THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATIVE, USA
An Online Journal of Political Commentary & Analysis
Volume VIII, Issue # 233, December 4, 2006
Dr. Almon Leroy Way, Jr., Editor
Government Committed to & Acting in Accord with Conservative Principles
Ensures a Nation's Strength, Progress, & Prosperity
WHAT WENT WRONG? A SOBER LOOK AT IRAQ
By Dr. Michael Rubin
THE CURRENT SITUATION IN IRAQ -- REASONS: WATERSHED DECISIONS & THEIR OUTCOMES -- FUNDAMENTAL
ALTERATION OF U.S. POLICY IN IRAQ & OF DEBATE OVER THAT POLICY -- PREWAR MILITARY & POLITICAL PLANNING --
POST-LIBERATION DECISION-MAKING -- THE BAKER-HAMILTON COMMISSION & ITS EXPECTED RECOMMENDATIONS --
MISTAKES IN ANALYSIS -- LOOKING BACK & MOVING FORWARD
FULL STORY:
According to the New York Times, the Baker-Hamilton Commission will call for a drawdown of U.S. military presence
in Iraq, albeit without a timeline. The proposition is lose-lose. The logic that an imminent withdrawal of troops will force the
Iraqi government to be more responsible is nonsense; Iraqis will side with strength; they will interpret withdrawal, promised
or actual, as weakness. Nor does creating a vacuum provide a solution to a security problem. If U.S. President George W.
Bush accepts the report, it will confirm U.S. defeat in Iraq. Inside-the-Beltway spin and diplomatic word parsing are irrelevant.
What matters is street perception, and, even if the American President does not accept the report, its very presence will
embolden Iraqi insurgents and militias. Any doubter need only listen to the recent rhetoric of Iranian President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad.
WHAT WENT WRONG?
As Iraq goes sour, assigning blame has become a Washington past time. It should be welcome. To learn lessons from mistakes,
is to avoid their repetition. While no one in Washington seeks another military conflict, the Baker-Hamilton recommendations
bolster adversaries' overconfidence. Miscalculations in Tehran, Damascus, or Pyongyang could force the U.S. military into
another conflict.
The situation in Iraq need not have been so bad. There have been several watershed decisions, the outcomes of which have
fundamentally altered policy and debate.
There will be plenty of blame to go around. Policymaking is organic. No memo rises through a department or agency without a
dozen officials approving. Sometimes, their edits change happy-to-glad; there was a quip in the Pentagon about one official
who would edit a stop sign if he had the opportunity. More often, alterations would reflect debates, compromises, and
insertions by those at a higher level who had information or directives about which more juniors staffers were unaware. Such
a bureaucracy is why so many Foreign Service officers dislike their Washington postings and why Pentagon officers and
Langley's analysts grow frustrated.
Policy proposals from different buildings get hashed out at interagency working groups, coordination committees, and
meetings. Principles decide big issues at the National Security Council. Sometimes, bureaucracies would win debates, and,
sometimes, they would lose. While many critics of Iraq policy bestow blame, they often practice anachronism, removing
policy arguments from context and failing to recognize how nodal decisions outside any single individual's control changed
situations.
In the real world, though, when a decision is made, policymakers at all levels have no choice but to accept it and fight the
next battle with an eye toward pushing subsequent policy choices to the best possible outcome, unless, of course, they
wish to reverse decisions or sway debate by leak. The indices of Bob Woodward's books are a pretty good compilation of
these A-list leakers. While bloggers and armchair quarterbacks can ignore trails of decisions and their aftermath,
policymakers do not have such luxury.
PREWAR PLANNING
Prewar military and political planning was poor. Emphasis on prewar diplomacy delayed military and political preparation.
In a diplomatic world where image trumps reality, senior officials felt substantive military and political planning could
undercut diplomatic optics.
Planning which did occur had insufficient coordination. Had working-level officials all operated under the same roof,
coordination, which took weeks, could take days. Personality matters. Proximity can ameliorate otherwise festering
interpersonal suspicions and bureaucratic rivalry.
