOVEREIGN STATES -- A SUNNI STATE, A
SHIITE STATE, & A KURDISH STATE: LAYING OUT AN ARGUMENT FOR IRAQI PARTITION & KURDISH INDEPENDENCE
-- THE WEAK & FLAWED ANALYSIS OF PETER GALBRAITH
FULL STORY:
In his book, The End of Iraq: How American Incompetence Created a War Without End (Simon & Schuster, 260 pages,
$26), Peter Galbraith, former U.S. Ambassador to Croatia, writes:
"My purpose is to urge a course of action by which the United
States can extricate itself from the mess in Iraq. ... This strategy
should be based on U.S. interests and reflect the reality that
Iraq has broken up in all but name."
The goal of Mr. Galbraith's book is to lay out an argument for Iraqi partition and Kurdish independence. After setting the scene
by describing the violence in today's Iraq, he reminisces about his own past experiences in the country. Mr. Galbraith first
visited Baghdad in 1984 as a congressional staffer on a fact-finding mission and returned four years later to chronicle reports
of Saddam Hussein's use of chemical weapons against Kurdish civilians. He and other human rights activists were appalled by
their findings, but Washington realists saw Saddam's Iraq as a buffer against Iranian expansion. Diplomats and officials voiced
outrage at the atrocities, but did little. Had the Ronald W. Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations not appeased
Saddam, Mr. Galbraith argues, the Iraqi leader might never have concluded he could invade Kuwait with impunity.
Mr. Galbraith returned to Iraqi Kurdistan after the 1991 uprising. With a bit of exaggeration and a heaping of melodrama, he
recounts his role in arranging for the U.S. Congress to take custody of captured Iraqi documents. Here, he misses an
opportunity to broaden his narrative and contribute positively to the contemporary debate by failing to ask why the U.S.
government has not made available the millions of documents captured when Saddam fell.
Mr. Galbraith's narrative degenerates into sloppy polemic rather than thoughtful critique as he turns to President George W.
Bush. While he lambastes previous administrations -- President Clinton's excepted -- for doing nothing to constrain Saddam,
he takes President Bush to task for liberating Iraq. He repeats conspiracy theories regarding the role of the Office of Special
Plans, a cabal of Neoconservatives, and the handling of pre-war intelligence peddled on Web sites such as that of a
University of Michigan professor, Juan Cole -- whose analysis he credits -- but which have no basis in reality; indeed, some
originate with Lyndon LaRouche. Elsewhere, he provides unsourced narrative to describe, often inaccurately, decisions and
debates relating to the nature of postwar administration in Iraq and the role of the Shiites and Kurds, matters in which he
played no part. He is unaware of the roles played by key officials in policy debates and makes only passing reference to the
U.S. State Department North Gulf Affairs Chief, Ryan Crocker; he makes no mention of National Security Council official,
Elliott Abrams, or the then Deputy National Security Adviser, Stephen Hadley, who attended or chaired planning sessions.
Like David L. Phillips's Losing Iraq: Inside the Postwar Reconstruction Fiasco (Westview Press, 256 Pages, $25), Mr.
Galbraith's narrative is laden with private agendas and petty animosities. He laments that the United Nations did not have a
larger role in Iraq's reconstruction, but ignores the distrust of even his Kurdish interlocutors for Turtle Bay. Like Mr. Phillips,
Mr. Galbraith regurgitates narrative from already published accounts and, while he could credit them more generously, he at
least does not plagiarize.
Where Mr. Galbraith is accurate, he is uneven. He downplays Kurdish divisions and unpleasant aspects of Kurdish history,
such as the Kurdish leader Masud Barzani's collaboration with Saddam, which extended to the days before liberation. While
he lionizes Mr. Barzani, his description of Shiite politics is superficial and his dislike of the Shiite community palpable. He
relates Kurdish suffering in the 1980s and early 1990s in elaborate detail, implying that it entitle the Kurds to independence,
but he only mentions Saddam's comparable atrocities against the Shiite population in passing. Most distressing, Mr.