The Future of Iraq Project was valuable as an idea forum in which all relevant offices within government participated,
although it did not produce action plans.
There was also reliance upon bad advice. Many retired diplomats like Baker-Hamilton report drafter Edward Djerejian
and a host of officials across the U.S. government felt that Iraq could be rehabilitated in 60-90 days. While some papers
subsequently leaked contradict this claim, often such documents contained mutually contradictory statements, as
bureaucrats avoided risk.
Implementation also undercut planning. It is all well and good to have Phase III and Phase IV plans, but, if no official
makes the call as to when one phase ends and the other begins, confusion reigns, and chaos and looting fills the
vacuum.
What were the nodal decisions that changed the course of Iraq's postwar development? First was the decision to occupy
the country. In December, 2002, I argued for Iraq's liberation and suggested Iraqis would welcome us (they did), unless
we became overbearing (we did) and stayed too long (once committed, we have no better choice short of completion).
Incumbent in this decision was delayed restoration of Iraqi sovereignty. There was an active debate at the time about
whether Washington would have more leverage over Iraqi politicians if there was an established political decision before
liberation, or whether boots on the ground would augment leverage. In the end, the U.S. State Department and some
officials in the National Security Council triumphed. Subsequent events show they were wrong. Their mistake created a
new reality. What would the Iraqi government have looked like, if the Pentagon had won that debate? It will take
declassification of Pentagon and National Security Council documents to show, but, suffice to say, the canard of
handing Iraq over to Ahmad Chalabi was not among them. That myth was the result of three factors -- (1) intelligence
officers ten years into retirement seeking limelight by claiming falsely to have current information, (2) bureaucratic
warfare, and (3) the imaginative mind of some journalists and bloggers.
Another nodal decision involved federalism. Before Iraq's liberation, it was clear that federalism would be a priority for
Iraqis. Here, U.S. policymakers lost an important opportunity to exert influence. While the Iraqis should have determined
the final shape of their government within clear parameters, Washington could have better influenced the process by
creating the right template. For example, when compiling Iraq's fiscal year 2004 budget, the Coalition Provisional
Authority could have chosen between determining the budget in coordination with the governing council, or fixing the
budget by compiling requests from municipalities and districts through the governorate to the central government to
adjudicate, negotiate, and then decide. The former was quicker, but the latter would establish a process which could
institute administrative, rather than ethnic or sectarian, federalism. For the sake of easing the Madrid Donors'
Conference, the Coalition Provisional Authority's chief of staff decided to go by the former route.
Another error was to miscatagorize Iraqis. The Coalition did this in two ways. Some diplomats and officials became
obsessed by the dichotomy between "externals" those Iraqis who had fled into exile or lived in Iraqi Kurdistan,
outside Baghdad's control and "internals," those who remained and, presumably, had greater legitimacy. Others
myself included paid too much heed to balancing ethnic and sectarian representation.
The external-internal split turned out to be a canard. One-in-six Iraqis fled under Saddam Hussein. But, many retained
family ties. There was not a division akin to China and Taiwan. Before the war, it was clear that exiles the Iraqi
National Congress coalition, including the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), the Iraq National
Accord, the Constitutional Monarchy Movement, and the two main Kurdish parties would play key roles. They have,
with the exception of the Constitutional Monarchy Movement. Had U.S. policymakers maintained a consistent template,
rather than changing the rules whenever exiles emerged as leaders, constitutional democrats would have had more
opportunity to develop strategy. There also would have been less animosity toward American diplomats and
policymakers.
While Sharif Ali bungled his political ambitions from the start, there remains in Iraq nostalgia for the past. Recently, some
commentators have written about Saddam revisionism and re-Baathification, which, ironically, have more traction among
U.S. Liberal Leftists and antiwar activists than they do among Iraqis. Among an older generation, there is also nostalgia
for some prominent military leaders from the Republican period, and also for the Hashemite monarchy. Even today,
former military officers, tribal leaders across the sectarian divide, and al-Anbar notables suggest that, more than the Iraqi
central government or the regional governments, prominent Hashemite figures not involved in the Jordanian government
would be welcome mediators and interlocutors.