Galbraith never mentions his affiliation with the Kurdistan Regional Government, an affiliation official Kurdistan Regional
Government Websites make clear (see, for example, http://www.theotheriraq.com/bio_peter.html). Kurdish officials confirm
his service as a paid adviser.
The core of Mr. Galbraith's argument, enshrined in a short chapter, "The Three State Solution," is weak. He parrots Kurdish
interlocutors and makes little effort to address how Sunni and Shiite Arab rump states might behave and interact. Would
division bring stability or simply allow Iran and Saudi Arabia to exert their influence more easily over divided and weaker
successors? Iraqi Kurdistan is perhaps the best organized of Iraq's regions, but its unification and stability are more
symbolic than actual. A joint parliament is irrelevant, if devoid of power. Cabinet unity is cosmetic: Both parties simply
duplicated important portfolios. While most unified states might have a single minister of the interior, the new unified
Kurdish government boasts both a minister of the interior and a minister of state for interior affairs. Nor is Iraq so easily
divided. It may have formed from the combination of three Ottoman provinces, but there has been much intermixing over
the past eight decades. Could Iraqis divide such mixed cities as Baghdad, Mosul, Kirkuk, and Baquba without bringing
about the bloodbath Mr. Galbraith says he aims to avoid? His analysis of possible Turkish and Iranian reactions is likewise
simplistic. Mr. Galbraith's contacts in Turkey are limited and often self-selected. True, many in Turkey have come to accept
Iraqi Kurdish autonomy, but such tolerance may evaporate the longer Mr. Barzani provides a safe-haven and sells supplies
to Kurdish Workers Party terrorists attacking Turkey. Iraqi Kurdish academics and officials detect Iranian opposition to
broader Kurdish federalism behind the recent wave of anti-Kurdish violence in Kirkuk.
The End of Iraq will disappoint and annoy. Melodrama and ego permeate; so too does irony. After visiting Saddam's
war memorial, Mr. Galbraith writes, "I wondered about a leader whose idea of a war memorial involved 144 pictures of himself."
True, Mr Galbraith includes only seven pictures of himself, but readers may wonder about an author who mentions himself on
88 pages. Mr. Galbraith's book may not achieve what he sets out to do -- provide a cogent argument for the division of Iraq --
but Mr. Galbraith makes one remarkable accomplishment: He manages to make both former Coalition Provisional Authority
Administrator, L. Paul Bremer, and former U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, look modest.
LINKS TO RELATED TOPICS:
The Middle East & the Problem of Iraq
Page Two
Page One
The Problem of Rogue States:
Iraq as a Case History
National Strategy for Victory in Iraq
Dr. Michael Rubin, a Ph.D. in History (Yale University) and a specialist in Middle Eastern politics, Islamic culture and Islamist
ideology, is Editor of the Middle East Quarterly and a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy Research. Dr Rubin is author of Into the Shadows: Radical Vigilantes in Khatami's Iran (Washington Institute
for Near East Policy, 2001) and is co-author, with Dr. Patrick Clawson, of Eternal Iran: Continuity and Chaos (Palgrave
Macmillan, 2005). Dr. Rubin served as political advisor to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad (2003-2004); staff
advisor on Iran and Iraq in the Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense (2002-2004); visiting lecturer in the Departments of
History and International Relations at Hebrew University of Jerusalem (2001-2002); visiting lecturer at the Universities of
Sulaymani, Salahuddin, and Duhok in Iraqi Kurdistan (2000-2001); Soref Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East
Policy (1999-2000); and visiting lecturer in the Department of History at Yale University (1999-2000). He has been a fellow at
the Council of Foreign Relations, the Leonard Davis Institute at Hebrew University, and the Carnegie Council on Ethics and
International Affairs.
The foregoing book review by Dr. Michael Rubin was originally published in the New York Sun, July 17, 2006, and can
be found on the Internet website maintained by the Middle East Forum.
Republished with Permission of the Middle East Forum
Reprinted from the Middle East Forum News
mefnews@meforum.org (MEF NEWS)
July 28, 2006
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