What other policy decisions had significant impact on Iraq's development? Again, the prewar debate about whether to
train a free Iraqi officer corps is, in retrospect, very important. The decision to train in advance a multi-ethnic,
multi-sectarian fighting force not affiliated with any political party was slowed by (1) a desire to emphasize diplomacy, (2)
questions as to how best to marshal resources, (3) vetting, and (4) interagency filibusters. Delayed by months, the conflict
began before the bulk of volunteers could be cleared through a cumbersome vetting process. And so, the opportunity to
both liberate and provide security fell by the wayside
POST-LIBERATION DECISION-MAKING
Journalists and many commentators overemphasize the decision to disband the Iraqi military. The Iraqi Army, while an
honored institution, had dissolved; there was no way to force conscripts to return. Many senior officers were guilty of
human rights abuses that made the U.S. scandal at Abu Ghraib pale in comparison. Mid-level officers became the bulk of
the reconstituted army. A far better subject of criticism was the failure to continue military pensions in an orderly fashion.
There has been little questioning of who was responsible for the pension decision.
The debate over de-Baathification and re-Baathification is more important. Some commentators, and, perhaps, officials
with long service in Baathist societies, belittle the human rights violations of the Baath Party. Feeling sympathies to their
previous interlocutors, they do not understand the hatred that ordinary Iraqis have for Baathism. Still, in an effort to
appear tolerant or perhaps offer political concessions to those uninterested in compromise, Coalition Provisional
Authority Administrator L. Paul Bremer reversed de-Baathification. Violence has grown proportional to re-Baathification.
All discussion of a Sunni strategy likewise backfired. Not only did it play into Shiite fears and Iranian propaganda, but it
undercut the notion of a unified Iraq.
Sometimes, the devil is in the details. There was much discussion of how to organize elections. I had already left
government by that point in time, but I pushed hard for geographic constituency elections, rather than party slates, much
to the annoyance of friends still in Baghdad. Some experts sought to reinforce the pro-party slate proposal with political
dispersions and straw-man arguments having nothing to do with Iraq. It is too bad that Iraqis so often became a template
to fight battles unrelated to Baghdad. While the debate became moot when policymakers made their decision, in retrospect,
this was a nodal point. Political systems characterized by absence of accountability encourage both radicalism and
corruption.
Other questions remain unanswered. Should the Coalition have shot looters? How could Abu Ghraib have been avoided?
Why did Tehran get their media outlets up so much quicker than did Washington? Such unresolved, unanswered
questions are worth considering now, before such issues ever again need to be actionalized. Also deserving of study is
an understanding, not of how journalists covered Iraq, but rather of how Iraqis reacted to the press coverage and how
they interpreted external political debates.
WILL BAKER-HAMILTON REPEAT MISTAKES?
One mistake which had immense impact on Iraq was misguided faith in diplomacy. Many present and former diplomats
counseled engaging Syria and Iran. Neither Damascus nor Tehran kept their promises. Outside the Green Zone walls, it was
obvious that Tehran and its proxies meant the U.S. harm. The British soft approach and U.S. navel-gazing gave Iran space
to replicate a Hezbollah model to build militias and undermine government. Steven Vincent's murder after exposing death
squads in Basra should have been a wake-up call. Instead, commentators who had never been to Iraq sought to justify his
murder.
Another issue involves the militias in general and firebrand cleric Muqtada al-Sadr in particular. Muqtada was not always
so powerful; his organization established roots and grew over time, often with the benefit of outside funding. Muqtada's
rise is symbolic of another mistake. Rather than tackle problems head-on, U.S. officials wished them away. Problems
metathesized. Investigative journalists have yet to uncover the debate surrounding questions of what to do about
Muqtada in April, 2003.
PERSONAL MISTAKES
An auto-da-fe is developing that demands mea culpas. While some conspiracy theorists believe that socalled "Neocons"
have had immense power and influence, the idea that three or four people within the U.S. government to a man, excluded
from decision-making and decision-implementation could control hundreds of others is absurd. Still, everyone played a
role in Iraq. As is the case in government service, individual jobs were less than glorious, even if they were satisfying.
I was a reporting officer, rather than an action officer. Decisions were taken by those living in the Green Zone, and the eight
or nine people surrounding Bremer who are apparent from the index of his memoirs. Nevertheless, like all involved, I made
mistakes of analysis along the way. Also, I should have given more credence to tribalism, although this revived with time
and insecurity. While my private reports focused alarm at the spread of the militias, I wish I had emphasized the problem far
earlier in my public writings once I left government.
As an outside analyst, I botched predictions on the last election. I thought Ahmad Chalabi could get five percent; but
officially, he did not win a seat. In reality, I suspect he got one or two percent, although he was sidelined after both he and
Ayad Allawi lost a number of ballots spoiled by having their ballots spoiled by dual votes on the same ballot paper for the
United Iraqi Alliance, apparently after the vote was cast. Can Chalabi make a comeback? Perhaps. Perhaps not. But he
certainly has the connections and expertise to remain relevant in one capacity or another. His potential remains as a
coalition builder. That he has become a lightening rod in Washington is irrelevant.
I was also wrong about Mithal al-Alusi, but pleasantly surprised to see, him do well. More seriously, I regret not
recognizing Hazen al-Shaalan's corruption earlier. Nevertheless, should there be declassifications of documents, I'll have
no reason to hide my face. Indeed, the one issue which should unify supporters of the war and their critics is the demand
that the U.S. government declassify all U.S. documents relating to policy and planning immediately, and release the
material seized from Saddam. The latter may contain embarrassing material, such as the names of those, not only in Europe
and in Arab media, but also in the United States, who accepted gratuities from Saddam's government. Avoiding
embarrassment is not a legitimate reason to withhold documents.
LOOKING BACK & MOVING FORWARD
Despite all the problems, do I still stand by the decision to liberate Iraq? Yes. Like U.S. diplomats and military servicemen
who have spent time in Iraq during the post-liberation period, I have met too many Iraqis and seen too much good to
regret my decision. Do I believe we need to press on? Yes. Do I believe U.S. foreign policy should look toward the
longterm and push for constitutional democracy? Yes.
Many commentators focus only on mistakes. Every mistake permanently altered the path of history and the outcome
possible to achieve. But, as bad as is the current situation, there might still be strategies to maximize results, improve
political stability, augment the strength of constitutional democracy, and gain the best possible outcome for U.S. national
security. Among possible prescriptions would be improving police training and oversight and, if need be, the dissolution
and reconstitution of the police force.
Reviving the Commanders Emergency Relief Program model of aid is also worth consideration. Think Provincial
Reconstruction Teams-on-Wheels. Failure to improve ordinary lives undercuts security. In a wartime situation,
Washington cannot afford to have USAID take six months to allocate a paper clip, six weeks to study its use, and then
six days to discuss new paper-clip applications at a conference at a luxury hotel in Amman. Perhaps, if the Baker-Hamilton
Commissioners had embedded with U.S. military units across Iraq, the Co-Chairmen's predetermined recommendations
could be checked by ground truth. They could have balanced filtered presentations from senior officials with raw
recommendations from privates, lieutenants, captains, and majors in units across the country. They also might learn from
the junior Foreign Service officers who often have excellent ideas which they are unable to push through a cautious and
risk-adverse hierarchy.
Entrusting U.S. national security to a Syrian regime that murders Lebanese politicians and journalists and to an Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps that supports militias is foolish. There is no evidence to support the assumption that Iran and
Syria want a stable Iraq. Rather, all their actions show a desire to stymie the United States and destabilize their neighbor.
More dangerous still than even this, though, is the naοve assumption that making concessions to terrorism or forcing
others to do so brings peace rather than war.
LINKS TO RELATED TOPICS:
The Middle East & the Problem of Iraq
Page Two
Page One
The Problem of Rogue States:
Iraq as a Case History
National Strategy for Victory in Iraq
Middle East -- Arabs, Arab States,
& Their Middle Eastern Neighbors
Islamism & Jihadism -- The Threat of Radical Islam
Page Three
Page Two
Page One
International Politics & World Disorder:
War & Peace in the Real World
Page Two
Page One
Islamist Terrorist Attacks on the U.S.A.
Osama bin Laden & the Islamist Declaration of War
Against the U.S.A. & Western Civilization
Islamist International Terrorism &
U.S. Intelligence Agencies
Counterterrorism & U.S. National Security
U.S. National Security Strategy
Dr. Michael Rubin, a Ph.D. in History (Yale University) and a specialist in Middle Eastern politics, Islamic culture and Islamist
ideology, is Editor of the Middle East Quarterly and a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy Research. Dr Rubin is author of Into the Shadows: Radical Vigilantes in Khatami's Iran (Washington Institute
for Near East Policy, 2001) and is co-author, with Dr. Patrick Clawson, of Eternal Iran: Continuity and Chaos (Palgrave
Macmillan, 2005). Dr. Rubin served as political advisor to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad (2003-2004); staff
advisor on Iran and Iraq in the Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense (2002-2004); visiting lecturer in the Departments of
History and International Relations at Hebrew University of Jerusalem (2001-2002); visiting lecturer at the Universities of
Sulaymani, Salahuddin, and Duhok in Iraqi Kurdistan (2000-2001); Soref Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East
Policy (1999-2000); and visiting lecturer in the Department of History at Yale University (1999-2000). He has been a fellow at
the Council of Foreign Relations, the Leonard Davis Institute at Hebrew University, and the Carnegie Council on Ethics and
International Affairs.
The foregoing article by Dr. Rubin was originally published in National Review Online , December 4, 2006, and can
be found on the Internet website maintained by the Middle East Forum.
Republished with Permission of the Middle East Forum
Reprinted from the Middle East Forum News
mefnews@meforum.org (MEF NEWS)
December 4, 2006
Return to Top of Page
Go to the WEBSITE INDEX
Return to Beginning of
THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATIVE, USA,
Public Issues & Political Controversies
Return to Beginning of
THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATIVE, USA
Most Recent Articles
Return to Beginning of
THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATIVE, USA,
Volume VIII, 2006
Return to Beginning of
THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATIVE, USA,
Subject Matter Highlights
Return to POLITICAL EDUCATION Homepage
CONTACT & ACCESS INFORMATION
This is not a commercial website. The sole purpose of the website is to share with interested persons information regarding civics,
civic and social education, political science, government, politics, law, constitutional law and history, public policy, and political
philosophy and history, as well as current and recent political developments, public issues, and political controversies.
POLITICAL EDUCATION, CONSERVATIVE ANALYSIS
POLITICS, SOCIETY, & THE SOVEREIGN STATE
Website of Dr. Almon Leroy Way, Jr.
Government, Politics, Public Policy, Legal Issues, Constitutional Law, Government & the Economy, Cultural Values, Foreign Affairs,
International Relations, Military Defense & National Security, Geopolitics, Terrorism & Homeland Security, American National Interests,
Political Systems & Processes, Political Institutions, Political Ideologies, & Political Philosophy
INDEX FOR THE ENTIRE WEBSITE
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M
N
O
P
Q
R
S
T
U
V
W
X
Y
Z
THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATIVE, USA
An Online Journal of Political Commentary & Analysis
Dr. Almon Leroy Way, Jr., Editor
Conservative & Free-Market Analysis of Government, Politics & Public Policy, Covering Political, Legal, Constitutional, Economic,
Cultural, Military, International, Strategic, & Geopolitical Issues